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Summary 
The Banco de Moçambique (Bank) was established in May 17, 1975. The 1920 
Brussels Conference recommended that in countries without a central bank, it should 
be created. The ‘Bank’ followed the new model of emerging countries’ central banks 
(mid-1950s), where those central banks regulated and controlled an existing financial 
system and promoted the emergence of a money and capital market. 
From 1975 the Bank performed commercial functions until 1992, when the functions 
of commercial banking and central banking were separated. Mozambique tried to 
establish a socialist society. The prevailing financial system, primarily consisting of of 
expatriate banks, was reorganised under the state bank. This was a restructuring 
and integration process. In 1980 the Metical, the new currency of Mozambique, was 
introduced. 
In the 1980s weakening economic conditions in Mozambique mandated the 
reconsideration of post-independence economic policies. In 1984 Mozambique 
accepted assistance from the Bretton Woods institutions and from 1987 the country 
embraced the Economic Rehabilitation Program. The Bank embarked on monetary, 
credit, supervisory and regulatory policies reforms, to consolidate conventional 
central bank functions.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
  
”In countries where there is no central bank of issue, one should 
be established…” 1920, Brussels, International Finance 
Conference. 1Being close to the National Independence date and 
the ongoing process of decolonization, the creation of a central 
and issuing bank that performs, besides others, the functions of a 
commercial bank became necessary in Mozambique. 2 
Mozambique is a Southern African coastal country that became independent in 1975 
after 500 years of Portuguese colonial domination. During the colonial era, central 
bank activities such as the co-ordination of banking activities in the colony currency 
issuing and control, exercising monetary authority, management of reserves, acting 
as state banker, among other functions, were performed by the Banco Nacional 
Ultramarino (BNU). 
With the advent of independence as well as political, economic and historical 
changes in Portugal in the 1960s and 1970s, the BNU had to cease its activities and 
leave Mozambique. Its departure meant that the new authorities, namely the 
Mozambican freedom fighters’ organization, the Frente de Libertação de 
Moçambique (FRELIMO) had to establish a central bank for the new country. This 
was the Banco de Moçambique (Bank). 
The focus of this study is the Banco de Moçambique and it will focus on the creation, 
functions, evolution and the level of performance of the central bank activities in the 
period 1975-2010. This study aims to examine and understand the operations and 
opportunities available to this institution in Mozambique by taking into account the 
following generally accepted main functions of a central bank: 
 The central bank as the government's banker; 
 The central bank’s oversight of the national financial system; 
 The central bank as the manager of the money supply; and 
 The central bank’s role in ensuring price stability. 
It is important to understand the phenomenon of a central bank established in a 
developing country recently liberated from colonial rule. This research will focus on 
the following theoretical questions: 
                                                          
1Anand Chandavarkar, Central Banking in Developing Countries, (London: Macmillan, 1996), 12. 
 
2 Preamble of the Decree-Law 2/75, May 17, 1975. 
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- What is a central bank, particularly in an African context? 
- What are the main functions of a central bank? 
Explaining the origin of the Banco de Moçambique enables one to analyse theories 
about central banking in the context of a newly independent African state. Research 
by Capie and De Kock3 shows that originally central banks were either commercial 
banks or government banks. Their evolution into central banks came about when 
they were awarded the monopoly of issuing banknotes and as they developed more 
central bank related functions such as that of lender of last resort. 
In Mozambique the central bank was a successor to the Banco Nacional 
Ultramarino. This bank was founded in Portugal in 1864 with private capital. Being a 
quasi-public institution backed by the State, the bank was vested with powers to 
develop the business of banking in the colonies. The Banco Nacional Ultramarino’s 
main functions were: issuing currencies for the colonies, coordinating banking 
operations and supervising the activities of the branches of Portuguese banks that 
were operating in Mozambique. The bank supported Portugal’s status as a colonial 
power, and ensured the transfer of colonial capital and currency to the metropolis.4 
The Portuguese government had granted the BNU the sole right to issue the colonial 
currency in return for its financial support in developing the colonies. This research 
aims to be a modest contribution to the history of banking in Mozambique. 
Systematic historical research on this subject is limited. This may be because of the 
confidential nature of banking operations per se. 
 
1.2 Historiography 
This subject was referred to in the 1995 BA History dissertation at the Eduardo 
Mondlane University, “A Actividade do Banco Nacional Ultramarino em 
Moçambique- da fundação a saída de Moçambique – 1864/1974”, (1995).5 This 
                                                          
3 Forest Capie, "The Evolution of General Banking" (paper presented at a World Bank Seminar, 
Financial History: Lessons of the Past, for Reformers of the Present, Washington, November, 1995. 
M.H. de Kock, Central Banking, 4th ed. (London: Crosby Lockwood Staples, 1974), 1.  
 
4 Carmélia Langa, ʺA Actividade do Banco Nacional Ultramarino em Moçambique: Da Fundação à 
Saída em Moçambique (1864-1974),ʺ (Unpublished BA Dissertation, Universidade Eduardo 
Mondlane, 1995). 
 
5 Langa, ʺA Actividade do Banco Nacional Ultramarinoʺ  
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study evaluated the history of the financial system in the period before 
independence, when the BNU acted as the central bank for the colonies. The BNU 
also played a leading role in the development of colonial resources. 
There are two other sources on the same subject. These are Napoleão Gaspar; A 
Evolução do Sistema Bancário em Moçambique, 1975-1992 (2000)6 and Nelson 
Jossias; Evolução Histórica do Banco de Moçambique - 1975 à actualidade (2005)7. 
Both analyse the history of the Mozambican financial system for two decades from 
independence to 2010. However, they do not deal to any great extent with central 
bank activity or how it evolved. 
Valuable contributions to Mozambique’s business history have been made by 
economists such as M. Wuyts, who wrote; Money and Planning for Socialist 
Transition: the Mozambican Experience, (1989)8 and Organização das Finanças e o 
Desenvolvimento Económico em Moçambique: do Sistema Capitalista Colonial ao 
Desenvolvimento Socialista.9 Wuyts addresses the changes in the Mozambican 
financial system from 1960 and in particular the impact of a socialist policy for the 
economy. Castel-Branco in the book, Moçambique: Perspectivas económicas (1994) 
and J. Mosca J. in Economia de Moçambique: Seculo XX (2005)10, evaluate the 
economic policy and its impact on the financial system in Mozambique in the period 
immediately after independence. 
As background reading, the work of David Hedges, "Protection, finance and 
integration in colonial Mozambique, 1920-1974(1998), is useful as it focuses on the 
impact of the protectionist policy and the nationalisation of banks in Portugal. The 
                                                          
6 Napoleão Gaspar, ʺA Evolução do Sistema Bancário em Moçambique, 1975-1992,ʺ(Unpublished BA 
Dissertation, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 2000). 
 
7 Nelson Jossias,ʺ Evolução Histórica do Banco de Moçambique - 1975 à Actualidade, (Unpublished 
BA, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 2005). 
 
8 Marc Wuyts, Money and Planning for Socialist Transition: the Mozambican Experience (Aldershot: 
Grower Publishing Co Limited, 1989).  
 
9 Mark. Wuyts, , ʺA Organização das Finanças e o Desenvolvimento Económico de Moçambiqueː Do 
Sistema Capitalista-Colonial ao Desenvolvimento Socialista,ʺCentro de Estudos Africanos, no 105, 
(n.d). 
 
10 João Mosca, Economia de Moçambique: Seculo XX (Lisboa:Instituto Piaget, 2005) 
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Banco de Moçambique Chronology 1975-2010 (2010),11, is an important source as it 
includes an exhaustive list of acts and facts related to, laws and regulations that 
coordinated the bank’s function and a list of important events occurred during the 
period. The book was published to coincide with the 35th anniversary of the Banco de 
Moçambique. 
The Banco de Moçambique rendered valuable support for this research, because the 
researcher had a 35 year career history with the bank. Access to primary and oral 
sources was granted. Among the latter were documents originating from former bank 
governors and managers who were involved with the operations of BM after 
independence in 1975. 
For this dissertation interviews were conducted with the former President of the 
Republic of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, José Oscar Monteiro,12 Sergio Vieira, 
Prakash Ratilal, Eneas Comiche and Adriano Maleiane, all former governors of 
Banco de Moçambique. Interviews were also conducted with António Pinto de 
Abreu, the Deputy-Governor, as well as former head of departments, directors and 
other personalities currently in charge. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
The methodology used is a qualitative, comparative and conceptual analysis of the 
origin, functions and the role of central banks in emerging economies against the 
framework of central banks in industrialised countries. The aim is to identify the 
Banco de Moçambique’s key features, based on qualitative historical analysis of a 
variety of primary and secondary sources, which will seek to evaluate how the Banco 
de Moçambique was established and performed as a central bank since 
establishment. 
The traditional concept, functions and evolution of central banking in older countries 
are discussed by M. H. de Kock in Central Banking (1974), while Anand 
                                                          
11 Banco de Moçambique, Banco de Moçambiqueː1975-2010ːChronology,2nd ed.(MaputoːCentro de 
Documentação e Informação, 2010). 
 
12 Who was the author of the text of clause 16 of the Lusaka Accord, which led to the creation of 
Banco de Moçambique. 
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Chandarvarkar on Central Banking in Developing Countries” (1996),13 and S. Basu 
(1967)14 with Central Banking in Emerging Countries, G. de Kock (1954) in A History 
of the South African Reserve Bank (1920-1952)15 outlined the origins and main 
functions of central banks in Africa. G. de Kock explains the development of the 
South African Reserve Bank as the South African development within the European 
tradition of central banking. Gorton and Huang16, Aglietta and Mojon17, Timberlake18 
and Livingstone19 also discuss the origins and the main functions of central banks. 
Other secondary sources consulted include statutes, periodicals, as well as Banco 
de Moçambique, Banco Comercial de Angola, Banco Standard Totta de 
Moçambique’s annual reports, staff and occasional papers, the speeches of the 
Banco de Moçambiqueʹs Governor published by the Banco de Moçambique. 
Documents in the Documentation and Information Centre and the Arquivo Histórico 
de Moçambique, the legal historical information chamber, were also consulted being 
these laws, monographs and periodicals and relevant internet sites.  
The major difficulty encountered was the lack of published material on the history of 
Mozambique’s financial system. For this reason this study had to rely on oral 
sources, with the risk of subjective interpretations of the historic record. Many 
institutions in Mozambique, including those in the financial sector, have not kept 
                                                          
13 Chandarvarkar, Central Banking in Developing. 
 
14 S. Basu, Central Banking in Emerging Countries (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1967).  
 
15 G. de Kock, A History of the South African Reserve Bank, 1920-1952 (Pretoria, J.L. Van Schaik LTD, 
1954). 
 
16 Gary Gordon and Lixin Huang, "Banking Panics and the Origin of Central Banking" in:Evolution and 
Procedures in Central Banking, ed. David Altig and Bruce Smith, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 181. 
 
17 Michel Aglietta and Bendit Mojon, ʺCentral Banking”, inː The Oxford Handbook of Banking, ed. 
Allen Berger, Philip Molyneux and John Wilson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 234-235. 
 
18Richard Timberlake ʺThe Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse Association.ʺ inː Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking. 16, in ːEvolution and Procedures in Central Banking, ed. David Altig and Bruce 
Smith, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 181. 
 
19James Livingston, ʺOrigins of the Federal Reserve System ːMoney Class and Corporate Capitalism 
1890-1913ʺ (Ithaca, N.Y. ːCornell University Press, 1986) inː Evolution and Procedures in Central 
Banking, ed. David Altig and Bruce Smith, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),181. 
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historical records systematically, and this hampered research and is something that 
future researchers will be confronted with.  
 
1.4 Structure of the dissertation 
Apart from the introduction, chapter 1 presents and discusses the concept of a 
central bank and its functions, particularly in emerging countries. 
 
Chapter 2 is an overview of the establishment of Banco de Moçambique, which 
occurred one month before the official independence of Mozambique in 1975, and 
continues to 1977. During this period the central bank developed and co-ordinated 
financial activities within the financial system in the context of the nationalization of 
the Portuguese banks branches or subsidiary operations in Mozambique. This 
changed the financial system towards the end of this period because Mozambique 
had to integrate assets and liabilities of some foreign banks into that of the central 
bank to guarantee continuity of a coordinated financial system. 
As a result of the Lusaka Accords of September 7, 1974, the BNU exited and left 
Mozambique Banco de Moçambique as its successor. The transition coincided with 
a massive exodus of experienced Portuguese bank employees. The new central 
bank encouraged large numbers of Mozambique nationals to join the remaining staff, 
and it also re-employed the former Portuguese commercial bank staff where 
branches were closing down. The assets and liabilities of Portuguese commercial 
banks in Mozambique were taken over by the new Banco de Moçambique to avoid 
the collapse of the system.  
 
Chapter 3 covers the period 1977-1983. It analyses the central bank’s activities 
during Mozambique’s socialist period. An important question to be dealt with is 
whether the bank consolidated its conventional role or jeopardised it. Those were the 
years of the “planned economy”. The third Congress of FRELIMO defined the central 
bank’s role as being that of a “tool for the control of the economy.”20 The FRELIMO 
government’s priority was to promote economic development and reduce 
unemployment. It was because of these considerations that Directive 11/80 
                                                          
20 Banco de Moçambique1975-2010ː Chronology, 34. 
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permitted the introduction of credit facilities as a tool to expand economic activity. 
The Bank was explicitly authorised to fund the economic initiatives of the 
government with the aim of promoting economic activity and rebuilding the 
devastated rural and urban centres of the country. To alleviate the severe economic 
and social crisis in the country, the 1983 FRELIMO Congress adopted far-reaching 
new economic and social directives. These marked a turning point in the newly 
independent country’s economic history. 
 
Chapter 4 covers the period 1984-1992, describing the central bank’s new monetary 
and foreign exchange policies that were designed to ensure a transition to a market-
based economy. In 1984 Mozambique joined the Paris Club, thus becoming eligible 
to be allocated funds from the Club Members. In 1985 the government signed the 
first International Development Association (IDA) credit for the Economic 
Rehabilitation Programme. The metical that had previously been tied to the US dollar 
was allowed to float against foreign currencies of nations with whom Mozambique 
engaged in foreign trade. In 1985 Mozambican citizens were authorised to open 
bank accounts in foreign currencies, and in 1986 foreigners resident in the country 
were granted the same privilege. Mozambique slowly embraced macro-economic 
reforms since November 1990, to introduce a market-based economy. The Banco de 
Moçambique’s organisational structure was reviewed and reorganised, and this led 
to the creation of the Banco Comercial de Moçambique, in 1992, which took over the 
commercial banking functions formerly performed by the Banco de Moçambique. 
 
The fifth and final chapter covers the period 1992-2010. It summarises the main 
reforms in the Mozambican economy and central bank activities. These include the 
central bank’s efforts undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s when it invested in the 
training and further qualifications of its staff, to improve operations aligned to the 
international accepted role of central banks and the implementation of policies, 
organizational structure towards a more functional central bank. These changes led 
to the formation of strategic partnerships and access to resources enhancing the 
operations of the Bank. The reforms applied particularly to those departments that 
carried out the central bank functions. New departments were created, such as the 
Market Department, the Supervision Department the Documentation and Information 
14 
 
Department and the Cultural Centre. Existing departments were reorganised to 
conform more closely to the internationally accepted structure of a central bank. The 
Research and Statistics Department, was responsible for developing and promoting 
monetary and foreign exchange policies, and the Human Resources Department 
was responsible for the employment of professional banking staff and appropriate 
independent financial expertise.  
The financial system reform, which according to Maleiane began with the creation of 
the Banco de Moçambique in 1975, endeavoured to provide the country with a 
sovereign institution for the issuing of currency, and for the management of its 
monetary and foreign exchange policy.21.Reforms were introduced in 1992, when the 
Banco de Moçambique began to devote itself exclusively to central bank functions. 
One of the outcomes of the reforms was that functions became more specialised. 
This led to a substantial improvement of the central bank’s performance, particularly 
in its supervisory role of the financial system, as banker and advisor to the State, and 
as manager of monetary and exchange policy. All these improvements led to the 
creation of mechanisms that resulted in closer liaison and co-operation with the 
government. 
 
1.5 Concept and functions of a Central Bank 
The concept “central bank” as semantic category is complex. Capie considers that 
″defining central banking is problematic, but we recognize it when we see it.″22He 
also notes that Douglas North defines central banks as organisations rather than 
institutions because they are groups of individuals with some common purpose in 
place to achieve certain objectives. The most common characteristics of institutions, 
on the other hand, are that they are ″the humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interaction’ and are made up of formal constraints like rules, laws, 
constitutions, and informal constraints like norms, self-imposed codes of conduct 
conventions which together define the incentive structure of economies and 
                                                          
21 Interview with A. Maleiane, Maputo, September 23, 2014. 
 
22 F. Capie, C. Goodhart and N. Schnadt, ʺThe Development of Central Bankingʺ inː The Future of 
Central Banking (The Tercentenary Symposium of the Bank of England) (Cambridge University Press) 
in Chandavarkar, Central Banking in Developing Countries, , (London: Macmillan,1996), 1. 
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societies″,23 North states that organisations are groups of individuals that have a 
common purpose to achieve a certain objective such as political parties, firms trades, 
schools, churches, are based on an institutional matrix which means that they reflect 
opportunities provided by the matrix. Thus institutions are the rules of the game and 
the organizations are the players.24 
Rutherford notes that, ″organisations have constitutions, are collective actors and are 
also subject to social rules.″25 Chandavarkar defines a central bank as “an 
autonomous public interest bureau with a constitution, operating rules, and a 
managerial bureaucracy, whose business does not have eminently profitable 
purposes”, but has to operate cost-effectively, seek an operating surplus and 
adequate reserves while meeting economic policy objectives. Chandavarkar 
describes a central bank as “a sum-up of an autonomous knowledge-based public 
bureau and a cost-effective financial entity“.26 
Following Capie’s argument, a central bank develops from an existing banking 
system that needs a central institution as a regulator to deal with actual and potential 
problems of the banking system.27 Discussing how the central banks came into 
existence, he argues that the main causes were great economic stress aligned to 
monetary expansion; social and economic tensions caused by war or revolutions; the 
need for monetary reforms due to severe inflation which led to the establishment of a 
legal framework and commercial code to stabilise the economy and its monetary 
market.28 
M. de Kock also states that originally, in many of the older countries the central 
banks were banks of issue or national banks, and from commercial functions a single 
                                                          
23 D. North, ʺEconomic Performance through Timeʺ inː American Economic Review,84, (1994) inː 
Chandavarkar, Central Banking in Developing Countries,1. 
 
24 Ibid. 
 
25M. Rutherford, Institutions in Economics (The Old and The New Constitutionalism), (Cambridge 
ːUniversity Press, 1994) inːChandavarkar, Central Banking in Developing Countries, 1. Ibid, 2.  
 
26Ibid. 
 
27 Capie, "The Evolution of General Banking,” 4. 
 
28Ibid, 2-4. 
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bank evolved and assumed the privileges of a sole issuing bank and a government 
bank.29 The main functions at this time were the regulating and controlling of the 
notes issue including its convertibility based on the gold standard, on silver, or on 
both. 30 
The Bank of England was established in 1694 at a time when “there was no concept 
of central banking.″ 31 This concept only emerged by the end of the century from the 
work of Henry Thornton (a British economist and banker who lived from 1760 to 
1815). According to Capie some analysts prefer the theory that the central bank 
arose with the monopoly right of issuing currency; others emphasise the role of the 
central bank as the lender of last resort.32 In fact, the Bank of Sweden, established in 
1658, became a state bank in 1668 and the Bank of England only in 1694. The old 
European central banks were established between the seventeenth and the 
nineteenth centuries when they were separated from commercial banks. Capie’s 
theory is that up to then they were not central banks and became central banks only 
in the beginning of the twentieth century.33 Their original activities were the issuing of 
fiduciary money or “paper” currency to avoid financial crisis and to relieve the 
scarcity of means of payment due to the advent of industrial economies. They also 
had to deal with the question of seignorage, and had to inform and educate the 
public on the advantages of using bank notes in addition to coins. 
 
The theory of central banking was first formulated by Bishop George Berkeley a 
British empiricist philosopher, who in 1735 conceived of a National Bank of Ireland 
and who wrote the Querist (formulating economic queries about causes of poverty in 
Ireland that influenced public thought in the eighteenth century and presented 
arguments on the reform of the Irish economy.) He was followed by British 
                                                          
29 M. de Kock, Central Banking, 1. 
 
30 Ibid. 
 
31 Capie, "The Evolution of General Banking," 4. 
 
32Ibid. 
 
33 Ibid, 4-5. 
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economists such as Ricardo (1828), Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot.34 
However, a significant discourse about central banking was started by Sir James 
Stuart (1713-80), who in 1772, as an adviser to the East India Company, wrote The 
Principles of Money Applied to the State of Coin in Bengal (India).The most detailed 
proposal for a State Bank of India was submitted by John Keynes in 1913.35 
According to M. de Kock, the concept of the central bank in the older countries 
evolved gradually and naturally, sometimes unconsciously. Central banks developed 
in various industrialised countries over many years during the nineteenth century, but 
there was no definition or systematisation of the concept or functions. It was a 
process in which one of the commercial banks came to assume more and more 
central bank functions, in particular the monopoly of note issue and to act as 
government’s banker and agent.36 M.de Kock states that in each country the skills 
and temperament of the decisions-makers had a great influence on the shape of its 
central bank operations.37 
Consequently, according to Gorton, Huang and Capie,38 in the early twentieth 
century there were only 18 central banks in central Europe; in 1950 there were 59 
and by 1990 there were 161. The number rose gradually as more states established 
autonomous governments, and the financial system became more sophisticated and 
complex. 
 
The development and standardisation of additional functions, duties and powers led 
to a process of consolidation of all the different central bank tasks. By their 
characteristic functions and operations the central banks became distinct from the 
other banks39. According to M. de Kock, the Bank of England was the first central 
                                                          
34 Chandarvarkar, Central Banking in Developing Countries, 11. 
 
35 Ibid, 11-12. 
 
36 M. de Kock, Central Banking, 1. 
 
37 Ibid. 
 
38 Gordon and Huang, "Banking Panics and the Origin of Central Banking" 181. Capie, "The Evolution 
of General Banking,” 5. 
 
39 Such as commercial banks, saving banks, hire-purchase banks, merchant banks, industrial banks, 
investment and agriculture banks. M. De Kock, Central Banking, 14. 
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bank that developed its own code of rules and practices in what is known as “the art 
of central banking”, subject to periodic readjustment. He defines the “Science of 
Central Banking” as the science that studies the origin, development, theory and 
practice of these institutions.40 
With regard to the functions of a central bank, Chandavarkar observed a consensus 
that price stability is the primary objective of central bank. This can obscure the 
principle that good management at a central bank aims to attain four major 
objectivesː full employment, growth, satisfactory balance of payment, stable prices 
and wages. Kaldor argued that the primary function of the Central Bank in 
developing countries, such as India, is to promote the fast expansion of credit, so 
that potential economic growth can be realised.  
Kaldorʹs approach to the best central bank practices in developing countries argues 
against any ordering of objectives given that the fulfilment of social and 
macroeconomic objectives and macroeconomic policies simultaneously pursue 
different objectives. This inevitably causes conflicts and trade-offs, which solution 
would be the implantation of a rational division of work involving the central bank, 
commercial banks and the national Treasury.41 
With the advent of new banks in the period between the two world wars, several 
economists raised questions about the main functions of the central banks. R. 
Hawtrey argued that the main function was acting as lender of last resort. Meanwhile 
he emphasised that the right of issue gives the central bank the advantage to 
perform this function, and without this right it surely could never exercise the lender 
of last resort responsibility.42 
Vera Smith noted that what defines a central bank ″is the monopoly in the note 
issue″. To W.A.Shaw, the main function is the control of credit. C.H. Kisch and 
W.A.Elkin elected the maintenance of stability of the monetary standard including the 
monetary circulation as the central bank’s main function, while for L. Jauncey the 
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clearing function is the central bank main operation. The Bank for international 
Settlements defined the regulation of `the volume of currency and credit as 
characteristic function of central bank in any country.43 
The custody of bank reserves is to some extent considered the central bank’s main 
function. For this reason several central banks in the world are called reserve banks, 
for example, the South African Reserve Bank, the Federal Reserve Banks of the 
United States, the Reserve Bank of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of 
India.44Moreover, for Jean Godeaux, the management of monetary policy was not 
the main function of the central banks in their early stages, as ″central banks existed 
even before the word monetary policy had been invented″. For him the central bank’s 
original mission was ʺto regulate issue of fiduciary money, paper currency, to 
appropriate the seignorage, to teach people how to use bank notes and not solely 
coins, and most important to avoid financial crisis″.45 
The concept of a central bank gradually became more sharply defined as 
constituting the apex of a country’s banking system when those banks began 
performing the primary function in economic development of their respective 
countries. M. de Kock highlight that central banking became a separate branch of 
banking and developed their own code of rules and practices, the ″art of central 
banking″.  
According to M. de Kock and Basu, this close involvement includes functions such 
as currency issuing, control and regulation of currency, being government banker, 
banker of banks, custody and management of the foreign reserve holdings, bank of 
rediscount, lender of last resort, settlement of clearance balances between banks, 
and credit policy management.46 
                                                          
43R. Hawtrey, ʺThe Rise of Central Banking: Characteristic of Central Bankʺ in: M. De Kock, Central 
Banking, 15-16. 
 
44 M. de Kock, Central Banking, 16. 
 
45Jean Godeaux, “Structure of the Central Bank" in: Perspectives on the Role 0f a Central , Bank, ed. 
Paul Volcker, Miguel Mancera and Jean Godeaux, (Proceedings of a conference held in Beijing, 
China, January 5-7), (Washington DCː International Monetary Fund, 1991),76. 
 
46 M. de Kock Central Banking, 14. G.de Kock, The Functions and Operations of a Central Bank: With 
Special Reference to the South African Reserve Bank (Cape Town, Juta & Co.1929), 6. S. Basu Central 
Banking in Emerging Countries, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1967), 80-81. 
 
20 
 
There are slight differences of opinion among the authors regarding the number or 
specification of central banks’ core functions. However, M.de Kock concludes that 
these functions are regularly and traditionally performed by older central banks 
whereas the newer ones are legally entrusted with only some of these functions.47 
Apart of central banks’ differences due to the different stage of countries' economic 
development and the political orientation of the various countries, these statutes 
afford a general clear concept of central banking. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to select the principal or priority function of a central 
bank, or even to list all functions in the order of their importance, given their 
interrelationship and complementary nature. Thus, any central bank has to be 
prepared to perform functions, or a group of functions required to organise, regulate 
and support the monetary and fiscal institutions of its particular domestic location.  
Central banks should be guided by the fundamental principle of acting in the public 
interest, meaning that the aim should not be profit.48 
 
1.6 The origin of central banking 
Although historically the Sveriges Riksbank of Sweden is the oldest central bank 
(1668) in terms of its formal constitution, the Bank of England (1694) was the first 
issuing bank to systematise the practices, principles and techniques of a central 
bank. It is for this reason that the Bank of England occupies the leading position in 
most studies that set out to examine the origin of central banks.  
The origin of central banking is associated with the countries’ leading the industrial 
revolution, for example Britain and Europe in the nineteenth century with a number of 
European central banks such as the Netherlands Bank (1814), the National Bank of 
Austria and the Bank of Norway (both in 1817), the National Bank of Denmark 
(1818), the Bank of Spain (1829), the National Bank of Belgium (1832) and the Bank 
of France (1880). The Bank of Japan was established in this century, 1882.49 
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M. Aglietta and B. Mojon maintain that central banks emerged in the mid-nineteenth 
century as a result of successive financial crisis of 1847, 1857 and 1866 in Europe 
which became contagious because of the expansion of industrial capitalism. These 
developments paved the way for the need for a high-powered financial intermediary 
to manage public debt, settle interbank transactions and issue money.50 This 
intermediary and regulatory institution became paramount over the banks. 
In the nineteenth century countries such as Egypt and Algeria in Africa, along with 
Java and Persia in the East, Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia in Europe, as 
well as Turkey, established their own central banks. These banks were accorded a 
series of privileges and powers and had the monopoly of issuing, acted as State 
banker and financial agent of the government, and performed functions in 
accordance with what was considered ″essential for a central bank” such as those 
performed by the Bank of England.51 
 
Banco de Portugal was formed and started operations on November 19, 1846, as a 
private, commercial and issuing bank as a result of the merger of Banco de Lisboa 
and Companhia Confiança Nacional. Banks were proliferating in Portugal as a result 
of the rapid accumulation of capital and the rise of industry.52Banco de Portugal was 
focused its operations on Portugal itself, Madeira and the Azores. To protect the 
financial system from crisis due to persistent public debt, this bank acted as the 
lender of last resort.53 
From 1891 onwards Banco de Portugal had a monopoly of issuing, but excluding the 
colonies. Because there were no Portuguese banks in the colonial territories, 
Oliveira Chamiço created the Banco Nacional Ultramarino (BNU) with private funds 
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in 1864 to act as issuing bank and to control the currencies.54 A proposal by Conde 
Burnay to merge the two banks, in terms of which the BNU would have been 
subordinated to the Banco de Portugal, failed because of the serious potential 
structural risk to which the Portuguese economy could have been exposed, given the 
instability of the colonial economies.55 
Although the monetary circulation was chaotic in the colonies, since Portugal did not 
have total control over its colonies, there was no Portuguese banking system 
operating and the proliferation of several foreign currencies. The establishment of 
BNU, a private bank with commercial and central bankʹs functions was in a sense 
strange to the Gorton and Huang model of how central banks originated. 
According to Gorton and Huang it is difficult to explain the origin of central banks, but 
they refer to Golbart who stated that ″central banks evolved as a response to banks’ 
inability to cope with panics″, when private banks achieve specific roles to act as 
governmental banks in a process of natural development.56 
Gorton and Huang also raised the question of what the central bank’s critical function 
would be, its function of lender of last resort, or even if it could be the government’s 
deposit insurance facility which was more fully developed later on (in 1980 only 16 
European central banks exercised this function). Both writers acknowledged the 
widespread role of central banks as issuing banks from the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The Gorton and Huang model explains that the function of lender 
of last resort and the central banking functions themselves develop in response to 
problems in many undiversified and private banks, particularly as a result of 
industrial organisation in the banking system. The banks form coalitions to exert a 
calming influence on the depositors and to persuade them that the system is both 
solvent and fully able to satisfy their demands in currency when needed, the 
opposite of the experience of the BNU during its formative years. This model was 
based on the experience of the United States, where private banks issued 
clearinghouse loan certificates, which could be claimed from a group of banks. Such 
circumstances require the imposition of mutual monitoring (which explains the 
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emergence of supervision), because the member banks’ entertained different 
performance levels and need to ensure sound observation of reserve and capital 
requirements. Gordon and Huang link the development of the industrial organisation 
of central banks to the function of lender of last resort and to the introduction of 
deposit insurance.57 V. Smith,58 however, maintains that central banks were formed 
to facilitate the raising of revenue by the government. 
The fact that no Portuguese central bank operated in the colonies, creates problems 
for the application of the model outlined above. The BNU had to address the chaotic 
circulation of foreign money in the colonies and raise money for colonisation. Other 
authors such as West and Timberlake focused on the origin of the Federal Reserve 
System as a result of a real bills doctrine considering that it emerged from a coalition 
of private banks that issue private money called ʺclearinghouse loans certificatesʺ. 
The system functioned as deposit insurance for the depositors, converting the 
demand deposits on a single bank into claims on a group of banks members of a 
coalition to assure public confidence in the entire group solvency59 and J. 
Livingstone relate the origin of the Federal Reserve System to the growth of financial 
capital.60 Livingstone criticised Bordo and Redish, who had ascribed the origins of 
central banking more too political rather than to economic circumstances.61 
The 1907 crisis in the United States led to a reconsideration of the efficiency of a 
decentralised banking system. Following the advice of a special commission of 1914 
the USA introduced a centralised banking system in the form of twelve Federal 
Reserve Banks, co-ordinated by the Federal Reserve Board in Washington. The 
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federal states in the USA came to understand the advantage of having centralised 
cash reserves and of controlling currency and credit vested in a bank which had 
state support. This bank was made subject to some state control. In contrast, the 
older European central banks were not brought under state control. They were 
formerly commercial banks that had developed through a natural process to a total 
monopoly of note issue, and had undergone a gradual expansion of functions such 
as banker and supervisor of banks, government banker and agent, and later on, 
becoming the lender of last resort.62 
The sole or principal right of issue was conferred from the beginning of central 
banking on an existing central bank by the State, or a bank was specifically created 
to assume this function. In addition, the government granted such a bank special 
powers and privileges, with a variable degree of State control and supervision. 
The government often participated in the control of such a bank by appointing a 
Governor, a Deputy Governor and some of the members of the Board of Directors or 
the management board, while the other members were nominated by the 
shareholders. Banks such as the Bank of England, the Bank of France, the Swedish 
Riksbank, the Netherland Bank and the Bank of Japan, had exclusive rights of issue 
and became their banker to the respective governments.63 
The International Financial Conference in Brussels in 1920 and the Genoa 
Conference in 1922, passed resolutions to the effect that ″all countries which have 
not yet established a Central Bank should proceed to do so as soon as possible, not 
only with a view to facilitating the restoration and maintenance of stability in their 
monetary and banking system, but also in the interest of world co-operation″. 64 
Among the oldest central banks in the world is the South African Reserve Bank in 
Pretoria. It began operating on 30 June, 1921 in very unfavourable economic 
conditions during the peak of post-war inflation, and in the midst of a severe 
depression. Its establishment was inspired by the Federal Reserve Banks of the 
United States and the Bank of England. According to G. de Kock the framers of the 
Currency and Banking Act (the original constitution of the South African Reserve 
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Bank) took into account whatever material then available to draft the legislation for 
the South African Reserve Bank. The legislation acknowledged the dissimilar 
constitutional and economic conditions within the Union. In 1920 there were few 
relevant models to choose, as central banks were only found in the older states of 
Europe. Thus, the constitution of the Reserve Bank was modelled upon the 
principles of central banking as the Bank of England and the legislation for the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 as if the Reserve Bank was 
going to operate in a similar environment as those banks.65 The South Africa’s 
Reserve Bank was the fourth central bank to be established outside of Europe, and 
the fifth-oldest bank in South Africa. It made an important contribution to the 
development of the South African financial system. The Currency and Banking Act 
was promulgated on 17 December, 1920. This statute established the Bank and was 
amended from time to time, most importantly in 1923, 1930, 1933 and 1944, to 
extend the Bank’s powers as government’s banker, in credit operations and to 
intervene in the financial market.66 
What is unusual is that the Reserve Bank of South Africa is a private institution, and 
its capital is quoted at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. It has currently more than 
660 shareholders (companies, institutions and individuals). Annual dividends are 
paid to the stockholders holding 10per cent and less shares amounting to 10cents 
per share. The remaining dividends are paid to the Government, after provision was 
made for statutory reserves.67 
Since the early 1920s independent countries all over the world have established 
central banks68 such as the National Bank of Hungary and Bank of Poland (both 
1924), Central Bank of Chile (1926), and Central Reserve Bank of Ecuador (1927). 
The Reserve Bank of India was established in 1935. Two later banks were the 
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National Bank of Cuba (1950) and Bank of Morocco (1959).Central banks were also 
established in newly independent countries after colonial rule, particularly the former 
Portuguese colonies of Mozambique (May 1975), Angola (August 1975), Cape 
Verde (July 1976), Guinea-Bissau (1980), and São Tomé and Principe (May 1975).69 
1.7 Central bank independence and structure 
The concept of a central bank is based on the provisions in the institution’s statutes. 
These are the objectives, functions, monetary and management reserves policies, 
relationship with the government, the financial system and the public, as well as its 
role as a developmental institution. According to Basu, all the developing countries’ 
central banks (except for the Libyan Central Bank, established in 1955, which was 
semi-state and private owned), were envisaged as wholly state-owned from the 
outset.70 After the nationalisation of the Bank of England and the Reserve Bank of 
India, the Reserve Bank of South Africa remained the only shareholder-owned 
bank.71 
During the First World War and the post-war period, high levels of inflation promoted 
by the belligerent countries led to a reaction against state control and 
management.72 This prompted a resolution by the 1920 Brussels Conference, to the 
effect that ″banks, especially banks of Issue, should be freed from political pressure 
and should be conducted solely on the lines of prudence″.73 
Since then the principle of central bank independence was adopted by the League of 
Nations and was enshrined in most central banks’ statutes. Central banks were no 
longer regarded as being “State departments” but as “public trusts”, as against the 
previous concept of “State banks” which were exposed to severe political 
pressure.74However, this clear separation of powers (political and financial) was 
undermined during the Great Depression(1929-1939), when governments tended to 
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nationalise their central banks, thereby participating in the ownership of the capital, 
administration and monetary policy. The central banks’ independence did not survive 
the impact of the Great Depression of the early 1930s, the state became the owner 
and sole provider of capital, and this paved the way for government intervention in 
administration and in monetary policy decisions. These changes were reflected in 
the statutes of central banks. In the developing countries with centralised, state-
controlled economic and fiscal policies the concept of a central bank with private 
shareholders, according to Basu, became a strange phenomenon.75 
Similar to other developing countries state ownership of central banks was a 
common feature in Latin America. Central banks’ statutes before the Second World 
War (1939-1945) reflected the general subscription to state intervention and control 
over the central banks. The post-depression years witnessed general increasing 
trend in state-ownership and state control of central banks.76 
After the Second World War, the relationship between the central bank and the state 
came to be more sharply defined, reflected in the central banks statutes regarding 
state capital ownership, participation in the administration and in monetary policy, 
disintegrating during the 1920ʹs mirage of central bank independence.77 
In respect of the states’ objective to achieve full employment and to replace the 
former concept of central banks working in isolation was replaced. The new 
understanding was that central banks consider monetary and fiscal policies 
constituted an integral part of the ruling government’s economic policy.78 In Portugal 
state control of the central bank was effective from the Decree-Law 450/74 [13, 
September 1974] that nationalised the Banco de Portugal. 
In the statutes of central banks of former British colonies (e.g. Nigeria, Ghana, 
Reserve Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland), different from the Bank of England and 
the Reserve Bank of India there were no provisions providing government powers to 
issue directions to the central bank in the case of conflict between the bank and the 
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Treasury. On the contrary Basu reports continuous and strengthened relations 
between the banks and respective governments.79 In contrast, in Sudan the Minister 
of Finance and of Economics, from time to time gave general directions to the Board 
in order to protect national interests.80 
In Mozambique the state intervention in the operations of the central bank was 
significant since independence and the restructuring and integration of private banks 
to the Banco de Moçambique in 1977 aimed at giving control over the entire banking 
system to the state. This seriously affected the concept of central bank 
independence in the recent past.81 
The Governor of the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland reported to the Radcliffe 
Committee, and the former Governor of the Bank of Botswana, that the relationship 
between the central bank and the government was harmonious, and was 
characterised by a close working relationship both formal and informal.82 Despite its 
private shareholders statutes the South Africa Reserve Bank’s relationship with the 
government is still one of close harmony and that the bank enjoys independence 
within the government (not of the government).83 
According to Godeaux, modern central banks should be “influential and 
autonomous”, but should still work in harmony with the government. Central banks 
organizational structure must support the bank in discharging of its responsibilities. 
This means that the central bank must enjoy financial, administrative and political 
autonomy. This implies that, in the first place, the central bank should not be 
dependent on the state budget, but it should guarantee, through high-quality 
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recruitment of staff, good research capacity and professionalism, professional career 
development and a remuneration dispensation independent of that of the civil 
service, and finally, senior appointments must be above political bias.84 
The influence and autonomy of the central bank should, firstly, be attributed to the 
quality of its research, its communication skills and its ability to influence public 
opinion. Secondly, the bank must be objective and non-partisan. Thirdly, a central 
bank should be “politically savvy”, which means that the Bank should be close to the 
political process but not be part of it. Godeaux is of the opinion that the days of 
“splendid isolation” are gone.85 Without any sense of subordination of one to another, 
the Governor and the Minister of Finance should hold regular meetings in the interest 
of co-ordination and to ensure the bank’s activities are in tune with the executive 
policies and programmes. 86 
The fourth requirement is frequent communication with the state and the public 
explaining central bank operations and results, as part of what is generally known as 
“accountability”.87 It means that, on the one hand a central bank must be aware of 
and sensitive to the economic, social and political environment in which monetary 
policy is embedded, while on the other hand the bank must do everything to make its 
policy clear and understandable to the government and to the public in general: this 
is public accountability88 Since its inception the Banco de Moçambique has 
established an effective relationship with the government, both at the level of 
technical co-ordination of policies (monetary and fiscal), and at the executive level on 
both sides in the form of periodic meetings. 
The organisational structure of central banks was invariably influenced by its 
historical development. Those of a British heritage tend to have seven members 
serving on the board of directors, including the Governor and Deputy Governor. 
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These two officials were formerly appointed by the Governor-General or by the 
Council of Ministers for a term of five or seven years. The Bank of Ghana’s Board of 
Directors has one Governor, two Deputy Governors, three executive directors and 
six directors. The francophone countries’ central banks have an organisational 
structure similar to the Bank of France. Morocco’s central bank has no board of 
directors; the administrative organ consists of the Governor, the Council, the 
Committee of Directors, the Government Commissioner and the Auditors. The 
Governor holds wide powers (direction, administration and supervision) and he 
serves for an indefinite period, as is the case in France. In Tunisia the Governor is 
appointed for six years.89 
In Mozambique the Governor is appointed by the President of the Republic for a five-
year term and the board is appointed by the Prime Minister. When a central bank is 
seen as an institution with autonomy to decide policies and to perform activities to 
meet objectives, then it is clear that the Banco de Moçambique has been an 
autonomous entity since 1922. It was only during the early years of Mozambique’s 
independence, when the country had a centrally planned economy characterised by 
state control over all economic sectors including the banking system, that the central 
bank’s independence was gravely compromised. 
The establishment of the Banco de Moçambique represented a new era of social 
and economic development and led to an expansion of regional and international co-
operation, whereas the main objectives and functions of its predecessor, the Banco 
Nacional Ultramarino were the development of the colonies and transfer of resources 
to the Portuguese metropolis. 
In terms of the Lusaka Accords of 7 September, 1974, the Portuguese government 
committed itself to transfer liabilities and assets from the Banco Nacional Ultramarino 
and to establish the Banco de Moçambique. The aim was to provide the newly 
independent nation with the necessary means to formulate its own independent 
economic and financial policies. Thus, the creation of Banco de Moçambique as 
central bank was imperative in terms of giving effect to national independence. This 
institution had peculiar characteristics, but it exercised the fundamental functions of a 
central bank. Its development was similar to many other central banks that had 
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initially functioned as commercial banks. From 1992 onwards the bank devoted itself 
exclusively to central bank functions. 
In chapters two to five the origin, functions and evolution of the Banco de 
Moçambique will be analysed in the light of central banking theories. The object will 
be to understand how the bank performed the main functions of a central bank, as 
outlined above. 
1.8 Central banking in the developing countries 
The traditional concept of central banking that was based on the structures and 
practices of the earliest established central banks has changed radically during the 
last 25 to 30 years. There has been a history of different experiences, practices and 
outcomes, particularly different historical, financial and economic conditions,90 which 
embodied different paths of central bank development in emerging markets. 
The new concept of central banking in developing countries arose from younger 
banks in Central and South American countries. With adequate monetary policies 
developing countries wanted to achieve rapid economic growth and development. 
They learnt from the older banks’ experiences, but also innovated according to their 
needs. Their charters did not merely copy the rules and practices of the older banks, 
where the Bank of England had been the leading institution. The new generation 
central banks developed institutions that benefited from the experience of the earlier 
central banks. 
These were established after the First World War and from the guidelines of the 
1920 Brussels Conference, namely to function ″as part of a scheme of currency 
stabilisation and to prevent inflation″.91 
The concept of central banking in the developing countries emerged gradually since 
the Latin America experience after the ″Great Depression″ up to World War II. 
Central banks in Latin America arose in mono-culture societies, export-oriented 
economies with an imperfectly developed commercial banking system. Money and 
capital markets were either absent or were at best in early stage of development. 
The classic model of central banking as used in older industrialised countries with 
their strong and diversified economic structures and their mature money and capital 
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markets were unsuited to Latin American conditions.92 For the latter countries, the 
existing economic and financial environment had to be taken into account before 
their own central banks could function. Some Asian countries have adopted the 
same pattern of development. 
The emerging markets could not simply duplicate early industrial economies central 
bank paradigms, but needed to develop models specifically suited to their 
economies. Emerging markets needed to develop models appropriate to central 
bank functions emerging in such economies. 
The emerging markets also found themselves unable to accept and apply doctrines 
that assume that central banks can only be created in advanced economies with, 
well developed monetary and capital markets and which were already integrated in 
the international financial system. Lord Cobbold, called it ʺan expensive luxuryʺ. 
Should emerging markets display reliance on it at the earlier stages of economic 
development as it could even be dangerous?93 
Mr. H.S. Tomkins of the Bank of England in respect to the Hong Kong Banking 
System and Sir Cecil Trevor, who commented on the inception of a central bank in 
the Gold Coast, recommended that the establishment of traditional central banks in 
relative undeveloped economies and infrastructures could be both unnecessary and 
inadvisable.94 Instead, they have argued that some central bank functions could be 
performed, at lower cost, by currency boards or by a semi-government commercial 
banks in the case of the Gold Coast. These alternative structures would act as a 
monetary authority operating as a local currency manager which would peg the 
respective country’s exchange rate to foreign currency.95 In 1948 H.C.B. Mynors 
opposed the establishment of a fully-fledged central bank in Southern Rhodesia,96 
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arguing that a currency board system served the needs of the self-governing British 
colony’s economic development more appropriately.97 
Basu described a currency board as being mere administrators of the monetary 
system but lacking any national monetary or credit policies.98 Moreover, a central 
bank in newly independent countries was a “symbol of financial independence which 
is the counterpart of political freedom″.99 
From the 1950s a new model arose when several newly independent African and 
South-East Asian countries established central banks in the wake of emerging from 
their former colonial status. Those countries had different economic, social and 
cultural conditions to those found in Latin America countries.100 
Establishing national central banks, the newly independent nations aimed at 
obtaining institutional authority to regulate the financial system. These institutions 
also sought to foster the development of indigenous monetary and capital markets. 
The new banking system was intended to foster national well-being by being an 
instrument to develop all the spheres of economic and social life. The new central 
banks replaced institutions serving former colonial interests and developed financial 
systems suited to the needs of the newly independent countries. The newly 
independent countries opted for a new concept of central banking that embraced 
both traditional and non-traditional activities to enhanced national development.101 
Although the concept of central banking varied from country to country, a consensus 
on the activities of the new central banks were their role as a monetary reserve, to 
foster good working relations with the government, the existing financial system and 
communicating with the public, apart from taking on the role of developmental 
institutions.102 
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M. de Kock reflected on a similar situation when discussing the opinion of Sir George 
Schuster at the time of establishment the central bank of India. Schuster pointed out 
that "a central bank was to be well designed, to meet the practical requirements of a 
country, it must be adapted to the banking organization of the country on which it 
should rest".103 When China’s central bank was created, it was severely criticised by 
many people who felt it was far too similar to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
America.104 
The development of central banks in several countries, irrespective of the stage of 
economic development, was motivated by the conviction of the important role the 
central bank performs in modern banking. This is particularly the case with the 
centralization of monetary reserves, the control of money supply and credit, with the 
support of the state. 
It was also realised that communication and co-operation among central banks 
would promote closer co-operation with banking systems around the world. Most of 
the central banks abide by similar functions and methods, notwithstanding 
substantial differences in their statutes and structures. In the absence of relatively 
uniform standards and conditions, countries developed local applications of general 
practices.105 
The stages of economic development of a country impact on the profile and 
characteristics of the central bank. Factors that impact on the central bank include 
the quantity of resources, the banking and credit structure, the development of 
monetary and capital markets, and the positioning of the central bank in the context 
of the international financial system.106 
Analysing the advantages and disadvantages of implementing central banks versus 
currency boards in the newly independent countries, Basu states that ʺ ...the rise of 
central banking in all the newly independent countries was not an accident.ʺ107 Given 
                                                          
103 M. de Kock, The Functions and Operations of Central Banks, 51. 
 
104 Ibid. 
 
105 M. De Kock, Central Banking, 13. 
 
106 Ibid. 
 
107 Basu, Central Banking in Emerging Countries, 52. 
 
35 
 
that currency boards have historically been a pathway towards the establishment of 
central banks,108 it is justified to ask whether alternatives to central banks could be 
more appropriate to independent and emerging market economies? Should they 
have opted for a national currency and established their own independent currency 
authorities? Should they perhaps have created and maintained a unified currency 
area with a common central bank for all member countries? What kind of institutions 
should developing countries adopt to fit in with their level of development? Is a fully-
fledged central bank the ideal solution towards achieving the monetary policies and 
objectives of emerging market economies? Williamson, Hanke and Schuler advocate 
currency boards as monetary authorities for small open economies. These boards 
would engage in monetary policy management; management of the exchange rate, 
seek price stability, and promote investments.109 The currency board system was 
considered suitable for the former centrally planned economies before they evolved 
into a conventional central banking system in a market-oriented economy because of 
the simplicity of the way they operated. Other advantages included the fact that fiscal 
responsibility was ensured and the governments concerned were prevented from 
printing money at will via a central bank.110 
On the down side a currency board would not allow a newly independent country to 
develop its money and capital markets, or embark on an independent monetary and 
credit policy. It would not exercise the fundamental function of lender of last resort 
and it could not foster the development of an indigenous money and capital market 
and infrastructure.111 
Historically, many African and other emerging economies’ central banks evolved 
from currency boards. Examples are the Rand Monetary Area (Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland); the West and East African Currency Boards (Gambia, 
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Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda); the former Central 
Africa Currency Board (Rhodesia and Nyasaland), the Palestine Current Board 
(Palestine and Transjordan); the British Caribbean Currency Board (Guiana and 
Trinidad and Tobago).112 
When Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland sought to negotiate their withdrawal from 
the Rand Monetary Area, the IMF and the business community advised strongly 
against such a move, supposedly because of the inherent risk regarding their 
national currencies and reserves management.113 
The Bank of England advised the newly independent former colonies and 
dependencies to retain their currency boards as a half-way station towards 
developing fully-fledged discretionary banking. It was not a matter of how small or 
large a central bank would be but the ″functions they are expected to perform″. For, 
the choice of whether to institute a central bank, a monetary authority or to set up a 
common currency area with a supra-regional central bank depended on historical, 
geographic and political conditions.114 Some of the experts, relying on the classic 
concept of a central bank, noted that the establishment of a central bank was 
inadequate and inadvisable in view of the underdeveloped states of the countries' 
economic and financial structures. It was argued that central bank functions could be 
better performed, at a lower cost, by a currency board.115 
In 1951 Sir Cecil Trevor argued that setting up a National Bank in the Gold Coast, 
with commercial lines to finance development projects and one that could act as a 
reserve bank, would be advisable. Such a semi-government institution could have 
central and commercial bank functions. It could offer deposits with or without 
interest, loans and advances, be banker to the colonial government and local 
authorities, negotiate rediscount bills and be in charge of foreign exchange. The 
advantages of such an institution were as follows: firstly, it could start as a nucleus 
and grow gradually by taking on central bank activities. Secondly, it would avoid the 
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need for a currency reserve backed by gold, a premise for the functioning of a 
central bank while an existing financial system with established money and capital 
markets was not a requirement. Thirdly, such a central bank would not be bound by 
the availability of traditional pre-requisites for classical central banks.116 
In the case of Nigeria, J.L. Fisher compiled a report in which he argued that one of 
the stages to be implemented on the road to establishing a central bank was to set 
up a Nigeria Currency Board with an indigenous currency, and its functions could 
subsequently be transferred to a central bank later.117Fisher argued that it was not 
ideal to create a central bank at that early stage of Nigeria’s development in view of 
the beginnings of a financial system in the country. Fisher felt that the priority was to 
establish a development corporation and a credit organisation with government 
sponsorship to encourage capital formation for development, and for voluntary 
savings. He also identified the lack of trained staff for a central bank in Nigeria as 
inhibitive of such development. 118 
British advisers were most critical towards the idea of establishing central banks in 
newly independent countries. J. B. Loynes who had recommended the establishment 
of a central bank in Nigeria, and had participated in its realization nevertheless, in 
the case of Sierra Leone, argued that it would be better to establish a “monetary 
institute” with more extended powers than a currency board. Loynes argued that 
″although the system of a currency board was cheap to run and was relatively 
trouble-free and preserved at all times a stable value of the colonies’ currency ...it 
could not provide a national currency after which every independent country aspired 
to, as much as its economic betterment″.119 
 
After the colonial territories had gained their independence, there was a movement 
to replace the currency boards with central banks. This developed in 1956 in 
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Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and in 1958 in Nigeria and Ghana, when the assets and 
liabilities of the West African Currency Board were taken over by local central banks. 
For African nationalists the creation of central banks meant the protection of African 
traders, agriculturists and industrialists against the discrimination practiced of 
expatriate banks. Arguments advanced by academics also favoured the 
establishment of central banks, because such institutions could contribute towards 
national economic development through the development of an indigenous financial 
system and money market.  
Those advocating transitional institutions as a means of moving towards fully-fledged 
central banks suggest that such institutions are suitable for small, open economies in 
transition. Chandavarkar points out that currency boards proved to be successful in 
small, open economies such as those of Hong Kong, Brunei, Singapore and Estonia, 
while countries such as Brazil and Argentina rejected this option, as did the vast 
majority of developing countries in Africa.120 
All former Portuguese colonies that achieved their independence in the 1970s and 
1980s opted initially to create central banks with commercial banking functions to 
start with, rather than currency boards. Some interviewees stated that this was linked 
to the desire to achieve full national sovereignty. On the other hand, an own central 
bank was preferable to the Banco Nacional Ultramarino which, during the colonial 
period, had tied the colonies’ economies to the Portuguese economy. Financial 
independence was considered essential if the colonial umbilical cord with Portugal 
was to be severed. 
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CHAPTER 2: BANCO DE MOÇAMBIQUE (1975 – 1977) 
The central, issuing and commercial bank, called Banco de Moçambique, is 
hereby created.121 
The Bank shall perform the functions of a central bank, the 
sole issuer of banknotes and coins, the Treasury bank and a 
commercial bank. 122 
 
2.1. Establishment and consolidation of a central bank: The political and 
economic situation in Mozambique during the final years of Portuguese 
colonial rule 
At the time of national independence in 1975, Mozambique’s economic and social 
structure mirrored Portugal’s own development and its position in the community of 
nations, as well as its relationship with Britain’s colonies in southern Africa.123 
The effective colonisation of Mozambique began after the Conference of Berlin 
(1884-85), which lay down that a colonial power would only be legitimised through an 
effective occupation of its colonial territories.  
Despite its military resources, Portugal had to face strong local resistance to its 
occupation of Mozambique  from 1886 to 1918, namely in the Gaza empire which 
ended with the defeat of the indigenous people after several battles, followed by the 
imprisonment and deportation of the emperor Ngungunhana to the Azores in 1895. 
The defeat of the Barué rebellion in 1917 meant the collapse of all resistance, and 
Portuguese colonial forces occupied the Makonde Plateau in 1919-20. 
In the pre-colonial era (the Portuguese penetration started from the sixteenth century 
with installation of trading posts , after Vasco da Gama first contact with 
Mozambique in 1498 on the way to India) Mozambique’s economy was 
predominantly agrarian with a population of about 3 million in 1900 and 4.2 million in 
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1930, when only about 100,000 people lived in urban areas.124 On the verge of 
independence in the mid-1970 the population growth rate was about 2.15 percent. 
Mozambique had 9 million inhabitants in 1975, about 90 percent of which were 
illiterate. As the fourth population census for the 1960-70 period showed, the 
economically active population consisted of only 2 927 606 people, of which 2 141 
020 were involved in agricultural, forestry, hunting and fishing activities. These 
statistics are indicative of a deplorably underdeveloped and backward society.125 
 The dynamics of Mozambique’s colonial economy tended to encourage urbanisation 
as a consequence of the establishment of ports and railways and the development of 
industry and commerce. The majority of African people lived in rural areas but some 
of them moved to nearby towns to avail themselves of work opportunities in 
construction, such as the building of embankments, ports and railways, roads, public 
buildings, and other public works. They formed a permanent presence in the towns 
as workers. With the consolidation of forced labour,126 consisting on indigenous 
compulsory labour to exploit the manpower, after the abolition of slavery in 1836,  
the peasants were transformed into migrant workers in the plantations and lodged in 
"compounds", far from their place of origin or residence.127 
Because Portugal lacked the financial resources to introduce and run its own 
administrative institutions in its colonies, it resorted to ceding administrative and 
military control of two thirds of the colony’s territory to foreign chartered companies 
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(British, French and German) so that large scale cultivation of exportable products 
could get under way. 
The Companhia do Niassa (1821) had control over the Niassa and Cabo Delgado 
provinces; Manica and Sofala provinces were under the Companhia de Moçambique 
(1888),Tete and Zambezia provinces were under joint control of Portuguese 
authorities and chartered companies. Among the latter were Companhia da 
Zambézia (1892), Companhia do Boror (1898), Compania Sociedadedo Madal 
(1904) and others that had rent from “Prazos da coroa”.128 There was, however, an 
effective Portuguese administration over the settlements south of the Save River 
(Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane provinces) and in Nampula. 129 
Mozambique’s colonial economy was closely tied to the Portuguese motherland’s 
backward economy, but it was also interlinked with the economies of southern 
African territories, predominantly the colonies in Southern Africa, as a result of its 
export of labour via the migration system to those economies. But Portugal sought 
ways and means of exerting a measure of control over Mozambique’s integration 
process so as to secure the revenue from invisible trade, and to regulate the 
workforce, all in the interest of financing the colony’s development. The Portuguese 
authorities for example attempted to manage the conflict that arose between the 
external demand for labour and the colony’s own demand for labour that was needed 
for the cultivation of export crops.130 
The dominant feature of the Mozambican colonial economic policy since the 
nineteenth century was complex. Besides the traditional familiar agrarian production 
for subsistence in southern Mozambique, Portugal had a state-by-state agreement 
for the monopolization of the workforce export to South African mines up to the 22nd 
parallel (from Lourenco Marques to south of the Save River in Sofala Province), in 
return for the use of Lourenço Marques Port (now Maputo). 
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As a result of Beira being linked by rail to Umtali in Southern Rhodesia in 1897, and 
to Nyasaland in 1922, Mozambique’s railways became integrated with that of the 
southern African region. One outcome of this was that the African peasantry in the 
Zambezi Valley, which had always practised their own plantation economy, were 
integrated into the monetary economy which was a feature of colonial rule, between 
1890 and 1936. To get the peasants to increase existing production levels, the 
Portuguese used coercive methods of exploitation such as forced labour (the 
chibalo), the imposition of a hut tax and the payment, in Zambezia, of mussoco 
(labour rent). 131 The export of labour to South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe), Tanganyika (now Tanzania), and Nyasaland (now Malawi) and to the 
island of Sao Tomé from the central areas lasted until 1913. 
Because of Portugal’s unstable industrial sector in the early twentieth century, 
Mozambique’s exports were diverted to France, South Africa, Britain and Germany. 
Portugal itself exported wines primarily to Mozambique. 132 
Portugal’s weak control over the colony in general brought about various conflicting 
demands on its labour force in particular, the labour required for seasonal work on 
the plantations. The export of labour to neighbouring countries, and the competition 
for labour among several other potential employers (from plantation owners to the 
mines) in this period induced the Portuguese to promulgate general labour laws in 
order to assert their sphere of influence and to safeguard their interests. 
Mozambique exported labour, in particular from the centre of the country, even 
though there was a chronic shortage of labour in the colony itself to develop the 
plantations. This situation had arisen because Portugal lacked the capacity to 
exercise direct control of the whole colony; besides, its migrant workforce was the 
source of important foreign exchange revenue, apart from furnishing the economy 
with funds to develop the plantations and a large part of migrants to Rhodesia-mines 
and farmers were illegal, running away from chibalo.133 
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The rise to power of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar as a result of a coup d'état on 28 
May 1926 led to a new colonial policy between 1930 and 1960. This policy was 
based on the principle of "economic and political nationalism". Its aim was to bring 
about a close economic integration of the colonies, and to enable Portugal to get 
direct management of the territories.134 For that purpose, financial and administrative 
reforms were introduced through the 1930 Colonial Act and the plebiscite of 14 
March 1933 in which people sanctioned the Portuguese Colonial Empire, based on 
the "New State" policy. This policy confirmed that Portugal’s national development 
was indissolubly linked to the colonies.135 
The new policy provided for the control of the chartered companies’ territories to 
revert to the Portuguese state, with particular reference to the territory of the 
Companhia de Niassa when the company was dissolved in 1929. Other companies 
became private enterprises. The Companhia de Moçambique, for example became 
the Entreposto Group in 1942 and by 1970 it had gained control of over 20 
enterprises. In the agrarian sector, the Companhia do Boror, the Companhia do 
Madal and Sena Sugar States expanded their operations and continued until 
national independence. The colonial government assisted them by supplying cheap, 
forced seasonal labour.136 
The integration of Mozambique into the southern African economy during these 
years, based on its migrant labour, transport services and cash crops grown for 
export, promoted the new economic nationalism. However, this policy was executed 
within the context of a repressive labour system that forced the peasantry into an 
integrated money-based economy. Mozambique’s ports and railways, used for 
handling and carrying cargo to and from South Africa, Nyasaland (Malawi) and 
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Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) was utilised to earn foreign exchange to help finance the 
colonial budget, while also contributing to Portugal’s own development.137 
In 1928, a convention was signed between Portugal and South Africa which defined 
a "deferred payment system" through which Portugal retained a percentage of the 
Mozambican miners’ wages in gold, at a fixed price, to be credited to the Portuguese 
State. Thanks to gold sales in the open market, Portugal stood to benefit from this 
arrangement with South Africa.  
Furthermore, the new phase of economic nationalism in Portugal, since 1936 
promoted a policy of industrial constraint, aiming at extensive cotton production and 
local industrial development.138 Cotton growing, particularly in the Northern 
provinces, was promoted from 1936 to develop the Portuguese textile industry. The 
cultivation of rice was made mandatory to feed the growing local towns. Likewise, 
the cultivation of produce such as cashew nuts, copra, maize, peanuts, cassava, and 
groundnuts for local consumption and for export was encouraged. 139 
Despite the restrictions imposed on industrial development in Mozambique to 
prevent competition with the metropolitan industrial revolution, (where the BNU was 
the executing agency)140, the colony’s agro-industry forged ahead with increasing 
mechanisation, particularly with respect to the processing of cotton, rice, sugar, 
tobacco, tea and oil. The expanding agricultural production was to supply settlers’ 
needs and led to the consolidation of the Portuguese capital.141 
Portugal’s industrial development led to extensive accumulation of capital and, after 
the Second World War, to the formation of monopolistic groups. Some groups 
invested in cotton marketing such as the Companhia dos Algodões de Moçambique 
and João Ferreira dos Santos; others, such as the Sociedade Agricola de Incomati, 
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invested in the colony’s sugar plantations. Yet other groups followed suit in 
insurance and banking. 
Portugal’s protectionist policy of economic nationalism placed the control of the 
Mozambican economy in the hands of the powerful privately owned financial, 
commercial and industrial groups. These included the Entreposto Group, 
Champalimaud, CUF (Companhia União Fabril), Joao Ferreira dos Santos, Monteiro 
e Giro and others.142 
After the Second World War, the “colonial question” received increasing attention 
internationally. In response, Portugal’s policy was to turn Mozambique into a 
Portuguese province by encouraging Portuguese immigration to the African colony. 
The settler population grew at a rate of 4, 5 per cent in the 1920s to a rate of 5, 8 per 
cent in the 1940s and 7, 3 per cent in the 1960s. 143 The population census of 1960 
in Mozambique indicated the total population of 6 603 651, and about 220 638 were 
non-African. 98per cent of population were indigenous.144A labour dispensation 
based on a policy of segregation was introduced in Mozambique since 19th century 
and consolidated in the first Portuguese republican Constitution enacted in 21 
August 1911145 Access to urban areas, education and to administrative and technical 
skilled positions was restricted to white settlers. Only a small number of Africans – 
those who had advanced to the status of “assimilado”, – could progress to unskilled, 
and semi-skilled jobs, or to other positions where they were subordinate to whites. 
This policy aimed at turning the natives into Portuguese citizens. By 1960 only 1per 
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cent of the African population had achieved the ʺassimiladoʺ status that was 
reserved to former indigenous inhabitants who had acquired the Portuguese 
citizenship. 146 
In the post-Second World War period, when the main economic activity was 
agriculture, pressure was put on the peasantry in two waysː by being integrated into 
a monetised economy towards which they needed to earn wages by supplying wage 
labour to neighbouring countries and plantation companies, and by providing labour 
in the domestic market for the construction of roads, railways and other colonial 
handling port cargo, and to provide forced labour for the agro-industry. At the same 
time the peasants were integrated to the market by selling their cash crops, while 
they were also expected to grow food for own subsistence.  
The growth of the settler population stimulated the demand for consumer goods, 
which, in turn, stimulated the development of light industrial production, at first only 
for the internal market. From 1960, a start was made with intermediary products. 
Food production on settler farms developed mainly in the southern region (Maputo, 
Limpopo, Revue, Sabie and in the Incomati Valley). In these areas the Portuguese 
authorities set up colonatos (where Portuguese peasant families relying on their 
family workforce to produce rice, meat, vegetables and dairy products) were settled. 
The expansion of agriculture accelerated the growth of industries such as 
transportation, trade and tourism in southern Africa. This in turn stimulated the 
banking in the region and this was regulated by Decree-Law 45296 of 8 October 
1963.147 
Thanks to this legislation, from 1965 all major Portuguese banks opened branches in 
Mozambique. The banks were linked to Portuguese monopolies or oligopolies, or to 
foreign capital owners. The banks concerned were Banco de Crédito Comercial and 
Industrial-BCCI, which began business in 1965 and which belonged to the Borges e 
Irmãos Group (the shareholder of the Portuguese Banco Borges e Irmão); Banco 
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Pinto e Sotto Mayor- (BPSM) (1966) which belonged to the Champalimaud Group, 
and the successor of the Standard Bank, the Banco Standard Totta de Moçambique 
(BSTM) (1966).  
The BSTM was a joint venture with 37per cent of Portuguese capital from the CUF 
Group (Companhia União Fabril), 5per cent of South African capital from Anglo-
American, 35per cent from the Standard Bank, while 15per cent came from local 
Portuguese settlers; the Banco Comercial de Angola (BCA), was established in 
August 1971 to replace Barclays Bank, but 60per cent of the capital was taken up by 
Barclays and 40per cent by the Banco Português do Atlántico.The latter invested in 
the Ruvué Hydroelectric Company148, and Casa Bancária, formed in 1971 by 
Portuguese settlers in Beira. Apart from these banks there were the Caixa 
Económica de Montepio de Moçambique, a bank established to finance housing and 
other social projects; the Instituto de Credito de Moçambique (1970); and the Banco 
de Fomento-BF. These three banks were State banks that financed agriculture and 
development plans.149 
Before 1963, the Banco Nacional Ultramarino (BNU) was the only Portuguese 
commercial bank in the colony (apart from Barclays Bank and the Standard 
Bank).Hence, it was the main investor in the Mozambican economy. In fact, this 
bank held one-third of the Colonial Buzi Company, CUF and SOCAJU, Matola 
Cement Company. In the insurance sector, the BNU was a shareholder of the 
Companhia de Seguros Lusitana and the Companhia Nauticus. In the sugar 
industry, the BNU was associated with the Anglo-Portuguese Bank in funding the 
Açucareira de Moçambique. The BNU participated in the Vinicola de Moçambique 
and established FIUL for housing finance. 
As the BNU’s successor, Banco de Moçambique became a shareholder (and 
sometimes it became the major shareholder) in many industrial and agro-industrial 
companies such asAçucareira de Moçambique (in which it owned 29.5per cent of the 
equity), Maragra (24,9per cent), Companhia do Buzi (51,8per cent), Caju Industrial 
(51,6per cent), Mac-Mahon (25,28per cent), Cometal-Mometal (5,56per cent), 
Carbonífera de Moçambique (10per cent) and Cimentos de Moçambique (10per 
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cent). In addition, it held shares in the nationalised companies. Such nationalised 
companies’ included; Fábrica de Óleos (FASOL), (28per cent), Cervejas da Beira 
(11,5per cent), Refrigerantes de Gaza (11,5per cent), as well as SONAP-SONAREP, 
which was nationalized in May 1977.150 
Inspired by the post-war Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of war-devastated 
Europe, Portugal decided to promote its own development plans for colonial 
development. The first of these was implemented in 1953-58 and was aimed at the 
development of infrastructure such as the Lourenço Marques-Malvérnia railway, to 
connect the harbour with Southern Rhodesia. The Interim Development Plan No. 3 
implemented in 1966 was designed to add value to the increasing settler activities, to 
modernise agriculture and to lift agro-industrial production.151The third Development 
Plan, from 1968-73, was to promote industrial development. The intention was to 
boost investment in the colony by way of refundable short-term credit.  
Despite Portugal’s efforts to reinforce colonialism through further investment and 
infrastructural development, this development phase was characterised by racial 
stratification. It was also characterised by the consolidation of legislation to establish 
trade unions solely for white and assimilados workers, and by religious and 
educational discrimination against the indigenous people. Overall, it was a situation 
which led to a heightened awareness of the underprivileged status of Mozambicans 
while stirring indigenous opposition to colonialism. 152 
The early 1970s was a critical period in the history of Mozambique. It was the period 
of the liberation struggle in which guerrilla warfare proceeded apace, while the 
Portuguese armed forces reached a point of psychological exhaustion, and some 
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151Ibid, 161-164. According to Wuyts, “Promotion Plans" were financed by the colonies themselves, 
whether local governments or financial institutions, Wuyts, A Organização das Finanças e o 
Desenvolvimento económico de Moçambique, 16. Langa, ʺA actividade do Banco Nacional 
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troops were ready to end the war.153 At the same time, the cost of living rose 
dramatically, food and goods became scarcer.  
With colonial rule in a state of crisis, the foundations of the colonial economy began 
to crumble. Its main institution, the BNU, weakened to the point where, in 1975, it 
ceased to operate. Apart from the demise of the BNU, there were military,154 political 
and social developments in Mozambique and in Portugal which contributed to the 
weakened position of the colonial power.155 
On the military front, General Kaulza de Arriaga's "Operation Gordian Knot”, which 
was intended to annihilate FRELIMO within a short period of time (seven months as 
of 1 July, 1970), failed. Guerrilla attacks on towns and villages intensified. 
Portuguese troops suffered from exhaustion and a lack of motivation. The liberation 
movement reached Cabo Delgado, Tete, Niassa and the region of the Zambezi River 
to Manica and Sofala in 1971. It claimed it was receiving more and more support 
from the indigenous population.156 The Portuguese April Youth Movement 
proclaimed that freedom and human rights were inalienable all over the world, and 
therefore Portuguese imperial rule over its colonies was indefensible. A new vision 
advocated closer co-operation between the people and the government, and this 
would bring about improved economic and financial developments after colonial 
domination.  
To counter the effects of the national liberation war that began in 1964 and to inhibit 
the growth of African independence movements, Portugal tried to promote the rapid 
economic growth of its colonies, thus consolidating the "Portuguese space”. By the 
end of the 1970s, the international pressure against Portuguese colonial rule 
became stronger, leaving Portugal increasingly isolated. In Portugal the democratic 
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154 The deteriorating military situation came to put the European population in a manifest 
psychological imbalance, De Almeida Santos, Quase Memórias, 73-81. 
155 The Cravos Revolution in Portugal was in solidarity with the liberation struggles and with the 
revolution in the colonies.  
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movement garnered growing support while the colonies were determined to gain 
their independence by intensifying the armed struggle.157 
To undermine the armed struggle for independence, which was part of the general 
decolonisation process in Africa, Portugal declared the colonies as provinces of 
Portugal. This process, however, had the effect of further institutionalising economic 
and legal-administrative dependence on Portugal, which served to consolidate the 
influence of Portugal and power in the overseas territories.158 From 1960 to 1973 
Portugal invested heavily in ports and industry, as well as in the energy sector. The 
Cahora Bassa hydroelectric project in Tete Province was approved in 1969.159 
Portugal found itself in an ever deepening crisis internationally. In a speech in the 
National Assembly on 5 March, 1974, Professor Marcelo Caetano, President of the 
Portuguese Council of Ministers,160 recognised that the “evolution of a multiracial and 
intercontinental society is disturbed by adverse [and] growing international pressure.” 
Caetano argued that it was Portugal that had made Angola; it was Portugal that had 
created Mozambique; and therefore Portugal did not recognise the right to self-
determination. He insisted that those who opposed the Portuguese presence in 
Africa were promoting the adverse interests of the capitalist world.161 
When the Portuguese Overseas Minister162 was interviewed by the Rio de Janeiro 
newspaper Globo, about the “overseas issue,” he stated: "We are also an African 
nation. It is shown by the five centuries of civilization, of appreciation and integration. 
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Socialist Transition, 22. 
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Our presence is thus as authentic in Africa as in Europe. Now, no-one will interfere 
with our right to our presence in Africa". When asked whether Portugal was prepared 
to free the colonies, he replied that his government was prepared to make the 
overseas territories even more Portuguese than before.163 
The creation of the Exchange Fund (1932) and the Portuguese Monetary Escudo 
Zone (ZMEP, acronym in Portuguese) in 1961 ensured the continuous contribution 
of the colonies to Portugal’s development, and that all foreign exchange earnings 
were under the control of the Banco de Portugal.164 
In 1962 the New Inter-territorial Payment System (NSPI, acronym in Portuguese) 
was created, based on multilateral clearing to facilitate clearance movements by the 
Banco de Portugal from the BNU and the Banco de Angola accounts.165 This system 
was designed to shield the Banco de Portugal from being adversely affected by the 
chronic balance of payments of the colonies; but overall, it was a system that 
allowed Portugal to drain the colonies' reserves, thereby reducing their balance of 
payments to chronic unprofitability.166 
Portugal’s Decree-Law 46312 of 28 April, 1965, established an “open door" policy, 
which liberalised and opened up the Portuguese money market to foreign 
investment. This liberal law reinforced the reorganisation of the monetary system in 
the colonies; It added value to the banking law enacted in 1963; it ensured strategic 
alliances which protected Portuguese interests from the rest of the world and it 
opened in the colonies to serve Portuguese commercial banks; this law also ensured 
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that foreign exchange earnings, mainly from transport services and migrant labour, 
would flow to the Banco de Portugal.167 
Since these macroeconomic strategies were implemented by the BNU, it could not, 
by its very nature, carry out the necessary transformation in Mozambique which 
would have created a new economic order. Therefore, the end of colonial rule also 
brought about the end of the BNU’s activities, leading to the establishment of a 
central bank in Mozambique. 
 
2.2. From the crisis to the inception of the central bank 
From the late 1960s, Portuguese colonial policy was subject to international political 
criticism.168 Because of Portugal’s intransigence in granting independence, liberation 
struggles began in the Portuguese colonies of Guinea, Mozambique and Angola, in 
sub-Saharan Africa 
From 30 June to 2 August, 1974, secret talks took place between FRELIMO and the 
Portuguese government in Amsterdam. Oscar Monteiro, in the name of FRELIMO 
met Melo Antunes and Almeida Santos, ministers of the Portuguese government, 
Samora Machel, the President of FRELIMO met Melo Antunes (mandated by the 
Portuguese Armed Forces Movement Co-ordinator) and the military commander 
Almeida Costa in Tanzania. At this preliminary meeting the parties agreed that the 
political issue would be the key issue before economic and military matters would be 
addressed.169 
On 17 July, 1974, the President Antonio de Spinola,170 of Portugal declared that 
Portugal recognised the right of the Mozambican people to independence. On 15 
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August, Dr Almeida Santos; the Inter-territorial Administration Minister, Mario 
Soares; the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Melo Antunes, Minister without Portfolio, 
went to Dar-es-Salaam for a bilateral round of negotiations in the wake of failed 
negotiations in Lusaka in June 1974 to effect a ceasefire. Meanwhile, in 
Mozambique, sabotage, terrorism and strikes occurred which caused a complete 
state of chaos. 
The colonies’ natural resources and strategic geographic position placed the 
liberation struggles within the ambit of the Cold War.171 Whereas Portugal had 
consolidated an alliance with South Africa and with Ian Smith´s Rhodesia concerning 
its hegemonic interests in the region,172 the liberation movements were supported by 
socialist countries and by progressive intellectuals, with the effect that the national 
liberation struggle was transformed into a popular democratic revolution,173 this 
shifted FRELIMO's decision to opt for a socialist development policy, leaving it bereft 
of international financial support. 
Because of the war and the effects of the global oil crisis during the 1970s, 
Mozambique’s economy was adversely affected by a recession and rampant 
inflation.174 By the mid-1970s, the war had exhausted both the colony and the 
metropolis.175 This dire situation caused the Portuguese armed forces to oppose the 
continuation of the fight for the colonial cause. The liberation movements intensified 
their diplomatic efforts on the international stage to proclaim the right of African 
people to independence. 
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At the start of the 1970s, the Mozambican economy was an agro-industrial economy, 
conjugated with a migrant labour system, the production of export commodities and 
with subsistence agriculture. The global inflationary crisis was felt in the fragile 
economy, especially in the transport and import sector. So the world economy was in 
recession. The entire world economy faced a severe economic crisis in 1974, and 
the 12 OPEC countries negotiated new oil prices in order to face the recession.176 
The results were reflected in developing countries’ economies. The lack of raw 
material affected the industry and led to unemployment.177 
Assessing the economic and financial situation of Mozambique in 1975, Carlos 
Gonçalves an economist in the electricity sector, said that without the usual financial 
injections by the metropolis, the Mozambican economy was on the verge of 
collapse.178 Production levels dropped 25per cent and 30per cent respectively 
compared to the 1973 and 1974 levels.179 
On 25 April, 1974 in Portugal the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) overthrew the 
Caetano government, in a coupe d’état and created a National Salvation Junta (JSN 
acronym in Portuguese). This was the driving force of the "Cravos Revolution”. As 
already mentioned, because of the colonial wars, Portugal was running out of 
resources, while questions were raised about how viable the colonial project was. 
While Portuguese descendants born in the colonies adhered to neo-colonial views, 
the nationalists in each colony worked to unify the people to fight for self-
determination and self-government. Almeida Santos reported having received on 23 
July, 1974, telegrams from the regional commissions of the MFA in Tete and Cabo 
Delgado, and from the Co-ordinating Committee of the MFA in Mozambique.  
                                                          
176 "Crescente Preço do Petróleo Cria Sérios problemas a Economia Mundial, " A Tribuna, February 
21 1974. 
 
177 "Crise económica e desemprego assolam países capitalistasʺ, Noticias, April 21, 1976, "Crescente 
preço de Petróleo Cria Sérios Problemas à Economia Mundial, " A Tribuna, February 2, 1974. 
ʺAumento dos Preços do Petróleo -Reunião dos Peritos Monetários Visando Salvar o Ocidente de 
uma Séria Recessão Económica," Diário, January 17, 1974. "Crise Mundial Afecta a Economia de 
Moçambique" A Tribuna, February 8, 1974.  
 
178 "Inquérito: "Economia de Moçambique no Momento Actual – Pequena Empresa Ameaçada de 
Morte – Média empresa Catástrofe Próxima," Noticias, August 19,1974.  
 
179 Mosca, A Experiência socialista, 109. 
55 
 
The letter was intended for President Spinola expressing the intention of the armed 
forces to capitulate. They were calling for a general ceasefire with FRELIMO to be 
reached by the end of the month. Several army divisions including trainees in Boane 
refused to go to the war front in the north of the country. Portuguese authorities had 
lost control over the military. 
It was within this context that Law 7/74 was passed in Portugal on 5 August, 1974 
after a presidential speech on 27 July, 1974, recognising the right of independence 
of Mozambique. This contradicted a provision in the1933 Constitution, which defined 
the overseas territories as Portuguese territories. A National Committee on 
Decolonisation was created in terms of Decree-Law 792/74 of 31 December, 
1974.180 
The immediate outcome of the political and military situation in both Mozambique 
and Portugal was that negotiations were held which resulted in the Lusaka 
Agreement, signed on 7 September, 1974 between FRELIMO and the Portuguese 
government, preparing the way for the end of the war.181 After 10 years of the 
liberation struggle (1964-1974) Mozambique became independent on15 June, 
1975.182 
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Picture 1: Lusaka Agreement. 
 
Lusaka accord signing session. Source: Banco de Moçambique, Banco de 
Moçambique1975:2010ːChronology, 25. 
 
The economic situation in the transition period (1973-1975) was characterised by the 
collapse of production and marketing because of the mass exodus of settler 
communities returning to Portugal while other people left to resettle in South Africa or 
Rhodesia. Particularly the loss of skilled people led to a serious disruption of the 
economy which also affected the financial system. There was a widespread crisis in 
production and supply, with especially the rural areas being hard hit. In addition, 
there were successive natural disasters such as cyclones, floods and droughts, 
which also impacted adversely on the economy.183 
The already critical situation took a turn for the worse due to economic sabotage, a 
flight of capital and resources, and the stoppage of production in companies. With 
reference to the latter problem, the government had tried to intervene by 
promulgating Decree-Law 16/75 dated 13 February, 1975. This law was also known 
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as 24/20, it permitted government to intervene in companies or nationalize the 
abandoned ones for more than 90 days. On the other hand the government could 
intervene in those companies in financial or administrative crisis in order to 
guarantee workers’ salaries184 by setting up Administrative Councils for its 
management. 
The financial sector experienced acts of sabotage in private banks in the form of 
massive illegal transfers of capital.185 This led the FRELIMO government to make 
intensive ad hoc interventions186 to avoid economic and social chaos. 
 
The support that Mozambique gave to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe led to a 
serious military intervention by Rhodesia into the country. The Rhodesian 
Government later provided support for the establishment of the RENAMO guerrilla 
movement that started civil war in Mozambique. This exacerbated the already 
deteriorating economic situation. The Mozambican civil war only ended with the 1992 
General Peace Agreement. 
Overall, economic indicators for the period 1970 to 1977 weakened as a result of 
conjectural factors, such as the global recession and the oil crisis, the change-over 
of power and the legacy of the colonial economic crisis. Table 1 below illustrate the 
percentage of Gross Material Product (GMP or GDP, the primary macroeconomic 
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indicator of growth in national accounts)187 declining, particularly in agriculture, 
industry and services sectors (at 1970 prices) to an average of 27 per cent in 1975.  
Table 1 shows that despite the value of the GMP estimated in comparison to 1970 
levels, production in 1973, seemed to improve, but decreased again in 1973-75. The 
change was a decline of -11per cent in agriculture, -38per cent in industry and -
28per cent in the services sector, which included domestic trade and transport. The 
volume of services reflects the weakening importance of Mozambique’s economic 
regional integration with southern African countries. 
According to Castel-Branco, marketable agriculture decreased by 43per cent in the 
1974-1975 period. This was in part due to the end of forced labour. The industrial 
output decreased by 35per cent and the net value of exports declined by 31per cent 
in 1976 and 25per cent in 1977. GDP fell 22per cent in 1975 and 17per cent in 
1976188 
Table 1: Gross Material Product at 1970 Prices (1000 Million escudos) 
 Sector 1970 1973 1975 1973-1975 
Change (per 
cent) 
Agriculture 5.8 5.3 5.6 -11 
Industry 5.6 7.4 4.6 -38 
Services 13.1 12.6 9.1 -28 
GMP 24.5 26.8 19.3 -27 
Source: Wuyts, Money and Planning for Socialist Transition, 71. 
It was within this context of political and economic crisis in the wake of a 10-year-
long struggle for liberation that the Banco de Moçambique was founded in 
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1975.189Explaining why the BNU had to cease its activities and be replaced by a 
central bank for Mozambique, the then Prime Minister of the transitional government 
in Maputo, Joaquim Chissano, said in a speech in Lisbon on 2 October 1974: “What 
we want is not the transfer of colonial structures, but we do want to destroy those in 
the colony which cannot in any way serve our people (...). We are working to have a 
central bank which performs the functions of a national bank, including the issuance 
of a national currency, like in any country in the world”.190 
 
2.3. The establishment of the Banco de Moçambique 
 
The aim of analysing the genesis of the Banco de Moçambique within the context as 
outlined above is to understand the background and the events that led to its 
creation, its development and its historical contribution to the national economy. But 
the important question is: 
Were conditions in Mozambique conducive to the establishment of a central 
bank? 
According to Oscar Monteiro191“, the news about the coup in Portugal on 25 April, 
1974, reached the nationalists in Nachingwea through Radio France Internationale. 
From that moment, they and others in Mozambique began to plan the management 
of the country, particularly its economic sovereignty. In this context they evaluated 
the BNU’s activities in Mozambique. 
On 27 August, 1974 in Lisbon, the Portuguese Council of Ministers chaired by Prime 
Minister Vasco Gonçalves, decided to nationalise the Banco de Portugal, the Banco 
de Angola and the BNU, as had been recommended by Álvaro Cunhal in 1964 
(following the guidelines of the Portuguese Communist Party), to protect Portuguese 
interests while taking into account the 1974 revolution in Portugal and the rapid 
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decolonisation process in1975. The state had to intervene in economic and financial 
institutions, and even in business. This was considered necessary to establish the 
credibility of the government in relationships with the former colonies, and in view of 
the necessity of addressing the economic effects of decolonisation.192 
The Minister of Economic Planning Melo Antunes, stated that to cope with the 
economic chaos that threatened Portugal, it was imperative for the state to exercise 
control over strategic economic institutions including banking, insurance, energy, 
transport and cement-making. Nationalisation was seen as a policy to secure such 
control. 
The nationalisation of Portugal’s banks in 1974 curtailed the BNU’s activities.  
Spinola's government enacted its nationalisation law on 13 September, 1974 which 
was published in the Diario do Governo no. 214. The law applied to the 
aforementioned banks, and reinforced the government’s supervision of commercial 
banks.193On 12 October, after Spinola’s resignation, the Portuguese government 
instituted by Decree-Law 540-A/74, the need for supervising, overseeing and co-
coordinating the activities of banking and non-banking financial institutions. 
This measure was reinforced by Decree-Law 671/74, which granted the Ministry of 
Finance the authority to appoint a delegate to the board of the central bank to 
represent the ministry in the management of commercial banks while also aiming to 
reinforce the control of credit to the economy. Once the BNU was nationalised in 
Portugal, the transfer of its branches to the new authorities in Mozambique was 
obvious, since the purpose of its very existence expired with the advent of 
independence.  
On 14 March, 1975, General Costa Gomes announced the nationalisation of all 
commercial banking and insurance institutions in Portugal, except foreign, savings 
and mutual agricultural credit banks.194 It was one of the most revolutionary 
measures taken in the modern history of Portugal. These protectionist measures 
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taken by the Portuguese colonial government did not include the possibility of 
Mozambique creating its own central bank. This in itself was a sure sign that 
Portugal finally recognised that with independence, the umbilical cord with the 
metropolis was being severed, and that it served no purpose to trespass on the new 
country’s sovereignty. 
In the 1970s, the armed struggle had reached crucial developments. This fact in 
conjunction with the political situation in Portugal led the nationalists to conclude that 
the moment was propitious to begin collecting documentation to prepare 
negotiations. This process was started at the Mozambican Institute in Tanzania at 
the beginning of 1974. 
The Mozambican nationalists were aware that national independence should not just 
be about the right to a national anthem and a new flag but it should mean economic 
independence. They were aware of the BNU’s issuance function in all the colonies, 
but regarded the right and the need to issue a national currency as the cornerstone 
of Mozambique’s nascent financial sovereignty. 
Joaquim de Carvalho noted that on the eve of independence, Mario Machungo and 
Pereira Leite (the first a lawyer and the second a member of the Democrats of 
Mozambique Party) warned the officials who were preparing the dossiers for the 
independence negotiations about the fact that the BNU was controlling 70per cent of 
Mozambique’s economy through loans and capital participation in most companies. 
They discussed the central role the BNU branches played in the economy, and 
concluded that there would be no genuine independence unless the BNU was 
replaced.195 
One of the key issues that had to be considered was the consignment of gold that 
were transferred to the Banco de Portugal in terms of the Mozambican miners’ 
remuneration agreement with South Africa. This information was received by Oscar 
Monteiro, who proposed that a clause providing for the cessation of BNU activities in 
Mozambique and the creation of a central bank should be included in the 
agreements between Portugal and FRELIMO.196 
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During the talks between FRELIMO and Portugal in Dar-es-Salaam, Monteiro wrote 
a proposal to that effect, which he submitted to Samora Machel. The following were 
the terms and conditions of what came to be the Clause 16 of the Lusaka 
Agreement.197 Enshrined in the Constitutional-Law no. 8/74 and signed on 7 
September, 1974, the clause reads: 
A Central Bank, which shall also operate as an Issuing Bank, shall be 
created in Mozambique, in order to guarantee that the Transition 
Government has the means to carry out an independent financial 
policy. In order to achieve this objective, the Portuguese State commits 
itself to transfer the attributions, assets and liabilities of the Banco 
Nacional Ultramarino‘s department in Mozambique to the said Bank. A 
joint commission shall immediately be empowered to study the 
conditions of the transfer 198 
The Agreement provided for the transfer of powers from Portugal to Mozambique. By 
Decree-Law no. 2/75 (Organic Law) of 17 May, the Banco de Moçambique was 
established. Under article 4 of the Organic Law, the Bank was to perform functions 
as the “Central Bank, the Issuing and Treasury Bank, in addition to commercial 
activities”. The subsequent articles stressed the bank’s credit management function, 
its responsibility in monetary policy management and the need to ensure national 
currency stability. Under the same law the Banco de Moçambique took over all 
BNU’s operations.199 
Article 5 of Law 2/75 stated that the Bank’s main purpose was to promote and 
achieve the correct monetary policy. This was to be done by means of appropriate 
criteria and credit controls. Other functions were to oversee the national economy; 
ensure internal and external stability of the currency; manage foreign assets in order 
to maintain adequate levels of means of payment necessary for international trade; 
provide financial resources to the State; ensure disciplined banking activity; guide 
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the country's credit policy in terms of its development; and to promote the interests of 
the Mozambican people.200The Bank also had to carry out commercial banking 
functions, although separate from central bank functions and full autonomy was 
expected within a six months period.201 
After signing the agreement with the Portuguese, the first president of the People’s 
Republic of Mozambique, Samora Moisés Machel, announced the composition of the 
various working groups which were to be chaired by Joaquim Chissano. Chissano 
became the Prime Minister of the Transition Government that took office in Maputo 
(formerly Lourenço Marques) on 20 September, 1974.  
In addition, a Steering Committee on economic and financial issues led by Joaquim 
de Carvalho was established. It was relatively autonomous, although the final 
decisions were made by the Party leadership.202 The Ministry of Economic Co-
ordination was created as an executive body, whose appointed minister was Mário 
da Graça Machungo. Among others, the roles of the Steering Committee and the 
ministry was to co-ordinate the transfer of credits and debts from the BNU to the new 
Banco de Moçambique. 
The Mozambican delegation to the Joint Commission for Economic Affairs consisted 
of fifteen members among Joaquim de Carvalho as chairman, Alberto Cassimo, who 
later on was nominated the Banco de Moçambique Governor, and Carlos Adrião 
Rodrigues, the Deputy Governor.203 
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 The Portuguese delegation to the first meeting of the Joint Economic Commission 
consisted of eleven persons, chaired by Antonio Figueiredo da Silva Martins, arrived 
in Mozambique on 18 January 1975. This commission included Banco de Portugal 
and BNU representatives, and the Portuguese Ministry of Finance representative. 
The Joint Economic Commission discussed and arrived at consensus on the 
following priorities: transfer of the department of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino to 
Mozambican authorities, particularly its material and human resources; terms and 
conditions to keep Portuguese collaborators working in Mozambique instead of them 
emigrating (between April 1975 and April 1976, about 20 per cent of bank employees 
left the country, 52per cent of Banco de Moçambique employees were 
Portuguese)204; the functioning of the Cahora Bassa hydro-electric scheme and its 
reversion to Mozambique; the transfer of the Marconi company (the company that 
enabled domestic and international communications to Mozambique) to the state; 
the secret deferred payment clause that was part of the 1928 Portuguese-South 
African Convention (revised in 1940, 1964 and 1969) was cancelled. (It was found 
that 60per cent of the Mozambican miners’ wages went to Portugal as trust money 
but was payable in gold – to Portugal, an important source of foreign exchange. 
These transfers ceased, and the fourth gold shipment after 25 April was embargoed 
in July 1974 on the order of General-Governor Soares de Melo. 205 
According to Carvalho, the “debt litigation or economic and financial litigation” was 
preliminary for Portugal to endure further negotiations stated on the eve of the 
inauguration of the Transitional Government by Dr Mascarenhas Gaivão and Dr. 
Abdool Karim Vakil, (which were members of the Provisional Government,) who 
emphasised the precarious state of the economic and financial situation of 
Mozambique, in particular to the huge foreign exchange deficit.206 
The debt had been generated through “late payments” brought as automatic 
accounting debt register movements made by the Banco de Portugal when recording 
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mandatory exports of Portuguese industrial goods and services to Mozambique. The 
respective payments were also made automatically, as soon as funds were 
deposited into the Exchange Fund.  
In terms of the debt litigation, Portugal claimed, inter alia, that it had to be 
recompensed “for works made by the colonial regime to benefit the people of 
Mozambique”207. President Samora refuted this assertion. In a letter to Prime 
Minister Vasco Gonçalves on 18 April, 1975, he mentioned the transfers of gold and 
currency from Mozambique to Portugal; and that more than 2,500 Mozambicans died 
annually in South African mines – victims of work accidents apart from the effects of 
resources plundering. 
President Machel emphasised that FRELIMO would consider the Portuguese 
delegation part of colonial litigation, and suspended the negotiations. In fact, 
Mozambique viewed the Portuguese claims as a kind of political manoeuvring by the 
Portuguese delegation in order to establish preconditions for the country’s 
independence.208 According to Joaquim de Carvalho, the “debt litigation” was the 
most controversial issue presented by the Portuguese delegation during the 
negotiation process. Portugal, however, withdrew its claims in a letter by the 
Portuguese Prime Minister, Vasco Gonçalves, dated 9 May 1975. In it the “economic 
and financial litigation" process was considered definitely closed (Matters of 
Committee B of the negotiations).209 
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In its Chronology the Banco de Moçambique, quoting the magazine Tempo states 
that there had been three rounds of talks, the first of which took place in Maputo in 
January, and others subsequently in February/March and April 1975, when the 
parties signed the Protocols of understanding for the transfer to Mozambique of 
assets and liabilities of the BNU department for Mozambique.210 In fact, in addition to 
this transfer, this round discussed the effects of the nationalisation of commercial 
banks and insurance companies in Portugal and the Banco de Fomento Nacional. 
Before that, the new transitional government had to collect and analyse information 
about how the BNU worked. It also had to define the strategic action that had to be 
taken to set up the Banco de Moçambique. For the Portuguese delegates, the 
mission was merely technical; it was only aimed at discussing accounting matters, 
probably because of that, the meeting produced no results.211 For the Mozambicans, 
the main question was the model of business transfer from one owner to another, as 
well as business continuity, particularly where it concerned staff members since the 
majority of them were Portuguese. The few Mozambicans in the employment of the 
central bank were unskilled. Many skilled people had already left Mozambique and 
had returned to Portugal. Subsequent to these talks,212 the BNU ceased operating in 
Mozambique, and a new central and state-owned bank, the Banco de Moçambique, 
replaced it.  
Alberto Cassimo, who obtained a B. Com. degree in Economics in Moscow in 1973, 
a member of FRELIMO’s Central Committee since the III Congress in 1977, and 
Adriāo Rodrigues, were appointed to carry out the transfer of Mozambican assets 
from the BNU to what would then become the Banco de Moçambique. On 21 May, 
they were nominated as Governor and Deputy Governor of the new bank 
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respectively. Cassimo stayed with the Bank from 21 May, 1975 to 22 April, 1978, 
when he became Minister of Labour before passing away in 1981213. 
Picture 2:  
                      
Governor Alberto Cassimo and Deputy Governor Adrião Rodrigues 
2.4.  The functioning of the Banco de Moçambique 
 
Based on the postulate of clause 16 of the Lusaka Agreement214and Article 3 of 
Decree-Law 2/75 (Banco de Moçambique’s Organic Law), the central bank began its 
work in Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques) on 25 July 1974 in the building 
formerly occupied by the BNU at Avenida 25 de Setembro (former Avenida da 
República).  
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Picture 3: 
 
Image of Banco Nacional Ultramarino. Source::Banco de Moçambique Photo collection 
 
Image of Banco de Moçambique. Source: Banco de Moçambique Photo collection 
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Under the Decree-Law 2/75, Banco de Moçambique inherited the BNU’s assets and 
took over its staff. Until 1978, the members of the board of directors and the majority 
of the managers were Portuguese215 except the Governor and Deputy-Governor, 
who were Mozambicans. 
For the first years the ʺBancoʺ adopted the BNU’s organic structure. The Governor 
appointed managers, but often the new managers emerged from among the existing 
staff. Although the Portuguese staff was expected to train the Mozambican 
employees, this could often not be done because the Portuguese left the country as 
soon as independence was declared. The nationals therefore had to learn by own 
experience.216During the Third Congress debate, Alberto Cassimo, the first Governor 
of the Banco de Moçambique, reported that among the 4 750 financial system 
employees, 3 800 were nationals, and of the 680 employees in managerial positions, 
only 100 were Mozambicans; of the 2.900 skilled employees, 1,250 were nationals. 
Finally, of the 1,250 people performing menial tasks, 95per cent were 
Mozambicans.217 In addition to the above, there was also gender discrimination in 
the Bank. Joana Matsombe, a board member of the Banco de Moçambique, 
conveyed in a 2015 interview that all female employees, even if they had high school 
qualifications, were used as typists instead of being trained to take over specialised 
functions.218 
 The new Bank had to start working not only in an exceedingly difficult economic 
environment; it also had to conduct business in the face of a new upheaval. From 
1976 onwards an armed conflict began in the country. It was waged against the 
FRELIMO government by the National Resistance Movement (MNR, later renamed 
RENAMO).219 
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FRELIMO’s strategy was to mobilise the population through what it called 
"Dynamising Groups" (GDs – the Portuguese acronym) in residential areas, 
workplaces, in towns and even in the countryside. These groups had to counter acts 
of sabotage. They played an important role and helped to limit sabotage and the 
destruction of infrastructure. They also played a role in the restructuring of the 
economy.220 In this sphere their main tasks were activities such as organising people 
in various spheres as production and social life, fostering patriotic awareness and 
behaviour, setting up literacy campaigns, organising people to discuss and execute 
FRELIMO policies and strategies, particularly those aimed at countering acts of 
economic sabotage. The Banco de Moçambique’s Dynamising Group was formed on 
6 November, 1974, but it became official only on 26 December 1978. Sergio Vieira 
noted that the creation of the Party cell in the central bank guarantees the exercise 
of popular power.221 Cassimo declared that "to proceed with governmental 
objectives, the banks should not be out of touch with the economic and social 
conditions in our country.” Moreover, "the Banco de Moçambique should be an 
instrument of Economic Plan execution and control the activities of all productive 
entities".222 He argued that in the colonial era, the BNU supported the colonial 
economic development mobilizing free financial resources’ for this purpose. A total of 
60 per cent of 290 bank agencies were in Maputo. The third FRELIMO Congress of 
February 1977, set guidelines to achieve its objectives in strategic sectors of the 
national economy, including the financial system. During the Congress, FRELIMO 
discussed the need to reorganise the country’s banking structure in terms of 
contemporary objectives.223The Congress defined the need of the State to control 
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the key sectors of the economy.224 The restructuring of the Bank was undertaken in 
accordance with this new framework. 
From 1975 to the time of the Third Congress, the FRELIMO strategy was to lay the 
foundations for socialism and to ensure the functioning of the economy. It was at this 
Congress that FRELIMO proclaimed itself a Marxist-Leninist party, and the Banco de 
Moçambique was defined as the instrument for controlling the economy. One of the 
consequences of the socialist development strategies for the monetary policy was 
that production results dropped dramatically and the Banco de Moçambique and the 
Instituto de Credito de Moçambique had to finance the deficits of the companies in 
order to ensure social stability and continue production in terms of Law 33/76 of 23 
September, 1976.225 Through its control over the banks (now owned by the State), 
the government pumped paper money into the economy to avert chaos.226 
Similar to the action taken by most banks in newly independent countries, the Banco 
de Moçambique initially adopted a restrictive management policy by intervening via 
the use of direct instruments of monetary policy. This was because the financial 
system was underdeveloped. Therefore, direct instruments were the only feasible 
instruments available until markets and frameworks were developed, allowing the 
use of indirect instruments. 
The management of price stability through direct instruments involves the use of 
interest rates and credit control through State regulation. According to Keynes’ 
explanation, in order to regulate the cost, availability, supply of money and credit, a 
central bank may use either its capacity to regulate the system (direct instruments) 
or to influence the money market through monetary variables (indirect instruments). 
The direct instruments seem to be the initial policy option taken by emerging central 
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banks. An IMF study states that such instruments had been successful in some 
industrial countries until the mid-1980s. They result from a combination of political, 
administrative and technical factors,227 including exchange rates and interest 
rates.228Other important reasons for the adoption of direct instruments include 
transparency, low fiscal costs, easy management of direct credit for priority sectors, 
easy implementation and negotiation of such instruments and the fact that they are 
responsive to any monetary instrument objectives.229 
S.de Abreu has supported this policy option. When reviewing the objectives of 
Decree-Laws 35 and 36/74 of 26 November, she emphasised the reasons for 
adopting a repressive policy in terms of interest rates. At that time, currency 
fluctuations were controlled administratively. This constituted a lucrative field for the 
parallel (informal) market, where the exchange rate came to be 46 times higher than 
the official market. Hence, an apparent stability of the currency was created and 
inflation was controlled. However, it led to an accumulation of financial and structural 
imbalances in the national economy.230 
On the other hand, according to S. de Abreu, whereas in developed countries where 
interest rates are generally determined by the market, in developing countries such 
as Mozambique, the authorities often impose maximum or minimum limits on the 
interest rates for loans and deposits.231 
2.5. The Metica – a currency that was never used 
Joaquim Chissano, who was Prime Minister at the time, said that during the 
negotiations for establishing a central bank, the steering committee that was dealing 
with the matter, asked him about a name for the new currency.  
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He consulted the historian Dr Fernando Ganhão (a member of FRELIMO). 
Ganhãosaid that the currency which circulated in the early stages of the colonial era 
in Mozambique had been the "metikal", (It had the equivalent of 4,83 grams of 
powdered gold in a feather). This was the first piece of currency to be displayed in 
the Money Museum in Maputo. The term "mit'qal” or “mit'ghal” comes from Arabic-
Swahili and was the currency used for transactions in the pre-colonial period.232 
The Prime Minister remembered how people called the Portuguese currency in use 
in Mozambique during the colonial era: 1 escudo (“xi–cudo”), 50 cents (“quinhenta”), 
20 cents (“duzenta”) and 10 cents (“sareji”).For the plural forms, they said “psi-cudo”, 
“miquinhenta”, “maduzenta e massaraji”. Those were the pronunciations of the 
people who lived south of the Save River, i.e., from Inhambane to Maputo. In some 
regions the currency was called “copper" (singular) and “ma-copper" (plural). 
Chissano wondered whether the people would say (ma) metikal (singular) or (ti) 
metikal (plural). However, a proposal was made to simplify the singular to "Metica", 
so that the plural would be "ma-Metica" or "ti-Metica", which was easier to say. In 
Portuguese the plural form would be "Meticas" and this represented its semantic and 
historical evolution from the days of colonisation and enslavement. Therefore, this 
name would not be adopted literally but rather in an evolutionary way.233 
Since the decision on “Metica”, the steering committee immediately began the 
process of getting the paper money printed and coins minted given that 
Independence Day was close. The currency was produced by the British firm 
Thomas De La Rue, and was received in Mozambique, but it was never released for 
circulation.234 
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Nobody could say whether, during the steering committee’s co-ordination and 
consultation visits to party leaders in Dar-es-Salaam, the committee had in fact ever 
suggested this name, or whether it had submitted a specimen for approval, in the 
implementation of a new currency.235 
President Samora Machel’s effigy appeared on the banknotes and on the coins. 
Later, when the currency was submitted to him, he did not approve of it, and ordered 
it to be withdrawn. 
Despite this setback, the need for a new national currency remained, although the 
matter was put in abeyance until after the proclamation of independence. After that, 
new notes and coins were designed, but without featuring the president. The way in 
which the old currency was to be replaced by the new money was kept confidential, 
so as to avoid any disruption of normal business. The transition only took place five 
years later. The name was changed to Metical, both for historical and security 
reasons. The security reasons pertained to the fact that the Metica was already in 
Mozambique, even though it was never actually in circulation. 
The profound social, economic, political and military crisis which prevailed in the 
immediate pre-independence years became the yeast needed for fundamental 
changes to mature. These included, in the financial sector, the Lusaka Agreement of 
1974, which spelled the end of the BNU’s activities in Mozambique and heralded in 
the establishment of the new central bank. 
Thus, in the period 1975-1977 Banco de Moçambique assumed the BNU activities 
which were in great measure commercial and with the main objectives to maintain a 
functional economy, similar to its predecessor. It was a transitional phase from a 
colonial banking system to a national one, where the central bank suffered great 
influence in the centrally planned economy. The national financial system was 
consolidated in 1977 with the end of Portuguese banks' activities, thereupon those 
assets and liabilities were integrated in the Banco de Moçambique.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE BANCO DE MOÇAMBIQUE IN A 
SOCIALIST REGIME (1977 – 1983) 
Bank Nationalization can be a confusing topic because it means 
different things to different people and there are a variety of 
reasons given by advocates for supporting such a move.236 
Nationalization means transferring the ownership or control of one 
or more banks from the shareholders to the government.237 
 
3.1 From a socialist society towards the transition to a market economy 
The years 1977 to 1983 can be considered a transition period from an economic 
crisis which had resulted from the process leading from colonialism to independence. 
During the period under review the new Mozambican authorities attempted to 
establish and consolidate a socialist society as an antithesis to the former colonial 
capitalist society which was based on exploitation and discrimination of the 
indigenous population in the interest of Portugal. 
The broad framework of macro-economic policy changed between 1977 and 1983. 
However, when one considers periodization of Mozambique’s history, one finds that 
periodisation is connected to the periods reviewed. Mosca, for example, stated that 
according to Oppenheimer (1994) and Baltazar Jr (1993), the transition period run 
from 1973 to 1977, given the characteristics of the Mozambican economy. The 
period between 1977 and 1981 represents the period of recovering and planning 
whilst the time between 1981 and 1986 represents the crisis during the war.238 If the 
focus is on the financial system, then the two-year period of 1973-74 is one of crisis 
and disruption, leading to the emergence of a new system in 1975 which continued 
to 1977. The banking sector was characterised by integration and restructuring. In 
1977 FRELIMO’s Third Congress was held which defined the government’s socialist 
strategy and its economic policy. 
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The Congress determined that the state, through its development plan, would control 
and direct the key sectors of the economy. This new policy direction was supported 
by a financial plan that would be driven by the Banco de Moçambique answering to 
the bank’s double function as both a state and a central bank. This bank was 
designated to play a crucial role in the economy.239 
The first indication of the implementation of socialist policies was the nationalisation 
of priority social sectors such health, education, funeral services and land ownership 
on 24 July 1975, and housing on 3 February 1976. It undermined expectations that 
small Portuguese investors would return to Mozambique. This was a clear 
expression of social and economic intention to change the colonial order. Moreover, 
it consolidated growth of the state sector as a strategy of economic reorganization. 
Nationalisation was a starting point of socialism and planning in particular with the 
integration of the financial system in 1977, as well as the state take-over of the 
companies abandoned by Portuguese owners. 
 
The social reforms were spearheading the new socialist development policy: the 
latter having a profound impact on production and on the social-economic 
development of the country. Mozambique under FRELIMO had opted for socialist 
development. Speeches made during that time reflect a primacy of politics over 
economic issues. Mosca has stated that, for this reason, some decisions that could 
be considered politically correct at the time impacted adversely on the economy.240 
The economy was dealt a serious blow when thousands of Portuguese left 
Mozambique just before and during the first years of independence, probably 
because they experienced a threat to their existential security after 1975. Mosca 
refers to the radicalization of the FRELIMO politic propaganda. The majority of 
Portuguese people left the country around independence, because the social 
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violence and transition crisis led them to fear for their lives and nationalisations of 
their property.241 
In addition, far too few Mozambican technicians had been trained, and this small 
group could not fill the hundreds of vacancies left behind by the departing 
Portuguese technicians. The country would come to resent these first years of 
independence as a time of great difficulty caused by the massive exodus of the 
Portuguese. This was aggravated by the devastating effect of the Portuguese policy 
of discrimination in education that had caused an illiteracy rate in excess of 90per 
cent, thus reducing further the number of technicians with higher education capable 
of sustaining the production sectors. 
Economic sabotage was committed when company assets were repatriated illegally 
as the case published in the Noticias Newspaper article on October 2, 1977, where 
the Banco Comercial de Angola confirmed the reported repatriation of millions 
escudos to cover export tariffs but the country never receive the correspondent 
commodities.242 Capital was transferred out of the country with the connivance of the 
commercial expatriate banks; the import orders were falsified; goods such as 
equipment and vehicles were exported illegally and a massive destruction of 
equipment, agricultural infrastructure and products, led the government to publish 
Decree-Law 16/75 of 13 February 1975 (also known as 24/20). This decree 
established Administrative Committees authorized to intervene in companies that 
were abandoned or sabotaged.243 
To halt the massive outflows of foreign currency, from 5 November, 1975, Banco de 
Moçambique took control of external transactions, which reduced the operations and 
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profits of the expatriate banks.244 Mozambique’s adherence to sanctions against 
Rhodesia since 16 March 1976, in solidarity with the United Nations following the 
unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith, dried up an important source of 
foreign exchange245 derived from the use of Beira’s port services and the sale of 
refined petroleum products to the beleaguered regime. Moreover, Rhodesia 
retaliated by launching attacks against Mozambique’s infrastructure to discourage 
support for the Zimbabwean liberation movements, and also by destabilizing the 
country through its support of the National Resistance Movement (MNR) anti-
government movement,246 as did FRELIMO to Rhodesia. 
Zimbabwe became independent in April 18, 1980, and RENAMO shifted its base to 
South Africa. The South Africa government undertook to support RENAMO as an act 
of revenge against FRELIMO for aiding the African National Congress (ANC). 
Mozambique was subjected to attacks which resulted in the destruction of property 
and infrastructure, as did the ANC in South Africa. South Africa also reduced the 
number of Mozambican miners who were recruited from around 120,000 to 
approximately 40,000. Many miners were repatriated.247In another move, the South 
African government decided to stop payments to the Banco de Moçambique from 19 
May 1978 that were due under the 1928 migrant labour agreement.248 
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The MNR which was later known as RENAMO began its anti-FRELIMO operations in 
Manica and Sofala. By 1976 the insurrection had reached the south, namely, 
Inhambane, Gaza and Zambezia. Civil war raged throughout the country.249 
Apart from the economic and social crisis that Mozambique had to contend with in its 
first decade of independence, the country was hit by a prolonged drought which 
alternated with severe floods, and with the effect of the global oil-price crisis and its 
inflationary impact.250 
Mozambiqueˈs foreign policy has resulted in declining foreign exchange revenue 
from South Africa’s use of the Maputo harbour and Zimbabwe’s use of the Beira 
harbour and railway. This revenue stream diminished drastically as a result of the 
prevailing regional hostilities.251 
In the international arena, the United States and NATO supported Portugal on 
account of US interest in the Lajes base in the Azores while also nominally 
supporting South Africa, to safeguard the oil routes from the Persian Gulf to the 
United States.252FRELIMO’s allies were the Soviet Union and China, and therefore 
Mozambique positioned itself squarely within the ambit of the Cold War.253 
From the late 1970s onwards, the intensity of the Cold War began to decline, 
resulting in a relaxation of tensions between East and West. The formation on 1 April 
1980 of the Southern African Development Coordination Committee (SADCC) 
brought some hope to Third World countries, particularly in southern Africa, since it 
was expected that much-needed funds for development projects would be 
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forthcoming. However, the Reagan and Thatcher governments in the US and the UK 
were still locked in a Cold War mind-set. Mozambique continued to be classified as a 
communist country and was blacklisted by the US, which indirectly gave support to 
the forces that were bent on its destabilisation.254 The impact of these concurrent 
circumstances was reflected in all spheres of the economy. The foreign revenue 
(including the earnings from the labour supplied to South African gold mines) 
supported the payment for essential imports only up to1982. Prakash Ratilal, a 
former Governor of Banco de Moçambique, recounts the dilemma of the inter-
ministerial committee headed by the Minister of Commerce and the Central Bank 
Governor that had the tough task to decide on import priorities. The choice was 
between food, or raw materials or other products for the country. For example the 
import priorities, of milk for children to medicines, were decided by the number of 
votes of the members of the commission, considering the scarcity of foreign 
currency. At the end of 1983 the international reserves were about US$ 14-million, 
sufficient for only one week of imports.255 
Yasmin Patel, who was a Banco de Moçambique Executive Director, added that in 
this period (1980-1983) the economy went into a downward spiral. In 1983 GDP fell 
8 per cent, the foreign exchange current account deficit corresponded to 22 per cent 
of GDP and the debt service ratio reached 131 per cent. At the end of the period 
gross international reserves were sufficient for only one week of imports.256 In sum, 
the general government budget recorded a large deficit, and the Central Bank had to 
issue notes to finance public investment.257 
The fall in exports and rise in imports accelerated the need for external financing of 
the economy. Between 1980 and 1983 the volume of domestic credit increased three 
times, in particular to industry and 30 per cent to agro-industry.258 According to 
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Wuyts, the main function of the financial system was to finance the circulating capital 
of the state enterprises through credit, while the state budget had to finance 
investment in fixed capital.  
Banco de Moçambique’s role was that of principal financier and it extended 77 per 
cent of all credit granted, followed by Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento with 19 per 
cent. Thus the state banks provided 96per cent of local credit. The remaining 4 per 
cent came from the only private bank.259It was the reorganisation of the banking 
system that made the financing of state companies possible; this was in accordance 
with the government’s development plan. 260 
The challenge to the state was to distribute the financial resources and the raw 
materials to achieve the planned production levels and to guarantee equal 
distribution of resources to the population.261State enterprises’ annual plans, (which 
institutional apparatus for state planning was the National Planning Commission, 
created on 8, May 1978, by presidential Decree 33/78) set out sector targets 
determined by law obligatory to fulfil, combined with direct resources allocation. 
Mosca stated that the first Central State Plan (PEC- acronym in Portuguese) was 
extended in 1978 for the period 1978/79. It included tasks, targets and deadlines for 
ministries, economic and social sectors. The plan was the instrument of access to 
financial resources and included those companies considered important in socialist 
development.262 
The stores soon ran out of most of their usual merchandise and there was a general 
shortage of consumer products, spare parts and raw materials. Mozambican families 
survived on horse mackerel and cabbage, and an individual rationing system, to 
supply basic products such as rice, sugar, soap, beans, cooking oil, salt, per month 
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for each member of family controlled by a "supply card."263 In Maputo the system 
was controlled by the ʺMaputo Supply Organization Officeʺ, one of the state 
companies created to coordinate supplies to consumers and to the productive 
sector.264 
This card was linked to a network of consumer shops where families had to buy in a 
tied system in their residential areas. Additionally there were co-operatives and 
"people's shops” that from time to time distributed other kinds of products such as 
bread, eggs, milk, beverages, clothes and kids toys under a controlled system. The 
prices of essential products were centrally fixed by the government hoping to control 
inflation and guarantee a flow of funding to the productive state companies, just to 
ensure an equitable distribution of the output. The State General Budget depended 
on a "centralized state plan”, because the aim was to achieve maximum social 
justice in a socialist system.265 
The period 1977 to 1983 was characterized by an expanding state sector and central 
planning system in line with the Third Congress directives to combat low productivity, 
investing in a strong state sector and rural socialism. The development axis revolved 
around converting the private sector into a state sector.266 The agricultural, industrial, 
agro-industrial, import/export companies as well as certain companies in other 
economic sectors (which had been either abandoned, sabotaged or under-
capitalised) were integrated into the state planning system to qualify for an 
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administrative allocation of investments, (excluding private enterprises). This was the 
process through which the large state sector was built.267 
According to Pitcher, by 1982 almost 73 per cent of industrial, commercial and 
agricultural companies were state owned enterprises or nationalised (meaning 
former private companies under state control), and only 27 per cent remained private 
enterprises.268 
Citing Machungo, who was Minister of Planning and Agriculture, the plan was meant 
to reorganise the country’s economic and social life. Socialism could not be 
implemented without a plan, and this plan determined the distribution of financial 
resources.269 For Cruz e Silva, the radical restructuring of the existing economy into 
a centrally planned state-run economy, did not solve the crisis brought about by the 
dismantling of the structures of the colonial economy. Neither did it result in a 
consolidated socialist management platform that would make a rapid recovery, apart 
from not solving economic and social problems. 
Cruz e Silva attributes these failures partly to the civil war, natural calamities and to 
an inappropriate model that did not meet the needs of the people, particularly the 
needs of the farmers, probably because the strategy involved people who remained 
capitalist-orientated as they had been prior to independence. 270 In the early 1980s, 
public health, housing and education showed signs of being in crisis, the economy 
was in dire straits, while the internal and external public debt was rising alarmingly 
despite state subsidies channelled to social services and state companies.271 
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Between 1980 and 1984 the deficit on the current account was estimated to be 14 
per cent of GDP, two-thirds of which was funded by donations and external credit.272 
Mosca states that the economic growth between 1975 and 1981 was about 5 per 
cent, while the official (State-controlled) inflation rate was between 1 to 2 per cent.273 
Arthur Gove was of the opinion that the economic policy was a disaster because of 
the high demand for consumer goods against a weak market supply. Castel-Branco 
and Ratilal considered the policy to yield good results, at least until 1981. They point 
out that from 1977 to 1981 exports grew by 83 per cent, with regard to the increased 
production results in the agricultural and industrial production indices, but after that, 
partly because of the civil war, a decline set in.274 Table 2 demonstrates the 
evolution of production between 1973 and 1986 at 1980 prices in meticais. In this 
table Abrahamsson and Nilsson show that between 1975 and 1981 the Global 
Production grew 18% not reflecting the impact of the metical that was about 2% per 
year during the period. 
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Table 2: Development of production and foreign trade1973-1986 
Year 1973 1974 1975 1977 1981 1983 1985 1986 
Development of global 
production -GDP (billion 
Meticais, 1980 prices) 
112 92 71 75 84 64 54 56 
- Agriculture 37 32 25 31 31 24 25 25 
- Industry and 
Fishing 
42 35 28 28 34 23 15 15 
- Transports 12 11 9 7 9 6 4 4 
Export 226 296 185 153 280 132 77 79 
Import 465 460 395 336 801 636 424 543 
Source: Abrahamsson H Nilsson A (1998) Moçambique em transição. p. 46. 
In 1973 the Mozambican economy reflected the impact of the colonial economic 
policy and reforms of the 1960s, followed by the decline in production from 1973 to 
1975. This decline was attributable to the difficulties encountered in the transition 
from colonial rule to national independence, as a result of the introduction of socialist 
economic policies. 
Between 1975 and 1981 there was a positive economic growth cycle, as a result of 
elements of crisis attenuation with the end of the liberation struggle and return of 
Portuguese to Portugal. More, the nationalizations policy of FRELIMO driven to 
reorganise the economy which was based on interventions in abandoned 
enterprises, investments in the public sector to consolidate and expand it, and the 
collectivization of production, made it possible to halt the downward spiral in 
production. In 1981 the growth rate reached the highest levels since independence, 
both in consumer goods and export goods. Mosca stated that in this period the 
economic growth was about 5 per cent, inflation rate was about 1 to 2 per cent and 
major economic indicators displayed positive performance.275The government was 
optimistic about developing the agricultural sector, which was defined as the “base of 
development”. This explains the considerable increase of state investment in large 
agricultural projects such as the 400.000 hectare for cotton in Cabo Delgado and 
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Niassa provinces, the Angonia agro-industrial project, the 120.000 hectare project in 
Manica, 300.000 hectares of irrigation in Limpopo Valley in the Gaza province. 276 
As shown below, in Table 3 a great volume of investment was directed at the 
agricultural sector. Construction includes infrastructure projects such as irrigation 
and dams.277 
Investment in agriculture more than doubled between 1978 and 1983. The strongest 
growth was in industry and energy, while initial high investment in construction 
served to build infrastructure as a matter of priority. The investment in the transport 
sector increased almost five-fold, because transport provision was a prerequisite for 
development in all the other productive sectors. 
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Table 3: Sectorial Allocation of Investment 1978-83 (million of meticais) 
 1978&1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
A. Economic 
sectors 
7,290 8,027 11,827 12,291 8,803 
1. Agriculture 1,095 2,271 4,181 4,826 2,560 
2. Industry and 
energy 
561 1,227 3,349 3,493 2,769 
3. Transport 177 155 345 468 1,012 
4. Construction  5,427 3,346 3,270 2,424 1,969 
5. Other - 1,028 682 1,080 484 
B. Social sectors  188 567 458 401 219 
1. State 
administration. 
311 660 753 184 179 
2. Local 
investment 
24 127 312 463 306 
3. Other  197 535 612 916 690 
Sourceː Wuyts, Money and Planning for Socialist Transition, 59 
Growth in the industrial sector was slow to take-off. There was a weakening between 
1974 and 1975, then displayed a slow but steady growth between 1975 and 1981, 
because it depended on State investment and was saddled with obsolete machinery 
and was seriously hampered by an acute lack of skilled labour. Table 4 shows the 
growth in the index of industrial production between 1974 and 1981. 
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Table 4: Index of industrial production evolution (1974=100) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
100 65 65 66 69 72 75 78 
Source: Castel-Branco. Problemas Estruturais da Industrialização, 98. 
The expansion of industry did not match the high volume of investment, and this 
reflects the incompatibility of the national development plan and the financial plan. 
Industry was defined as the “dynamising” sector. This situation called for a massive 
investment to consolidate the existing productive capacity and to achieve higher 
production.278 
The financial plan was funded by a combination of domestic credit and foreign loans. 
The master plan was to pay for such loans from surpluses of investments in large 
projects, which never materialised because these projects never generated profit. 
This policy increased the money supply resulting in monetary disequilibria, which 
hampered the process of transforming production during the socialist transition. 279 
The reorganisation of the agriculture sector included the creation of state companies 
by appropriating, in terms of Decree-Law 16/75, the abandoned enterprises from the 
period immediately following independence. The state provided significant funding 
for mechanisation (3,000 tractors, 300 combine harvesters and other machinery 
imported in four years from 1977) and for the development of State-owned farms. On 
the other hand no hoes were imported at a time that domestic manufacturing of hoes 
had all but collapsed. This shows the neglect of the family and cooperative 
sectors.280 The investments were intended not only to consolidate increased 
production but to regain 1973 production levels.281 
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Table 5 shows the effect of state reorganisation of agriculture production levels 
between1977 and 1981, because farming resumed at the end of the war. 
Table 5: Agricultural production, 1977 to 1981(in metric tons) 
 1977(metric 
ton) 
1981(metric 
ton)  
Percentage 
growth (per 
cent) 
Maize 34,0 78,3 130  
Cotton seed 52,0 73,6 41.5 
Tea–green 
leaves 
79,0 99,2 25.6 
Citrus 25,0 36,7 46.8 
Source: FRELIMO Party: IV Congress Economic and Social Guidelines, 1983, Maputo 
In this period maize production increased by 130per cent, cotton seed by 41,5per 
cent, tea by 25.6per cent and citrus by 46.8 per cent. It would appear that the 
economic and financial management measures were successful, but the overall 
recovery in the agriculture and other sectors could not be sustained. Inappropriate 
agricultural policy was based on gigantic state projects and cooperatives through 
ʺcommunal villagesʺ intended for mass production. This was unsustainable. Despite 
the political (socialist) fervour (as reported by Abrahamson and Nilsson) output 
declined after 1981. In 1983 the lower production levels in sectors such as 
agriculture, industry, fishing and transport impacted adversely on the external trade 
figures (imports and exports) as previously mentioned by Patel.282 
In response to civil war and natural disasters, people living in rural communities 
began to abandon agricultural pursuits and migrated to the cities. This worsened the 
already precarious supply of consumer products.  
Between 1977 and 1981 signs of an economic recovery began to appear. 
Investments began to modernize, consolidate and expand the state sector, 
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particularly in mechanization of agriculture, thanks to a relatively peaceful 
environment.283 The Third Congress Social and Economic Directives stressed the 
need to increase production and productivity to the level of 1973 as a priority. In the 
rural area the strategy was the socialization of production through ʺcommunal 
villagesʺ, which met with resistance of farmers in some cases, as they had to leave 
their areas of origin. The state controlled the key sectors of the economy by funding 
financial needs through state banking). These sectors were large scale agriculture, 
major industries, wholesale trade and banking.284 The centralized management of 
many companies were abandoned and scattered. The major projects were 
transformed into state-owned companies such as Complexo Agro Industrial do 
Limpopo CAIL, EMOCHA EE,Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique-CFM in the 
railway sector, in the road transport the ROMOS, ROMOC and ROMON, whose 
capital management and production ultimately became the source of the widespread 
management crisis of the state companies.285 
Mosca notes that the apparent economic recovery in the period from 1977 to 1981 
reflects the growth cycle but developed contradictions because of the application of 
the socialist economic model. During the same period other crisis factors deepened, 
such as change of economic agents, the management’s concentration of production 
in the state which led to general inefficiency, the marginalization of the family sector 
and increasing poverty and inequality. These developments caused disruption and a 
need for reform.286 
 In the regional context there were coordinated efforts with the British government to 
resolve the Rhodesian problem where President Machel had an important role up to 
the Lancaster House Agreement which led to peace in Zimbabwe. Because of it 
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Prime-Minister Margaret Thatcher was grateful,287 and this brought expectations of 
peace and better regional co-operation. The independence in Zimbabwe on 18 April 
1980 cleared the way for normal relations between the two neighbouring countries.  
Internally, President Machel launched a “Political and Organisational Offensive" in 
March 1980, to correct general mismanagement of companies and institutions and to 
boost production.288 This was the turning point when he decided on the privatization 
of retail trade and small activities such as small scale industries, restaurants, hotels, 
to release the state from managing of small companies and allowing the state the 
opportunity to concentrate on the direction of the economy and large projects.289 The 
President directed visits to state companies, ports, factories to detect cases of 
corruption, negligence and mismanagement, addressing plan compliance, work 
discipline and good management.290 
As already mentioned, after 1981 the economic performance again showed a 
downward trend due to the escalation of the civil war and hostility with the 
neighbouring countries, drought and a shortage of foreign exchange for imports. In 
1983 state revenue was low because of increased military spending and subsidies to 
consumers and state-run companies that were highly` in debt.291 
Due to this state of affairs, with lower exports and imports and the demand for 
consumer goods, spare parts and raw materials exceeding supply, the commercial 
network contracted as former Portuguese owners abandoned their interests. This 
boosted inflation and it was a fertile environment for the emergence of a ‘parallel 
market’.292The commercial sector was also in a state of crisis because of 
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government’s policies that led to a critical rise in inflation. On the one hand, the 
private sector battled with high prices for necessary imports while on the other, 
export earnings were low. 
This situation led to a revision of domestic economic policy. A strategic long-term 
Indicative Prospective Plan (PPI, acronym in Portuguese) was conceived by the 
Mozambican government to foster the development in divers sectors and address 
the anticipated weak development in the decade1980/1990. 
It was in this context that the following projects were planned: 400,000 hectares for 
cotton production in Niassa and Cabo Delgado; the Mocuba Textile Complex; The 
Texmoque factory in Nampula; Accelerated Development Project of Limpopo and 
Incomati; the Moatize coal project; and power transmission lines from Cahora Bassa 
to Zambezia and Nampula.293 These and other projects were, part of the ʺrevised 
domestic economic policyʺ and they were regarded as being the anchor of regional 
development. 
FRELIMO’s Fourth Congress was held from 26-30 April 1983, when the economic 
and financial policies were reviewed.294 The congress was convened in the midst of 
severe economic and social crisis due to war and drought, exacerbating their own 
failing policies. These compounded to devastate the country. This congress criticized 
the economic policy as laid down by the Third Congress, in particular the size of the 
State sector, the neglect of family and co-operative agriculture and private 
enterprises, all of which had led to economic hardship and poor results 
The economic and social Directives of the Fourth Congress defined the development 
goals until 1985, according to which the family agriculture sector was important for 
the production of consumer goods and exports, so the state should support that 
sector with the production of tools, industrial consumer goods, seeds and training. 
Since state agriculture was responsible for 50per cent of production, it should be 
restructured and resized, improving management by establishing better relationships 
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with the co-operative, family and private sectors. The congress stressed the need for 
small industrial units for the processing of domestic raw materials, local opportunity 
where private activity would have an important role, stressing the importance of 
coordination of private business with the state in various areas of economic 
activity.295 The foreign reserves of Mozambique stood at almost nil due to the 
demand for imports to feed inefficient production systems, and for weaponry for the 
civil war. 296 
The congress defined important economic and social guidelines aimed at revitalising 
an economy that was clearly in crisis. The congress was especially concerned about 
high government expenditure, and about rural development and industrial strategies. 
The overall aim, however, was to “purify and consolidate” the socialist model and its 
ideology.297 The important role of the private sector was recognised and a start was 
made to give it more attention and financial support. Small-scale farming and light 
industries benefited as well, with the ultimate aim being to increase production.298 
Since the objectives were to concentrate resources in the State sector while also 
promoting economic development, macroeconomic adjustments became imperative. 
In this sense the policy on prices was reviewed and changed, and monetary and 
fiscal reforms were introduced to reduce the huge national deficit. 
Decisions of the Fourth Congress determined that “… we must ensure that all 
available resources are concentrated in the Government Budget, including those 
resulting from donations by the international community.299 
According to Wuyts, money creation was the strategy resorted to balance the 
national budget to cover the financial plan. That created economic imbalances which 
reflected either to the national economy or to the foreign exchange reserves that led 
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to weak economic results, stagnation and low productivity. That brought pressure to 
bear on the financial system to seek foreign loans.300 The preparatory discussions 
prior to the Fourth Congress and after the Congress itself led to the consolidation of 
new ideas about the economic policy pursued since the Third Congress, in particular 
the over-concentration of financial and material resources in the state sector, 
particularly in the large projects. This was seen as the major constraint hampering 
the development of the private sector and small privately owned projects that could 
turn out consumer goods to satisfy the demand for basic necessities.301 
In sum, the Congress reaffirmed that the country could develop further along 
socialist lines. The Mozambican government desired to develop the planned 
economy but also wished to change the financial system so that it would be 
controlled by the state through the central bank. At that stage the central bank was 
composed of Portuguese commercial banks’ branches, and this was seen as a 
hindrance towards attaining the desired socialist objectives. The first great reform 
was the restructuring and integration of the financial system in 1977. 
3.2 Restructuring, integration or nationalisation of the financial system 
(1977- 1978) 
At independence the financial system in Mozambique consisted of nine banks, with 
around 5,170 employees.302 The banks were the Banco de Moçambique and the 
overseas branches of Portuguese commercial banks. The latter were Banco de 
Credito Comercial e Industrial-BCCI; Banco Comercial de Angola-BCA with 
headquarters in Luanda; Banco de Fomento Nacional-BFN; Banco Pinto & Sotto 
Mayor-BPSM; Banco Standard Totta of Mozambique-BSTM; Casa Bancária in Beira-
CBM; Caixa Económica de Montepio de Moçambique-CEMM; and the Instituto de 
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Crédito de Moçambique-ICM (see chapter 2). Only the Banco Standard Totta de 
Moçambique had a small slice of local shareholding, namely 15 per cent.303 
Although Portugal nationalised its banks in March 1975, followed by the 
nationalization of the industrial and financial groups that were shareholders,304 its 
branches in Mozambique continued to operate as before. This structure remained 
unchanged for about two-and-a-half years after independence. 
 
The new Banco de Moçambique inherited a financial system where almost all the 
players were expatriate banks. According to Pitcher, these banks were in the red 
before the end of colonial rule because most of them as the Banco de Credito 
Comercial e Industrial and Banco de Fomento Nacional had made bad investments 
in a series of companies. The banks had links with Portuguese financial oligarchies, 
with headquarters in Portugal and Angola, except the Banco Standard Totta de 
Moçambique. Most of the bankers did not agree with the Mozambican government 
policy and without forex activities most of them were in a precarious position.305 
The new government perceived the existing bank system to be incapable of 
contributing to the struggle for economic independence.306 
At the Third Congress of FRELIMO in February 1977 it was decided to establish a 
new financial system. The Banco de Moçambique was to function as an instrument 
for the control of the economy.307 Before this decision came into operation the 
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expatriate banks transferred their funds out of the country, thus almost draining the 
economy of cash and capital.308 
In order to ensure the functioning of a supportive financial system, the government 
passed Decree-Law 5/77 which was designed to integrate the banking system. From 
1 January 1978, Casa Bancaria de Moçambique had to cease operations, and its 
assets and liabilities were integrated to the Bank. The same was to apply to the 
Banco de Credito Comercial and to the Banco Comercial de Angola.309 These two 
latter banks had their headquarters in Angola, and in these two cases the decision 
was taken after consultation with the Angolan authorities. 
Decree-Law 6/77 created the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD), by merging 
the Instituto de Credito de Moçambique with the Caixa Económica de Montepio de 
Moçambique, both of which had been ordered to terminate all business.310 
According to Corniche, one of the former Bank's Governor, the fate of the 
Portuguese banks in Mozambique were not decided without meticulous analyses. 
The main criterion was to establish which bank had its head office in Mozambique 
and which had their head offices in Lisbon or Luanda. In respect of those Portuguese 
banks that had been nationalised by Decree-Law 132-A-75, no negotiations were 
considered necessary given Mozambique’s independence.311 The Banco de 
Fomento Nacional and the Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor were dissolved, and had to 
close their Mozambican operations within a year.312The implementation of the 
Decree-Law 5/77 was preceded by arduous sessions of negotiations between 
Portugal and FRELIMO in Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques) and in Lisbon. The 
aim was to reach common ground concerning the terms and conditions of how to 
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end the Portuguese banks’ operations in Mozambique. In respect of the Banco de 
Fomento Nacional and the Banco Pinto Sotto Mayor, arguments ensued as to who 
should be liable for compensation to the Portuguese depositors for losses incurred. 
Portugal insisted that Banco de Moçambique had to compensate the Portuguese 
depositors but Mozambique claimed it was a responsibility of Portugal. The 
Portuguese delegation abandoned the negotiations in March 1979 without 
consensus having been reached, and both Banco de Fomento Nacional and Banco 
Pinto Sotto Mayor had to close down in Mozambique.313 
The integration of private banksˈ branches into the Bank had as main objective to 
avoid risk in the forthcoming economic and social revolution, given that those banks 
were not very successful in Mozambique, because originally their business was 
centralized on exploring the colonial market.314 Apart from commercial banking 
activities these banks were subsequently required to finance specific joint-ventures 
and investments to financial groups that they were linked with.315 
In addition to exercising the main central bank functions, the Banco de Moçambique 
had to extend credit to large state enterprises whereas the Banco Popular de 
Desenvolvimento had to finance state infrastructure and the industrial and 
agricultural sectors. The Banco Standard Totta de Moçambique was assigned to 
finance the private sector.316 
The outcome of restructuring and integration of the banking sector was that, Banco 
de Moçambique got to be the sole controller of the financial services market. It 
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conducted 100 per cent of offshore banking transactions (Order of 4 November 
1977),317 80 per cent of the credit market by 1988, and it held 90 per cent of the 
deposits of large companies.318The axiom that drove the 1977 banking reform in 
Mozambique is controversial given that the Mozambican authorities and even the 
financial sector itself assumed that all that was required was a simple integration and 
restructuring process since the banks were in a crisis and were technically bankrupt. 
According to Comiche and Vieira, "there was nothing to nationalise." On the other 
hand, according to Maleiane, nationalisation would imply taking over indemnities of 
the bank’s shareholders.319 In fact, Decree-Law 5/77 had forecast that this would 
indeed be the case.  
Since the government had opted for a planned economy, the interventions in the 
economy and the nationalisation of several companies were pragmatic responses to 
the outflow of capital, the prevalence of absenteeism and even sabotage.320 The 
state felt it had to play a controlling role to ensure the proper functioning of the 
financial system.321 
Unlike the nationalisation programme of 1974-75 in education, public heath, land 
ownership and funeral services, which targeted the socialisation of social services, 
the banking reform was aimed at saving the financial system from imminent collapse. 
Therefore the first thing to happen was that all but one bank closed down, and all 
their residual assets were transferred to the new central bank.  
Theoretically, nationalisation occurs when the regulator took over the insolvent or 
near-insolvent banks in short order to return the troubled banking scenario to “best 
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practice.”322 Elliot defines its meaning as the transfer of the ownership or control of 
one or more banks from the shareholders to the government,323 commanding or not 
a majority stake, with one or more purpose such as to avoid future morally 
hazardous issues and protect management from excessive risks, to redirect banks’ 
policies towards socially desirable goals and away from bad practices.324 This action 
is not uncommon in the banking world. Similar examples occurred in the United 
States with the Continental Illinois (1984) and the Indy Mac Bank (2008), which 
afterwards was sold to private groups. There were similar situations in Sweden, 
Indonesia (1990s), in the United Kingdom (2008), in China, Russia, North Africa and 
South America.325 
Mosca argues that the growth of the state sector in Mozambique can be attributed to 
the decolonisation process and to the selective nationalisation programme in 
Portugal, particularly in the financial sector, rather than to the economic policy of the 
new government.326 
In the case of the Mozambican financial system the previous shareholders had 
resigned their responsibilities, without being reimbursed, in response to 
decolonisation. There were no longer any technical or other systems to keep the 
banks operational even if they were to be nationalised. Those banks that had not 
been nationalised in Portugal (CBM, BCCI and BCA) had to cease operations and 
were integrated into the new central bank. Those that had been nationalised were 
ordered to wind down their operations (BFM and BPSM).327 The Mozambican 
                                                          
322Douglas Elliot, Bank Nationalization: What Is? Should We Do It? 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ research/files/papers/2009/2/25-bank-nationalization-
elliott/0225_bank_nationalization_elliott.pdf Accessed 27 June 2015. 
 
323 Ibid, 13. 
 
324 Ibid, 15. 
 
325 Moore Heidi, ʺCrisis Q&A: What “Bank Nationalization” means for you, The Wall Street Journal, 
January 21, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/01/21/crisis-qa-what-bank-nationalization-
means-for-you/, accessed February 18, 2016. 
 
326 Mosca, Economia de Moçambique,149. 
 
327 Comiche, ʺO Processo de reestruturação e Integração da Banca,ʺ 71. Wuyts, ʺ A Organização das 
Finanças e o Desenvolvimento Económico,ʺ 28.  
100 
 
authorities’ first move was to restructure the banks to avoid their imminent 
bankruptcy, which would send shockwaves throughout the economy 
Pitcher maintains the Portuguese government had hoped that the banks and 
companies controlled by the Mozambican government would be handed over to the 
private sector in 1978, and that the shareholders would be compensated. The state 
merged all banks, transferred their deposits to the Banco de Moçambique without 
compensation, and nationalised all big companies.328 
In Mozambique’s case outright nationalisation of banks was not feasible since the 
central bank had neither the capital nor the technical capabilities to absorb the 
troubled banks’ assets and removing them from the banks’ books. The only 
possibility was to close down the banks’ separate operations and to integrate and 
restructure them into the central bank. However, since in the medium to long term 
the state took control of the complete financial system in Mozambique, authors such 
as Wuyts, and Moscacame to the conclusion that the reforms did in fact amount to 
nationalisation.329 
The system that eventually emerged comprised two state-owned banks, the Banco 
de Mocambique and the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento and only one private 
bank, the Banco Standard Totta de Moçambioque. The nationalised banks 
guaranteed employment stability by financing deficits of productive enterprises, 
preventing collapse in production and ensured that the new financial system served 
the interests of the emerging socialist society in Mozambique.330 
At FRELIMO’s Third Congress the Economic and Social directives looked closely at 
India’s nationalisation of its banks in 1969, their objectives being to concentrate the 
funds held by private banks into one account at the central bank. The directives also 
wanted to ensure equity and the growth of the economy while also promoting social 
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welfare; control private monopolies, reduce regional imbalances and curb the 
expansion of the private banking sector. The congress concluded that what was 
good for India would be good for Mozambique. 331 
At the time of the Third Congress, the only operating private bank that survived the 
restructuring of the financial restructuring process was the Banco Standard Totta de 
Moçambique. This may have been because of its healthy financial structure, its 
capital composition that was partially domestic, and because this bank was never 
mentioned as having engaged in economic sabotage.332 
Mosca considered whether the nationalisations or re-structuring was caused by a 
lack of control over the evolution of the economy or as a coherent consequence of 
FRELIMO's economic policy intention of socialist experience, concluding that the 
political options had been defined before independence and the occasional facts 
may have shaped the process of bank nationalisation in Portugal.333The bank 
restructuring process consolidated the role of the Banco de Moçambique as the state 
banker, fiduciary circulation controller, commercial bank, while allowing control of 
credit and international cooperation.334 
Having inherited the central and commercial bank functions of the Banco Nacional 
Ultramarino in 1975 with its network of countrywide branches, the Banco de 
Moçambiqueˈs network was expanded trough the integration with the operations of 
the Banco Comercial the Angola, the Banco de Credito Comercial e Industrial and 
the Casa Bancária de Moçambique. The Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento, 
inherited Caixa Económica de Montepio de Moçambique and the Instituto de Credito 
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.With the entire financial system controlled by the state, a new credit and monetary 
policy for a centrally planned economy could be implemented. 
To assist in shoring up the national currency, a concentrated effort was made to 
increase the deposits. An extensive press campaign was launched to educate and 
encourage the people to entrust their savings to the bank. Up to that point personal 
savings did not feature in the financial system since most people either buried their 
savings or tried to hide their cash in unsafe or questionable places.335 
The Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento played a leading role in re-educating the 
general population and turning them into potential bank customers. This bank was 
commonly called the “bank of the barefooted”336 because it concentrated on 
mobilising the small savers. Soon people gained sufficient confidence and trust to 
turn their modest savings over to this bank in particular, and its customer base grew 
significantly. On 28 April 1978, President Machel appointed Sergio Vieira as the 
Banco de Moçambique’s Governor. Vieira was given instructions to transform the 
banking system into a tool to develop the national economy, and to resume the 
aborted mission to create a national currency (See Chapter 2). 
Signs of economic recovery were recorded between 1977 and 1981 (see table 2) 
along with some hope of a regional thaw in view of the Zimbabwean peace 
negotiations in which President Machel played an important role. In this period the 
nationalisation of the banks was completed, and this facilitated the monetary control 
by the central bank. Central bank Governor Sergio Vieira began “Operation Zero", 
the creation of the indigenous metical and its exchange rate with the Portuguese 
escudo.337 
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3.3. The metical as the new currency 
Before national independence, the creation of a central bank and a national currency 
was expected by the freedom fighters, as these two developments would constitute 
visible and tangible proof of the new country’s national economic independence. This 
remit was entrusted, among other tasks, to the nationalists who in 1974 became 
members of the transitional government. The central bank was established one 
month before independence (17 May 1975) but the new currency, the metical that 
was to have replaced the Portuguese escudo, could not be introduced and circulated 
because of a presidential fiat against its use (See Chapter 2 ). Albeit produced by 
Thomas de la Rue in London and delivered to the country before the Independence 
Day, its circulation was interdicted due to procedural reasons as mentioned in 
chapter 2.  The new currency was introduced on 16 June 1980 in terms of Decree-
Law 2/80, as a symbol of national monetary independence and sovereignty. The 
actual change-over was accomplished in three days, from 16 to 19 of June, after a 
preparation period that was shrouded in secrecy while “Operation Zero” was being 
planned and then executed. The task of introducing a new currency had been 
formally assigned to the central bank Governor338 Sérgio Vieira on 20 February 
1979. The Central Commission for Exchange of Currency was formed to organise 
the legislation for exchange, all the aspects related to the new currency.339 
The initial task force of Operation Zero was made up of Matias Xavier from National 
Security Services; Cândida Perestrelo, a member of the central bank board; Helmut 
Schubert from the Central Bank of the Democratic Republic of Germany (East 
Germany); who worked with Perestrelo in all administrative and other matters. As 
mentioned in chapter 2, immediately after independence President Machel turned his 
attention to the question of a national currency and instructed Vieira as the new 
Governor of central bank to get rid of the escudo and to substitute it with a new 
national currency. Machel felt that despite having political sovereignty, Mozambique 
would not be financially independent if the escudo was to remain as the medium of 
exchange.  
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From 1975 to June 1980 the escudo, issued by the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, 
circulated freely in Mozambique. On 12 March and 17 December 1979, under 
Decree 13/75, notes with values of 500$00 and 100$00 respectively made their 
appearance with the words “Banco de Mocambique” overprinted on them.340After 
Operation Zero began attempts at sabotaging the financial system were made, 
especially when in April 1977 counterfeit 1,000 escudo notes were secretly brought 
into Mozambique from South Africa.341 
 
According to Prakhash Ratilal, “…in 1975 we did not dominate the national economy. 
At that time, the creation of coin would have been of little significance. At present 
(1980) we have economic growth and development as the basis for monetary 
stability. The currency must be a balance between production and consumption…” 
342 
The implementation of the new currency began within days of the release date (16 
June 1980) so considerable quantities of cash were sent to every corner of the 
country. In order to keep the secrecy of this important transaction authorities spread 
the word that in the place of the escudos it was weapons.343 
Previously, the Governor had requested designs for the notes and coins from several 
people including the numismatist Guilherme Cabaço. Printing and minting began in 
the Democratic Republic after the President of the republic had given his approval. 
The late Jose Craveirinha, the most distinguished poet of Mozambique, contributed 
to the design. Under Decree-Law no. 2/80 of 16 June 1980, the metical was declared 
the official currency and formally and legally replaced the Portuguese escudo. 
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Picture 4: The Metical 
  
 
Specimen of coins and notes of new metical 
This law also decreed that the Central Bank of Mozambique was the only institution 
that was authorised to issue the metical and to determine the currency’s exchange 
rate. It was also authorised to intervene in monetary and foreign exchange markets. 
The central bank was mandated to determine the value, quality and quantity of the 
notes and coins, the inventory model and the mechanics of conversion. In addition to 
the previous law, Law no. 3/80 was approved in terms of which, from June 16, all old 
banknotes in circulation no longer had any value. These included the notes issued 
by the previous colonial administration and the notes that bore overprint “Banco de 
Moçambique”.344 
The change-over took place, thanks to the commitment and dedication of the staff of 
the central bank and the enthusiastic co-operation of the people. During the Fourth 
session of the People’s Assembly, the Central Commission for the Exchange of 
Banknotes statedː “The conclusion, in essence, of the exchange of banknotes within 
the three days as provided by law, although often carried out in extremely 
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unfavourable conditions (lack of roads, heavy rains, lack of communications, etc.) 
was made possible by the huge and enthusiastic participation of the people.”345 
After the introduction of the new unit of account was completed, the next step was to 
gain control over the foreign exchange reserves. These were always held in trust by 
South Africa and Portugal. It was imperative to prevent risk or any kind of pressure 
such as a re-opening of ʺfinancial contentionsʺ (as mentioned in Chapter 2) in the 
case of Portugal, one of the pre-conditions that emerged at the national 
independence negotiations. 
The South African Reserve Bank Governor, Dr C. L. Stals, immediately consented to 
transfer the reserves as requested by the Banco de Moçambique. Negotiations with 
the President of the Union Bank of Switzerland, Mr. de Wess, were concluded to 
take over these functions. Subsequently this bank became the depositary of 
Mozambican reserves.346 
The Portuguese Minister of Finance was reluctant to abdicate his country’s historical 
trustee depository role and to transfer the gold that belonged to Mozambique. The 
Banque de France was brought in as a mediator. Pierre Schwed (a manager of a 
financial intermediary company in foreign currencies) had to put pressure on the 
Portuguese to transfer the trustee depository role to the French bank. When 
Governor Vieira left the bank the gold and foreign exchange reserves were sufficient 
for seven months of imports as against the 15 days that prevailed when he assumed 
his post.347 
Chandavarkar compared the theoretical assumptions for the successful introduction 
of a new currency in a transition economy as set out by Einars Repse, President of 
the Bank of Latvia. Referring to the Latvian experience, Repse recommended the 
following steps and strategies: liberalisation of markets (foreign exchange and 
others); setting up an independent central bank; introduction of a new currency; 
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adjusting the financial system to open market principles; introducing floating 
exchange rates; and introducing and running an efficient monetary policy. In the area 
concerned with currency transition, Latvia stood the test of Repse’s model in that its 
own currency transition was a success. This was evidenced in a decline of the 
inflation rate and the emergence of a stable exchange rate.348 
Repse’s theoretical assumptions were applied and compared by Chandarvarkar to 
Mozambique’s actions in swapping an old currency for a new one. After the central 
bank was created in 1975 its functions were only consolidated in 1992 and only after 
that was it assigned the opportunity to establish and manage a national currency, the 
metical, which was introduced in 1980. 
Chandavarkar noted that, with the introduction of new currencies, transition 
economies registered a propensity to develop a “dollarisation”, a phenomenon where 
residents transferred part of their assets considered to a stronger currency,349 (in 
Mozambique it was the ZAR and US$) which involves the partial replacement of the 
national currency for offshore currencies in order to conduct the main functions of 
money in the economy. This was because nationals preferred to switch their financial 
assets to foreign currency deposits in an attempt to protect their money from the 
ravages of domestic inflation. This was a reactive conduct which fluctuated in 
tandem with the respective countries’ inflationary pressure.350 
The reforms of the decade between the 1970’s and 1980 have created an economic 
recovery cycle and a consolidation of the national financial system where the state 
had assumed the role as manager of the economy. At this stage the central bank 
became the executor of the economic policy for the state, granting credit in 
accordance with the needs of the centrally planned economy. Already at the end of 
the period under review, the models showed inefficiency that pointed towards reform. 
The policy change was anticipated at the Fourth Congress of the FRELIMO Party. 
The next phase was characterised by the adhesion of the country to the Institutions 
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of Bretton Woods and the introduction of economic liberalisation and a market 
economy. 
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Chapter 4: The central bank’s role in the process of financial 
system reform 1984-1992 
 
The role of the central bank is crucial in any 
process of financial system reform. So due to 
that the strategy of reform prioritized the 
separation of functions to fit the central bank with 
instruments and an enhanced autonomy. 
4.1 The reform of the financial system – 1984-1992 
The period under review, was the dawning era: changing from a socialist orientated 
economy to a market oriented economy. The reform of Mozambique’s financial 
system initiated in 1975 with the creation of the Banco de Moçambique began in 
earnest in 1977 when a national financial system began to emerge with new 
economic, monetary and credit policies designed to support and promote the 
government’s overall policy to transform Mozambique into a socialist society.  
The deterioration of the global economy during the 1970’s and 1980’s resulted from 
successive crisis of commodity and oil prices (1973-1974) and another crisis of 
1979-80, had adverse consequences for Third World countries in general and to 
Mozambique in particular. These developments contributed to rising current account 
deficits.351 Mozambique emerged from colonial rule in the acute global economic 
crisis at a time when the international focus was shifting to a New World Economic 
Order. Cooperation between socialist countries and the Third World resulted in a 
failed model of economic development. The collapse of the USSR in 1989 led to a 
world-wide retraction by socialist economies from the Third World and from 
Mozambique. Mozambique lost an important alternative source of external financing 
and oil supply. The political, economic and technological backwardness inherited 
from colonialism made the possibility of Mozambique overcoming the crisis more 
remote and avenging their development strategy improbable. In these circumstances 
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the pragmatic change of macroeconomic policy became a necessary alternative 
many countries contemplated – Mozambique also investigated such policy changes. 
The economic crisis which Mozambique faced in the mid-1970s to 1980s led to a 
reconsideration of the socialist development strategy, as the ruling party (FRELIMO) 
began to reflect on the disadvantages of the large-size and inefficiency of state 
enterprises. Frelimo began to entertain a more favourable perception of the private 
sector, as well as the need for a change in foreign policy. Internal and external 
factors impacted on the implementation of reforms, including the domestic political, 
social and economic environment, and also the international conjecture. 
It was from 1984 when Mozambique aligned itself more closely to the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, followed by the adoption of an economic readjustment program, ERP, in 
1987 that the implementation of neo-liberal reforms gained in substance. In the 
financial system a set of reforms designated “Guidelines for Financial Reform” was 
structured in 1990 by a joint team from the Banco de Moçambique and the Ministry 
of Finance. The main vector was the separation of central bank functions from 
commercial functions, and consequently creating a new commercial bank, the Banco 
Commercial de Moçambique. The latter acquired the central bank’s commercial 
banking functions and allowing the central bank to focus primarily on the 
consolidation of its operations and specialization in banking regulation and monetary 
control. 
The government and the central bank adopted a series of measures that were aimed 
at reducing both the effects of the legacy of an inherited backward economy and the 
weakening caused by socialist policies after 1975 and the subsequent economic 
crisis which resulted in a severe decline in production (of about 40 per cent) and a 
three-digit inflation rate. These measures included monetary policy reform that 
terminated the administrative control of the currency via rigid interest and exchange 
rates that had been practiced since 1974/75. Other measures included a reformed 
credit policy and the liberalization of prices.352 The Economic Rehabilitation Program 
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of 1987 was the platform around which the new financial system reforms were 
implemented.  
During the Fourth Congress FRELIMO conducted a reappraisal of the country’s 
socialist development. Its Economic and Social Directives defined the guidelines 
along which a planned economy would be developed while also prioritizing strategic 
actions to tackle economic and monetary imbalances and changes in foreign policy. 
The foreign policy changes included the signing of the Nkomati Accord with South 
Africa on 16 March, 1984, which represented good neighbourly cooperation and non-
aggression agreement.  
Because of the significant decline in production after 1983 and a drastic collapse in 
foreign earnings, Mozambique’s foreign exchange reserves were almost depleted. In 
the fourth Congress guidelines were defined on the need to proceed to 
macroeconomic adjustment and monetary and fiscal reforms. FRELIMOˈs guidelines 
emphasized the importance of small farmers, family farming, and the need for 
government to support state-owned enterprises, cooperatives and the private sector. 
The country embarked on a search for alternative sources of finance. With regard to 
the foreign policy the Congress defined the need of ʺmaking more friendsʺ and that 
Mozambique should adhere to multilateral or international institutions since that 
would provide benefits to the economy and Mozambican society. The Nkomati 
Accord, the negotiations for adherence to the Lomé Convention,353 the European 
Economic Community and membership of the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank were intended to open doors for achieving this goal.354 From then 
President Samora Machel oriented actions to liberalise and privatise small and 
medium enterprises, opening the economy to the private sector, cooperative and 
family sectors, and to attract direct investment.355 
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4.2 Mozambique and the Bretton Woods institutions after 1984.356 
The economic and social crisis since mid-1970s and early 1980s induced the 
Mozambican authorities to search for a new model to boost the economy and to 
develop the country, given that the previous model failed to fulfil objectives. The 
economic crisis in socialist countries reflected in a reduction of cooperation and 
support to Mozambique that suffered from a shortage of financial resources due to 
the war.357 Particular importance was given to the supply of crude oil by the Soviet 
Union at a time where international prices rose.358 The rejection of Mozambique to 
join the Comecon as an effective member was an important fact, which encouraged 
negotiations between Mozambique and IMF.359 
The Iran-Iraq war of 1979 caused the world’s second oil crisis. As Iraq was 
Mozambique’s main oil supplier, the local economy was once again adversely 
affected. 
In its search for financial aid, the authorities felt it would be possible to access 
foreign credit if Mozambique were to become a member of the Bretton Woods 
institutions. This opened a new era in international relations.360 In 1982, at the height 
of the oil crisis, a delegation led by Prakash Ratilal, then Banco de Moçambique 
Governor, went abroad to seek foreign funding. Countries such as Mexico, 
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Venezuela, Algeria, Libya and Angola were approached.361 The Algerian Minister of 
Finance in private criticized the FRELIMO party’s lack of clear-sightedness that had 
left the country suffering in the name of political alliances and development 
alignments.362 Tanzania’s Minister of Finance, Amir Jamal, felt that the only way for 
Mozambique to gain access to the international financial system was to adhere to 
conditions of the International Monetary Fund, and World Bank (the Bretton Woods 
Institutions that promote global finance stability and world cooperation).363 To qualify 
as a member of these Bretton Woods institutions, Mozambique had to comply with a 
number of prerequisites. These included instituting a rehabilitation program, 
subscribing to the Lomé Convention and revenue reforms that came to be 
conventionally known as the Washington Consensus.364 
Mozambique did not follow the usual practice of newly independent nations in joining 
the Bretton Woods Institutions directly after independence in 1975. This must be 
seen in the political context of the liberation struggle (supported by East European 
countries, China, the Nordic bloc and the non-aligned countries) which pre-empted 
the economic policy Mozambique was bound to follow. Moreover, there was a 
perception that notwithstanding their memberships of Bretton Woods Institutions, 
some African members still suffered economic and social imbalances.365 
Once independent, Mozambique and Angola were viewed with suspicion by the 
Western countries, led by the United States and the OTAN alliance,366 and it was 
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feared that the new countries could become potential centres from which 
communism might spread.367 This perception was not unfounded since Mozambique 
chose to position itself in that sphere until 1983 and thus remained politically bound 
to the socialist ideology in respect of its national development. International co-
operation was thus limited to its allies, namely socialist countries, the Nordic bloc 
and to some African countries.368 
Apart from the underperforming economy, Mozambique was suffering from the 
effects of the Cold War because of its alignment with the socialist bloc.369The 
economic and social directives of FRELIMOˈs Fourth Congress decided that its 
international policy had to be changed.370 In order to achieve economic and social 
development objective until 1985, the foreign relations guidelines of the Congress 
stated that ʺthe international co-operation with all countries, founded on the 
principles of mutual and reciprocity of benefits is the basic orientation of our external 
economic relations.ʺ371 
Mozambique officially joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the protocols 
of the World Bank on 24 September 1984. It also signed protocols of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD and the Association 
for International Development, AID, of two World Bank Institutions. These institutions 
give support to low-income and developing countries to reduce poverty by means of 
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long-term non-interest bearing loans.372 These developments were initiated after a 
preliminary study by Mark Wuyts in 1977/78, purportedly as a political option that 
could drive the country from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. 
Wuyts’s conclusions showed that membership of these international financial 
institutions was the only way the country could obtain additional loans from the 
Bretton Woods’ countries members.373 
Before the admission, the IMF mission undertook an evaluation of the Mozambican 
economy in order to propose the terms and conditions for the country’s participation 
and the respective cost. The mission was led by Mr. Zulu, a Zambian who was an 
IMF Deputy Director of the African Department. The mission concluded that 
Mozambique’s economy was extremely weak. In this context and in the absence of 
reliable statistics Mozambique’s shares were set at SDR 61-million (about US$79-
million). Mozambique paid 21, 7 per cent in foreign currency and the balance in 
meticais.374 Since economic and financial system reforms were implemented, 
particularly the improvement of national accounts and external reserves 
Mozambique gradually succeeded in controlling inflation and a reduction of external 
financial imbalances. Mozambique accepted the conditions for admission to the 
Bretton Woods institutions. Mozambique thereafter introduced the Economic 
Rehabilitation Program (PRE-acronym in Portuguese), in the context of the 
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economic adjustment program (PAE-acronym in Portuguese),375 aimed at changing 
the socialist model of development as a way to reverse the negative course of 
economic growth. Mozambique gained access to foreign aid by the international 
community through the Bretton Woods’ multilateral institutions and bilateral co-
operation.376 
After the Mozambican Minister of Finance, Rui Baltazar dos Santos Alves, signed 
the conditions of membership, Mozambique became eligible for the first Mozambican 
General Debt Rescheduling Agreement with the Paris Club on 25 October 1984.377 
There were seven more rescheduling agreements, the last one under the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, which allowed the removal of 90 per cent of the 
country’s external debt stock. The “London Club” also rescheduled private debt.378 
Thanks to its membership of the World Bank group Mozambique also became a 
member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with a share 
capital of US$ 93-million and a member of the International Development Agency. 
Mozambique had 0, 06 per cent of the voting power. 
On 23 July 1985, Mozambique received the first International Development 
Association credit for Economic Rehabilitation to an amount of SDR45.5-million 
(about US$-59-million). The second tranche came on 19 June 1993 for economic 
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reconstruction.379 These advances formed part of long-term concessional loans to 
the poorest countries, and were designed to support programs aimed at poverty 
reduction and rebuilding a sustainable growth path. The loans were meant to finance 
the reconstruction of the industrial, transport and agricultural sectors.380 The World 
Bank’s assistance to Mozambique was centred on economic rehabilitation projects, 
institutional reform to strengthen the market economy, and to benefit social 
reconstruction.  
The first Financial Agreement with the IMF of the type SAF (Structural Adjustment 
Facility) came into operation on 8 June 1987 with SDR28,87-million ( about US$37-
million) 381, valid until 1990. The second Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
was to the value of SDR 30, 05-million, valid to 1993 and extended to 1995.382 On 8 
September 1987, Mozambique signed the second International Development 
Association credit for economic rehabilitation. On 16 June 1988, Mozambique 
benefited from the second General Debt Rescheduling Agreement with the Paris 
Club. The Third Debt Rescheduling Agreement was signed on 14 June 1990,383 
while the third International Development Association credit for Economic 
Rehabilitation came on 21 June 1989.384 These concessional loans allowed 
progressive economic improvement in the context of structural reforms and 
economic readjustment programs under the ESAF (Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility) and PRGF (Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility.385 
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4.3 Legislative reform 
The Economic and Social Directives of the Fourth FRELIMO Congress established 
the basis for a strategic change in the management of the economy. This included a 
significant relaxation of the stated economic guidelines, and gave priority to small 
projects that were vital to the economy. The Congress introduced the Economic 
Action Plan and the Decree-Law 4/84 on foreign investment, which was designed to 
attract foreign capital to Mozambique.386 The new law embodied essential changes, 
as the Minister of Finance, Rui Baltazar, emphasized during his presentation: “…it 
reflects the spirit of the Economic and Social Guidelines of the Fourth Congress of 
the FRELIMO Party which define the importance of foreign capital in private or mixed 
capital companies, with priority for those sectors which, by their effect on the 
substitution of imports or the promotion of exports, provide revenue in foreign 
currency”387. 
Given the new policy directives recommended by the Fourth Congress, the Banco de 
Moçambique also had to adapt its policies. This time the economic aspects took 
precedence over political matters. Statutory reform of the financial system was a 
prerequisite for structural reform of the economy. It was also a prerequisite to enable 
the central bank in particular to modernize the financial sector and to strengthen 
investors’ confidence. The existing financial legislation dated from 1943 and was 
therefore inadequate.388 
The second phase of financial system reform began in 1984, when the government 
approved the Economic Action Plan to restructure the production that had an impact 
on the financial system.389 In this period the financial system still operated in terms of 
the restrictive monetary policy adopted in 1975. This comprised liquidity 
management based on direct control of credit, prescribed domestic liquid assets 
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ratios, the administrative control of the value of the currency, and a managed rigid 
exchange rate for the metical.390 
In the framework of the legislative reform of credit policy, the Cabinet introduced 
changes in 1986, to article 5 of Resolution 11/80.391 In view of the increasingly 
commercial function of the central bank, Resolution 10/86 decreed that depositors 
who held deposits in meticais at the Banco de Moçambique could have the same 
advantages as offered by the commercial banks. Similar interest could now be 
earned on such deposits as the rest of the financial system. Resolution 10/86 
conferred powers on the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Banco de 
Moçambique to publish new terms, limits and conditions applicable to deposits and 
credit transactions.392 
To comply with Resolution 10/86, on 2 January 1987, the Banco de Moçambique 
issued Administrative Order no.1/87 as an internal instruction in terms of which the 
Bank began to remunerate the deposits on call and to accept fixed deposits at all its 
branches.393 The central bank thus undertook commercial banking functions and 
continued to do so until Law 28/91 relating to the credit institutions permitted other 
financial institutions to perform those functions. The Organic Law of the Central Bank 
1/92 that established the separation of the commercial functions banking from Banco 
de Moçambiqueˈs central bank.394 
To revitalize the economy by stimulating those sectors earning foreign exchange to 
increase the flow of foreign currency revenues, the Banco de Moçambique approved 
Administrative Order no 9/84 of 30 April, thus launching the New Foreign Exchange 
Management System. This permitted companies that generated foreign currency 
earnings (about 100 companies), to retain consigned funds (fundos consignados) 
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destined to guarantee the reproduction of its economic cycle. Companies were 
allowed to retain a percentage of external funds in their accounts to import raw 
material for production.395 
In May 1985 the Council of Ministers accepted policies to partially liberalize prices 
and salaries, and to allow the free movement of goods in the country. These 
concessions however, led to smuggled goods appearing on the informal market, ʺthe 
candongaʺ thus encouraging the production and supply of those goods.396 This was 
indeed not the intention of government, but was necessary to encourage the flow of 
foreign exchange into the Mozambican monetary system. Small vendors including 
farmers began to do business in US dollars while the government set up duty-free- 
shops, the so-called “Interfranca”, in an attempt to capture the earnings of workers 
working in South Africa (miners and technicians). This led to the process of 
"dollarization”397 and to the non-official currency market, particularly in dollars and 
rands, given the paucity of external resources in the official market.398 In June 1987, 
the Banco de Moçambique adopted liberalization measures via Administrative Order 
no. 14/87, which authorized resident nationals to open deposit accounts in foreign 
currencies so as to clear the financial system of those transactions (in rand and 
dollars) that were beyond the Bank’s control.399 In February 1988 foreign residents 
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were likewise authorized to open deposit accounts in foreign currencies, thus ending 
the restrictive policy on foreign currency deposits.400 
To stimulate savings deposits on call and fixed deposits with monthly and quarterly 
interest, the Banco de Moçambique’s Administrative Order no. 18/90, and Order no. 
19/90 were approved. Decree no. 2/75 of the Organic Law, laid down the terms and 
conditions of compulsory deposits.401 
The Fifth Congress of the FRELIMO Party in 1989 finally authorised the separation 
of the central bank functions from the commercial functions of the Bank of 
Mozambique. This development was followed by providing for the creation of the 
Banco Comercial de Moçambique. This introduced a separation of central bank and 
commercial bank functions, which signalled the emergence of a liberal financial 
services industry. The primary legal framework of the reforms was the 1990 
Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique. The Constitution declared that the state 
of Mozambique would adopt a market economy and that the name Popular Republic 
of Mozambique would be changed to the Republic of Mozambique. 
The Bank of Mozambique’s growing commercial banking activities partly detracted 
from its role as a central bank. This dual function came to an end in 1992 when Law 
1/92 defined the nature and objectives of the Banco de Moçambique as solely a 
central and state bank. Decree-Law 3/92 of 27 February 1992 provided for the 
creation of the Banco Comercial de Moçambique. This bank was later privatized. 
 
4.4 Monetary and credit policy reforms 
From September 1, 1978, Administrative Order no. 1/REC/78 assigned the exclusive 
responsibility of foreign exchange transactions to Banco de Moçambique’s head 
office. No other banks or their branches were authorized to deal in foreign 
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exchange.402 As a result from April 1989 the ability to execute foreign exchange 
transactions were decentralized to the branches and agencies of the central bank.403 
On 12 July 1989, by Administrative Order 17/89, the Banco de Moçambique 
abdicated its monopoly of external operations. Henceforth the private Banco 
Standard Totta de Moçambique was also authorized to conduct such foreign 
exchange transactions.404 
Apart from the liberalization of the foreign exchange market, the Non-Administrative 
Allocation of Foreign Exchange System came into force in 1989. This measure 
ended restricted access by the productive sector to foreign exchange, which 
included both the state and the private sector. In April 1989 Mozambique joined the 
Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa and on 7 July a preferential 
trade agreement with South Africa became effective.405 
Although there were signs that a market economy was being adopted, the banking 
structure continued to be dominated by two state banks: the Banco de Moçambique 
and the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento. From 1980 to 1984 the budget deficit 
was estimated at 14 per cent of GDP, which was financed by external grants and 
loans, and by domestic credit. These developments stimulated inflation.406 The 
Banco de Moçambique continued to support the economy by providing credit, 
especially to large companies such as Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique as well 
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as to companies operating in the sugar, cotton, tea and tobacco sectors even when 
there was little prospect of repayment in the short to medium term. 407 
Since domestic credit to finance production was difficult to come by, the government 
obtained external financial support from multilateral financial institutions. To avoid 
any negative impact of the entry of foreign funds on monetary policy, the Banco de 
Moçambique agreed with the Ministry of Finance that those funds should be 
domiciled at the central bank and transferred to borrowers against payment of the 
equivalent amount in meticais (the counter-value) as a means of “sterilizing” these 
funds. This had the advantage of a coordinated absorption of these funds in the 
economy and it allowed the state to clean up the state companies’ debts.408 
In 1986 government debt amounted to around 83 per cent of total liquid credit 
granted to the state companies before PRE. The government adopted an "assumed 
debt program” to repay the state bad debt based on the counter-values paid by the 
beneficiaries of credits to access to the World Bank's funds. 409 
From 1987 banks acted rationally in accordance with the laws of the market. The 
central bank began to establish annual credit limits, which were agreed with the IMF. 
From 1981 to 1983 the average annual credit growth was 28 per cent, but this 
declined to 17 per cent by 1986.410 Between 1987 and 1992 this new credit policy led 
to the reduction in total credit extension to state enterprises, and an increase in 
credit to private companies, according to the table below.411 
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Table 6. Extension of credit by sector, in percentages (1987-1992) 
Type of 
company 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
State-owned 83,5 70,7 57,1 53,9 42,9 35,2 
Private 16,5 29,3 42,9 46,1 57.1 64,8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Abreu and Hallan, ʺA. Estudo da Procura e Oferta de Crédito em Moçambique, ʺ 23. 
From 1987 to 1992 the state-owned sector credit reduced by 48, 3 per cent, while in 
the same period the credit to the private sector increased in the same volume. This 
growth in the volume of credit to the private sector, with a corresponding decrease of 
credit to the state sector, reflects the change in development policy and strategy 
which took into account the increasing dynamics of the private sector against the 
inefficiency of the state companies. 
In 1986 the Banco de Moçambique’s share of credit to the economy was 79 per cent; 
that of the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento was 19 per cent; while that of the 
Banco Standard Totta de Moçambique was 3 per cent.412 The ratio of credit to 
agriculture and the agro-industry was 51 per cent, for secondary industry 19 per 
cent, for trade 11 per cent, for transport 10 per cent, and for construction 7 per cent. 
413Although credit was relatively well controlled along with currency stability, a 
growing market distortion emerged, due, in part, to larger volumes of external credit 
and to a dwindling supply of goods to meet growing market demand. In 1986 the 
debt ratio was around 275per cent, and inflation rose to three digits despite the 
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stability of the official value of the currency.414 Interest rates in the non-official 
exchange market were 20 to 40 times higher than the official rate.415 
These dynamics of credit extension led the Banco de Moçambique to introduce 
criteria for the restructuring of internal bank debt. Norms for the granting of credit 
were changed to favour new credits and special lines416 that were aimed at 
promoting employment, agriculture and industry, and stimulate exports and 
investment.417 Statutory changes such as the revision of Resolution 11/80 previously 
mentioned, and the Banco de Moçambique’s new Organic Law 1/92 paved the way 
for a revision of the credit policy. Decree-Law no. 28/91 of December 31 1991, the 
Law of Credit Institutions, which was adopted in October 1992, aligned with the New 
Constitution, to encourage the entry of new operators. It also heralded a new era of 
private commercial bank operations in a market that until then was virtually a state 
monopoly. Two new Portuguese banks; the Banco de Fomento Exterior and Banco 
Português do Atlantico were allowed to operate in Mozambique.418 
4.4.1. Interest and exchange rate reform 
According to Adelino Pimpão, the administrative control of the currency’s value and 
the fixed exchange rate of the metical (both linked to the financing of the Budget 
deficit) by the Banco de Moçambique were important factors that hampered the 
export trade on the one hand, while on the other hand the increasing demand for 
scarce foreign currency to pay for essential imports had the effect of hampering 
liquidity expansion in the economy. It became apparent that introducing flexible 
monetary and exchange rate policies were a high priority.419 
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Between 1974 and 1980 the discount rate varied from an average of 5 per cent to 
6.5 per cent and dropping to 3 per cent in 1981 at a time when inflation displayed an 
opposite tendency. In this way the interest rate performed a quasi-fiscal function420 
by funding the priority sectors. Meanwhile, the interest rates did not yet indicate the 
unit cost of money.421 
The decline in export earnings (due to rising production costs and the non-competitiveness 
of Mozambican products on foreign markets)422 as well as a growing demand for 
necessary imports created a greater need for access to international finance. The 
destabilising civil war was reaching levels that impacted adversely on the successful 
implementation of the Central State Plan, the basis for a socialist economy.423 Added 
to that was the general lack of financial discipline as well as incompetent financial 
management – factors which cried out for more rigorous financial control on the part 
of the state and the productive sector. The country’s financial situation was chaotic. 
To complicate matters, from 1984 several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
to support humanitarian and/or development projects entered the country, but these 
were not always coordinated or aligned with government efforts to consolidate its 
control of the economy and to revitalize it.424 These factors prompted the FRELIMO 
party to review its policy and development strategies.  
According to Chandavarkar, a major problem that has been identified in virtually all 
transitional economies is the ineffectiveness of financial infrastructure with special 
reference to an outdated and inefficient payments system. He considered that this 
problem was a result of: 
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 “…an abnormally large size and unpredictable variability of the payments float 
(…),The float reflects difference in the timing between credits and debits of accounts 
caused by delays in transmission and in the subsequent registration of entries which 
are a cumulative result of several factors…“425 
These problems arose from the transition from a monopoly bank system to a two-tier 
banking system. 
Although the Portuguese escudo had a nominal circulation in Mozambique until 
1980, a possible local currency linkage to the Portuguese monetary authority was 
never contemplated. From 1975 up to 25 February 1977, the Mozambican escudo 
was pegged to the Portuguese escudo for calculating foreign exchange rates. 
Portugal devalued its currency in terms of a structural adjustment program in 1977. 
For technical reasons the published exchange table in Mozambique was based on 
information from the Banco de Portugal. Mozambique decided to suspend the 
foreign exchange table from 25 February, 1977. On 4 March, a notice by the Banco 
de Moçambique defined a new basis for fixing the foreign exchange table. 
Mozambique decided not to devaluate the escudo (in 1977) circulating in 
Mozambique, given the different contexts and policies that prevailed. The Banco de 
Moçambique decided to determine the parity of eight currencies from a basket of 
currencies that were of direct relevance to Mozambique’s in international trade. The 
devaluation of the Mozambican escudo would have had a negative effect on the 
economy.426 
The Mozambican decision to agree to the IMF and World Bank conditions of 
membership impacted directly on its foreign exchange policy. Mozambique gradually 
had to move away from centrally managed exchange rates to market determined 
exchange rates. From 1989 onwards the exchange rates were calculated based on a 
set of representative currencies of the country's foreign trade (payments and 
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receipts). The calculation of the daily exchange rates would take into account the 
international daily prices of currencies as quoted by Banco de Moçambique.427 
With the introduction of the Rehabilitation Economic Program, the management of 
the exchange rate policy was changed. Exchange-rate adjustments were made in 
the two-year period 1988-1989 which Pimpão called the “Shock therapy period” 
(Table 2)428. The aims of that exchange-rate restructuring were: to establish a 
realistic, flexible exchange rate that was adjusted to the prevailing market 
liberalization of foreign trade, management of the balance of payments in 
accordance with the laws of the open market; adjustment of the objectives of internal 
inflation control; and the necessity of opening the national economy to the foreign 
market.429 In table 2 below the functioning of the new exchange rate dispensation is 
illustrated. The significant depreciation explains the reference to ‘shock therapy’. 
Table 7 - Depreciation of the metical against the USD in the “shock therapy period”, 
1987 -1988 
Date New exchange rate Mobile base Fixed base 
31.01.87 38,28 Mt - - 
27.06.87 200,00 Mt 422,5 422,5 
01.01.88 400,00 Mt 100,0 945,0 
05.01.88 450,00 Mt 12,5 1,075,8 
01.07.88 580,00 Mt 28,9 1.415,2 
15.10.88 620,00 Mt 6,9 1.519,7 
Source: Pimpão. “Cronologia dos Principais Desenvolvimentos da Política Cambial," 11. 
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On January 31, 1987, the metical was delinked from the eight-currency basket. 
Instead, its value was calculated on the basis of the US dollar, which became the 
basis currency for calculating the exchange value of the remaining convertible 
currencies.430 The écart between the purchase and sale table was set at 2 per cent. 
The Banco de Moçambique published daily exchange rates of the metical against 20 
currencies listed on the forex market, namely: the Danish krone, the Swedish krona, 
the Japanese yen, the Italian lira, the German mark, the British pound, the French 
franc, the South African rand, the escudo, the Canadian dollar, and ten other 
currencies. The successive and progressive devaluations431 were followed by the 
gradual relaxation of state control of foreign trade control, although the government 
continued to license exports and imports.432 This, however, caused speculation, as 
traders held back their merchandise in anticipation of timely “sell” positions, thereby 
taking advantage of currency fluctuations. 433 
In Mozambique, the calculation of the exchange rate since December 1, 1989 was 
based on a select weighted basket of ten currencies most relevant to Mozambique’s 
external transactions.434 This was facilitated by the growing technical skills of the 
central bank employees responsible for foreign exchange transactions. The Banco 
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de Moçambique had previously published three bulletins of exchange rates,435 but 
later published a single table of 20 currencies, namely: 
Danish krone, Canadian dollar, Dutch guilder, Belgian franc, French franc, Swiss 
franc, Japanese yen, Norwegian krone, Zimbabwean dollar, Swedish krona, 
Portuguese escudo, Malawian kwacha, Zambian kwacha, British pound, Italian lira, 
German mark, Finnish markka, Spanish peseta, South African rand and Austrian 
schilling. 436 
Neither the purchases nor the sales of foreign currency were subsidized, and was 
tax free. The ‘shock therapy period’ was followed by monthly mini-devaluations in an 
attempted to mitigate the adverse effects of the first phase (shock therapy), from 
January 1989 to September 1990, i.e., the period of the “Crawling Peg”.437This was 
the second phase of the interest-rate adjustment, to promote the liberalization of the 
forex market combined with the flexible foreign exchange allocation limits. The 
objective was to minimize government intervention in the allocation of funds for 
imports of raw-materials for the textile and footwear industry, spare parts for 
transport, etc. 
On 18 September 1990, Decree 20/90 formalized the secondary foreign exchange 
market to achieve exchange rate stability, in conjunction with other macroeconomic 
policies (monetary, trade and credit, and fiscal policies). The state wanted to reduce 
the pressure on the foreign exchange market given the volume of transactions 
conducted. This step was to provide the market with an additional mechanism for the 
allocation and reallocation of scarce resources within the new legal and structural 
reorganization of the financial system environment.438 
                                                          
435One to be practiced by central bank to the credit Institutions, the second for the credit Institutions 
to the public and the third one for the credit Institutions to money changers. 
 
436 Pimpão, "Cronologia dos Principais Desenvolvimentos da Política Cambial," 11. 
 
437For de Sousa this period went to August 1991. De Sousa, "Contribuição Para Análise do Impacto da 
Unificação Cambial,ʺ 3. Pimpão, "Cronologia dos Principais Desenvolvimentos da Política Cambial 
,ʺ14. 
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In accordance with article 2 of Decree 20/90, “It is the responsibility of the Banco de 
Moçambique, in its capacity of Central Bank, to authorize, supervise and examine 
the activities of the Secondary Foreign Exchange Market.” The Banco de 
Moçambique would not interfere with rates that were negotiated by the parties, but 
would merely provide the average buying and selling rate at the close of the 
preceding business day. This would serve as a reference rate. In terms of the law, 
the following currencies were transacted: the US dollar, British pound, German mark, 
French franc, Swiss franc, Portuguese escudo and South African rand.439 
From September 1991 the Central Bank introduced a Daily Crawling Peg which took 
into account the official market exchange rate, equivalent to 78 per cent (the 
corresponding averages for August 1991) of the secondary market exchange rate 
aiming at the unification of official and secondary market exchange rates.440 
The unification of the secondary and the official market exchange rate commenced 
in April 1992. By Decree 25/92 the regulation of secondary exchange markets was 
approved, revoking Decrees 20/90 and 15/91. The Banco de Moçambique’s 
exchange-rate calculation was thereafter based on the average costs of its foreign 
operations.441 
The flow of international aid on concessional terms (grants and loans) to the country 
increased from US$ 500-million in 1986 to US$ 700-million in 1990. The percentage 
of donations in the same period increased from 43 per cent to 64 per cent. This 
narrowed the deficit of the Balance of Current Transactions from 26 per cent of GNP 
in 1987 to 22 per cent of GNP in 1991.442 
According to S. Abreu, the monetary policy of the period 1974-1980 was 
characterized by fixed interest rates for long periods (on average of one year or 
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more.443 Since 1981 to 1988 interest-rates were gradually adjusted to stimulate 
production in priority sectors. Economic reforms introduced under the Economic 
Rehabilitation Program impacted directly on the interest-rate management. From 
January 1989 to March 1992, the monetary-policy entered a new cycle of successive 
interest-rates adjustments, and of changes in the structure and level of rates.444 
Theoretically, these adjustments attempted to reduce structural and conjectural 
market distortions. The result was a reduction of their differential to inflation, a 
gradual simplification of the interest rates tables, boosting simplification with 
perspective of further unification. This reform had also the objective of obtaining 
positive interest rates in real terms and to reduce pressure on domestic credit.445 
 
4.5. The institutional and managerial reforms 
With economic reforms between 1977 and 1992, the Banco de Moçambique had to 
introduce managerial and policy reforms to establish an appropriate financial 
management system. 
The Governor of the bank changed in the course of time, Sergio Vieira, was the 
second Banco de Moçambique Governor between 22 April 1978 and 28 December 
1981(his predecessor Alberto Cassimo had a short term during which the Banco 
Nacional Ultramarino organic structure was still operating.) Vieira prioritized the 
training of staff, from all provinces of the country, between 1978 and 1979. The 
German Democratic Republic provided professional support for the training program. 
After their training, staff were assigned as central bank delegates to state companies 
to assist with the financial management in order to safeguard the Bank’s interests.446 
                                                          
443 Portuguese colonial ordinance no. 35 and 36/1974. 
 
444 S. Abreu, ʺO Papel das Taxas de Juro,ʺ 18. Maleiane describes three different stages of fixed rates 
in the period, namely; 1974-1980, fixed rates at long duration (6 rates for active operations and 8 for 
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From the central bank’s early years until 1984, the Governor was a full member of 
the Council of Ministers.447 Sergio Vieira was designated Minister-Governor, but this 
dual position undermined the institution’s autonomy. At the same that he had to drive 
monetary and credit policy and meet the priorities of the Central State Plan.448 In this 
period (1978-1984) the Banco de Moçambique could not align its monetary and 
credit policies with macroeconomic indicators, as it had paid heed to the 
government's political priorities. This undermined its institutional autonomy. 449 
Sergio Vieira’s called a board meeting (1978) to establish rules for the functioning of 
the Bank. The Portuguese members wished to resign, and this was promptly 
accepted. The Governor immediately appointed Mozambican staff to replace those 
employees who were leaving the bank and the country.450 
A disciplinary board, directly responsible to the board of directors, was created in 
terms of President Machel's guidelines for a credible Mozambican financial 
system.451 The main goals were: to establish an instrument of national development 
and to create a national currency by 1980.  
One of the President’s recommendations concerned a dress code. He recommend to 
Vieira never to go to the bank in “balalaika”, which is what FRELIMO's members 
usually wore, but to be attired in a “suit and tie.” 452 At that time employees would go 
to work in sandals, T-shirts and other casual clothes. It was Governor Vieira who laid 
                                                          
447 Sergio Vieira was the only governor with this double function expressed formal and officially, at a 
time when the government had the monopoly management. 
 
448Maleiane states that in these circumstances the state had to repay USD90 million of loans granted 
to state enterprises, Maleiane,"Moçambique: As Etapas da Programação de Credito," 3. 
 
449Ibid. Mosca explains that the Plan was to replace the role of the market in balancing the demand 
and supply of goods and services, and for management of currency and price stability. Mosca. " 
Economia de Moçambique". 
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451Banco de Moçambique,1975-2010:Chronology, 38. Banco de Moçambique Administrative Order 
8/78, May 19. It was the legal basis for the creation of banking deontology, what came to make the 
central bank a distinct institution up to the present day.  
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down staff members’ formal dress code and ethical attitudes that are still in force 
today.453 
Since its constitution, the bank’s central organs of management were; the Cabinet, 
with a Governor appointed by the President of the Republic assisted by the Deputy- 
Governor; a Board of Directors with a maximum of 8 members, chaired by the 
Governor who has a casting vote, Deputy-Governador and Head of Department 
appointed by the Prime Minister . The bank also has a Board of Auditors chaired by 
a president designated by the Council of Ministers. The vertical integrated structure 
was a pyramid structure that meant that each structural unit presided over an 
immediately lower level of structure and consisted of a department lead by a 
Director, service, section and sector. The number and level of structural units varied 
over time according to the needs of monetary, credit and exchange rate 
management reform. An organic change in the structure was introduced on 29 April 
1981 with the creation of the Foreign Accounting Administration to give effect to 
Banco de Moçambique’s Administrative Order 3/81.454 
In its early years the top managers were given three to five-year mandates. On 28 
December 1981, in terms of Presidential Decree 18/81, Prakash Ratilal was 
appointed Governor of the Bank.455 He had graduated as a licentiate in Economics 
from the Institute of Economic and Finance Science of Lisbon in 1974. From 1978 to 
1980, he was Banco de Moçambique’s Deputy Governor. Before that he had been 
chairman of the Montepio de Moçambique (bank), and from 1977 to 1979 he was 
General Director of Empresa Moçambicana de Seguros (insurance company). His 
mandate ended on 24 April, 1986. It was with his tenure that the Governors’ term 
was determined to last five years. 
Decree 58/86, 24 April 1986, appointed Eneas da Conceição Comiche the fourth 
central bank Governor from 24, April 1986 to 24, July, 1991. He had graduated in 
Economics at the Faculty of Economics of Oporto University in 1969. From 1970 to 
                                                          
453 Testimony of the author as a bank staff at that time.  
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1975 he was a lecturer in the Faculty of Economics of Universidade de Lourenço 
Marques (now Universidade Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo). He also collaborated 
with the Instituto de Credito de Moçambique from 1970, of which he became 
chairman from 1975 to 1977.456 
In May 23, 1987, Comiche proceed with the central organic structural and 
management system reform, in order to separate the central bank functions from 
commercial bank functions to reflect the Economic Readjustment Program.457 In 
effecting this functional separation, different departments were established in the 
bank to focus on central bank functions. The new departments were the following: 
Planning and Economic Research, International Relations, Personnel Department 
and the Banking System and Supervision Department (this department had the 
functions of guiding, monitoring and controlling the operations of the participants 
within the financial system, such as financial companies, stock exchanges and 
others). The Foreign Exchange and Credit Departments focused on commercial 
bank functions.458 
Appointed by Presidential Decree 36/91, Adriano Afonso Maleiane was the fifth 
Governor of the Bank. His term began on 24 July 1991 and it lasted for three terms 
until 2006. Admitted in the extinct Casa Bancária de Moçambique (Banking House) 
in 1973 he moved to Banco Comercial de Angola in 1974 and to the Banco de 
Moçambique in 1977. He accumulated experience in different positions as Head of 
Department, Executive Director, Deputy Governor and then Governor.  
After 15 years as central bank Governor, Adriano Maleiane was succeeded by 
Ernesto Gouveia Gove, his former Deputy Governor. Gove was appointed Governor 
on 25 July 2006. He continued the policy of implementing institutional reforms and 
growing the bank. Gove started working at the central bank in 1976. He graduated in 
Economics at the Eduardo Mondlane University in 1989, and completed a Master's 
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458 Banco de Moçambique Administrative Orders 14/91 and 16/91 for central bank functions, 17/91 
and 18/91 for the Banco de Moçambique's commercial functions. Banco de Moçambique,1975-
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degree in Financial Economics from the University of London. Gove had worked in 
various positions in different departments. Co-operating with a World Bank team, he 
participated in the financial system reforms which led to the publishing of the 
Financial System Report in 1992. In 1991 he was appointed member of the board.  
The President of Mozambique decided to strengthen the Bank’s board of directors by 
appointing Antonio Pinto de Abreu as Deputy Governor on 9 December 2010.  
 
De Abreu holds a Bachelor’s degree in Economics from the Eduardo Mondlane 
University and a Master’s degree in Financial Economy from the School of Oriental 
and Africa Studies in London. He was a Bank board member and from 1996 De 
Abreu participated in negotiations with the World Bank Group and the International 
Monetary Fund since 1990, and specifically in those discussions that led to the 
structural reforms of 2000 to 2005 when he led the Bank’s technical team. He also 
participated in the monetary, financial and exchange programmes agreed with IMF 
from 1995 to 2006.  
With the introduction of the Economic Rehabilitation Program there was a need for 
the Banco de Moçambique to set up a technical organ to specialize in the 
preparation, negotiation and implementation of rehabilitation programmes and to 
implement the reforms required by the IMF and World Bank. To comply with these 
objectives, the former Banco de Moçambique’s Directorate of Economic Studies and 
the Statistics Directorate merged in 1989, to become the Banco de Moçambique's 
Department of Economic Studies and Statistics. Training the human resources was a 
priority. In 1987 it was decided to set up an Information and Documentation Centre 
from the residual Banco Nacional Ultramarino Library, to give support to the bank 
employees. This project was to improve the technical skills of the employees and the 
financial sector and the funds were applied in the Ministry of Finance and in the 
Banco de Mocambique. 
The work of the new Information and Documentation Centre went beyond the 
library’s documentation services, and included information analyses and the 
provision of graphic arts services. It also coordinated communication to the public 
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and the media. The custody of the historical documents of the bank, with the 
integration of Archive service formed part of the project. 459 
Focusing on transparent management and accountability, the Banco de 
Moçambique published periodicals with leading articles on analyses and research, in 
particular the Annual Report”, the Statistical Bulletin, the Prices and Financial 
Conjecture, the Staff Paper, the Occasional Paper and other titles. The central bank 
published an "Annual Financial Report" since its formation, and this publication was 
improved substantially in form and in content from the 1980s.460 Since 1989 the 
central bank commenced with business automation and the implementation of IT 
systems, with a strong emphasis on commercial bank functions.461The Legal 
Department, which formerly focused on litigation issues with customers, became 
instrumental in the drafting of bank legislation. 
The admission of more players in the financial system was a challenge to the Bank. 
The organic structure and the Organizational Procedures Manual were revised to 
confirm the separation of the Bank’s commercial bank functions from its central bank 
functions, and to authorize the appointment of relevant managers.  
Internally, a new staff policy was approved and implemented. It affirmed that 
workers’ rights and obligations were governed by the labour law and internal norms, 
and was aimed at improving the performance of the Bank’s employees, and 
guarantee employment satisfaction in the service of the Bank.462. 
                                                          
459 The author participated in the design and implementation of the project Documentation and 
Information Centre.  
 
460 Despite the difficult working conditions performance in accordance with IMF requirements were 
possible due to the contribution of other units of the bank. In addition it was close collaboration 
with the technical group formed for the monetary policy formulation which included the National 
Planning Commission, NPC, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Commerce. José Viola. " Desafios na 
Implementação do Programa de Reformas acordadas Com as Instituições de Bretton Woods," in: 
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Conceito, Princípios e Opinião- A Experiência do Banco de Moçambique (Maputo,2000), 37-38.  
 
462 Banco de Moçambique, Administrative Order no. 14/89 and later Administrative Order no 8/91, 
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Institutional and organisational restructuring of the central bank functions introduced 
the oversight functions of the entire banking system. Since the central bank 
terminated its commercial banking operations, it oversaw and regulated the 
operations of new commercial banks. One aspect of this regulation was to determine 
capital of institutions. 
By Administrative Order no. 01/92 of January 27 1992, the Bank changed the rate of 
mandatory reserves of bank liabilities from 18 per cent to 25 per cent. The minimum-
value of capital to be held by credit institutions was defined by Banco de 
Moçambique’s Notice 2/GGBM/92. Although being a flexible amount, calculated in 
the base of a percentage of average deposits balance of commercial banks in 
certain interval of time, in December 1998 the reserves capital requirements was 
943.000, 00 mts, the equivalent to U$D 20.000,00 At actual rate. 
With the Money market development and the monetary policy reforms the ʺBankʺ 
created the Market Department in 2001 for monetary policy instruments and 
mandatory reserves management, centralise and manage credit risk data. This 
department had to guarantee the adequate ʺBank ʺ intervention in the interbank 
market, trough researches and specialized interbank market analyses, in order to 
formulate, in coordination with the Department of Economic Research and Statistics, 
appropriate monetary policies evaluating its impact.  
 
4.6 The impact of the Economic Rehabilitation Program 
Mozambique’s membership of the Bretton Woods Institutions had a significant 
impact on the economy. The Mozambican government had to reconsider its 
economic policies. In January 1987 the government discussed the Economic 
Rehabilitation Program463, and obtained the approval of the World Bank and the IMF 
for its implementation.  
In 1990, when a social component was included, as a result of the 1989 inter-
ministerial appraisal of the impact of the adjustment program on poverty, it was 
                                                          
463 Through one of its departments (the Administration of International Relations) the Central Bank 
participated in the negotiations with the IMF. 
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concluded that 60per cent of Mozambican people lived in absolute poverty. This 
confirmed the need for a social dimension of adjustment to minimize the side effects 
of the program to the vulnerable population,464 the name was changed to the 
Economic and Social Rehabilitation Program, PRES-acronym in Portuguese. This 
program aimed to reverse the negative growth trends and re-establish a 
macroeconomic environment of positive growth, to reduce the internal financial 
imbalance, to ensure minimum income and a minimum level of consumption for rural 
populations, to reduce the budget deficit, to ensure macroeconomic equilibrium and 
to ensure the strengthening of the balance of payments transactions and break the 
diplomatic blockade that prevented access to external financing by multilateral credit 
institutions and bilateral co-operation with Western countries 465 
The main objectives of the Economic and Social Rehabilitation Program were the 
liberalization of the economy and to steer it towards equilibrium of supply and 
demand, and price stability. Under the program, domestic and foreign private 
investment was to be mobilized.466 To achieve these objectives, policy reforms in key 
economic sectors, as well as reforms in monetary, financial, fiscal and credit policies, 
were implemented to absorb excess liquidity to liberalize trade and prices to 
restructure large state enterprises by resizing them and introducing an emphasis on 
profitability. Further reforms included the reduction of government spending by 
making cuts in subsidies to companies to improve the collection of taxes, and to 
have the state benefit from foreign currency flows of international aid.467 
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The introduction of these measures enabled the accumulation of international 
reserves. In 1990 these were sufficient to cover two months of imports, as opposed 
to the reserves level at the end of 1983 that covered only one week of imports.468 
The implementation of the Economic Rehabilitation Program (from 1987) arrested 
the sharp drop in production that had been recorded between 1983 and 1986. From 
1987 Mozambique gradually returned to record positive growth.469 However, 
negative levels were recorded for 1990/91.470 In January 1987 the Bank devalued 
the national currency by 80 per cent against the level of 1 US dollar to 200 
meticais.471 
Table 8 below illustrates the performance of the Mozambican economy after the 
introduction of market orientated policies. 
Table 8 – Production development and growth rates, 1985-1991 (per cent) 
 1985 1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  
GNP GROWTH (per cent) -7,2 1,1 3,8 5,5 5,1 -1,3 -0,2 
Agriculture 0,8 -0,6 7,0 7,2 4,0 1,1 1,9 
Industry -18,6 -4,3 8,9 7,5 6,8 -9,6 -5,6 
Construction -4,4 44,5 -16,0 0,1 3,0 1,5 3,0 
Transport and communication -11,8 1,7 -9,8 6,2 10,2 0,5 -2,3 
Commerce and Services -6,8 -0,7 3,5 4,5 4,0 2,5 2,0 
GNP growth per capita (per cent)  -11,2 -1,7 1,9 2,8 1,7 -1,3 -1,8 
Source: Abramsson and Nilsson, Moçambique em Transição, 51. 
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The improvement in agricultural production was the result of the privatization of state 
farms.472 The neglect of family agriculture and the co-operative sector was raised as 
a major issue, while the over-concentration of financial resources and investment in 
the large public-sector projects was reviewed. These projects were divided up into 
small private units that were geared towards producing people’s basic needs, in 
parallel with the liberalization of prices of agricultural products. 
The impact of war and drought in 1992 led to further decrease in production 
volumes. Shortly after the first year of the introduction of the Economic Rehabilitation 
Program, industrial production grew by around 9 per cent until 1989 and then fell 
9.7per cent in 1990, partly due to foreign competition, particularly from South African 
companies in view of the weak competitiveness of Mozambican products.473 
On the other hand, the lower levels of local production of raw materials required by 
industry and agriculture led to rising imports of such materials without, however, an 
expected increase in exports.474 A deficit in the current account subsequently 
followed, which, excluding international aid, raised from 47 per cent of GNP in 1987 
to 58 per cent of GNP in 1990.  
During the debt negotiations, some creditors granted full or partial debt pardoning. In 
1991 Mozambique paid off 64per cent of the commercial debt with the credits from 
the Association for International Development AID, thereby reducing the debt ratio 
from 146 per cent to 42per cent in 1991. For this reason and to ensure the 
continuation of the Economic Rehabilitation Program, the flow of international aid 
was increased on concessional lines from US$500-million in 1986 to US$700-million 
in 1990. It was thanks to this co-operation that the deficit in the current account 
balance shrank from 26 per cent of GNP in 1987 to 22 per cent in 1991.475 
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In practice, the entry of counter-values against international aid had the effect of 
reducing the budget deficit and, combined with fewer state loans. This led to a 
drastic reduction in the inflation rate from 167 per cent in 1987 to 40 per cent by 
1989, but once again in 1990 the inflation rose to 90 per cent due to a lack of food 
production in the market and the end of oil subsidies by the Soviet Union. In 1991 
the inflation rate decreased to 34 per cent.476 The government reduced its deficit 
registered on financing the state companies.  
State revenues increased from 13 per cent of GNP in 1985 to 22 per cent in 1990, 
boosted by improved tax revenue and the inflow of foreign aid. This was despite 
rising government expenditure by about 21per cent of GNP in 1985 to 50per cent in 
1990, when funds were channelled towards rebuilding destroyed infrastructure. From 
1985 to 1990 the investment budget rose by 45per cent and the budget for 
agricultural development rose by 4per cent, the budget for investment in 
infrastructure increased from 9 to 16 per cent. Private investment rose to 15-20 per 
cent of GNP. The budget deficit rose from 8 per cent in 1985 to 30 per cent of GNP 
in 1990. The deficit was mainly funded by international donors reducing the real 
deficit and inflation.477 
Since independence the Banco de Moçambique was the custodian of 95 per cent of 
the country’s financial resources. The central bank reduced the amount of funding of 
the national budget and removed the credit to all unprofitable state enterprises. The 
size of the grants was based on analyses of their profitability.478 The development of 
small and medium enterprises was afforded priority through the streamlining of the 
procedures for the Bank’s participation in small and medium development 
projects.479 
Apart from the separation of the central bank from its former commercial bank 
functions and the creation of a new commercial bank (where the state held 80 per 
cent of share capital while 20 percent reserved for staff) a new program under the 
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“Guidelines for Financial System Reform” was envisaged. This reform system 
included: the consolidation of central bank external auditing, creation of new 
commercial banks the reform of the insurance sector the separation of the Banco 
Popular de Desenvolvimento commercial functions from its savings functions and the 
statutory reform to ensure the flexibility of financial operators in the system. 
The liberalization of interest and exchange rates were gradually framed upon the list 
of reform measures in order to make the transition from the mechanisms of direct to 
indirect control. The liberalization of the foreign exchange market strengthened the 
commercial banks’ foreign operations. These banks were later permitted to grant 
loans in foreign currency. 
The Economic Rehabilitation Program, adopted in 1987, sought the liberalization of 
all sectors of the economy, thus its implementation had far reaching implications for 
the entire economy. It was in this context that the central bank adopted monetary 
and exchange policy and credit control reforms in 1987. The legislative reform of 
1991 on the regulation of the financial system and the subsequent restructuring of 
the central bank created the supervision department, which granted greater control 
of the financial system. It was a critical factor for the consolidation and specialization 
of the Bank of Mozambique as central bank. 
The opening up of foreign exchange trading granted operators’ greater autonomy, 
the creation of a secondary market for foreign exchange and subsequent integration 
into the official market, and the separation of the central bank from its commercial 
bank functions in 1992 were some of the major reforms in the context of PRE. These 
reforms brought about an important reduction of state monopoly in the financial 
sector and the liberalization of financial intermediation. Financial system 
modernization secured better functioning in the market and secured enhanced 
openness to international financial markets. The following chapter will analyse the 
consolidation of reforms and the subsequent consolidation of the central bank 
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Chapter 5: CONSOLIDATION OF A CENTRAL BANK (1992- 
2010) 
 
 
The Banco de Moçambique is the central bank of the Republic of 
Mozambique.480 
 
Advisers advise, ministers decide policy481 
 
 
 
5.1 The evolution of reforms from 1992 to 2010 
The period under review in this chapter was characterized by the rapid evolution and 
consolidation of the Banco de Moçambique as a central bank. The separation of 
functions in 1992 was intended to enhance the central bank’s expertise and improve 
the quality of its services. In the financial sector the period 1992 to 2010 was a most 
progressive period since many important reforms were brought about. These 
included reforms in monetary and credit policies and in the area of foreign exchange 
with the purpose a greater liberalisation and a dynamic market. It was during this 
period that the bank adopted an integrated technology program to improve working 
processes and modernization of the management by adoption of a triennial strategic 
planning. These reforms were supported by legislative enactments and regulatory 
provisions, and all these measures, taken together, created a new, dynamic 
institution with a streamlined infrastructure and staffed with qualified officials, where 
previously these had been lacking. These reforms had its place as a counterpart to 
the economic rehabilitation program and according to the condition of structural 
adjustment management defined by the Bretton Woods institutions.  
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5.2 General macroeconomic environment 
Mozambique embarked on the transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
market-orientated economy after the implementation since 1987, of a program of 
structural adjustment, with World Bank support. Prior to these reforms a number of 
factors inhibited the economic reform programme. These factors include the 
recurrence of civil war, the destruction of infrastructure such as schools, the rural 
commercial network, railways, roads, factories, equipment and thousands of lives. 
During the period of structural adjustment, between 1985 and 1990 state revenue 
rose by 13per cent in 1985 to an increase of 22per cent in 1990. State expenditure 
also rose by 21per cent in 1985 and by 50per cent in 1990 – primarily as a result of 
state expenditure on the reconstruction of infrastructure. The adverse impact of the 
war delayed a positive outcome of the recovery program in the short term. The 
economic crisis and balance of payments detracts were prolonged. Food aid was 
delayed. By 1992 Mozambique held the 146thposition on the UNDP Human 
Development index.482 
The supplementation of the economic reconstruction plan (PRE) from 1992 sought to 
bring about political changes where the economic crisis was deepening and the 
implementation of a development model placed under immense stress.483 The costs 
of war rose consistently and domestic production increased only marginally. 
Destroyed infrastructure hampered the supply of food and other aid and contributed 
to the displacement of the population. This displacement was exacerbated by a 
persistent drought.484 Mozambique became increasingly dependent on foreign aid, 
especially food aid. Cereal imports made up 58per cent of food aid in 1985, but rose 
to 75per cent in 1992. A total of 644 tons of equipment was supplied as part of 
foreign aid. In 1986 foreign donations comprised 19per cent of the funding of the 
deficit, but rose to 64per cent in 1990.485 Weak economic conditions led to higher 
unemployment and social inequality. Vulnerable people were unable to buy bare 
necessities through the GOAM-system. 
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The state started with a program of privatisation in 1990 as part of the World Bank 
Structural Adjustment program. Under structural adjustment 506 of 670 state-owned 
enterprises were privatised and 106 joint-ventures were set up and 64 exploration 
concessions granted. It was in this privatisation drive that mega-projects such as 
Mozal was established. South African interests comprised 70per cent of the 
investment capital, followed by investment from Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
With a legacy of inexperience in a market economy not all privatisation exercises 
were successful. Privatisation of cashew production led to an almost collapse of 
production processing and export of cashew nuts and cashew products. The cashew 
exports comprised 21.3per cent of total exports in 1974 which was 60per cent of 
world production.486 By the early 1990’s cashew production had almost grinded to a 
halt. 
In October 1992 the Agreement of Rome was signed. This agreement ended the 
Mozambican civil war and opened the opportunity to consolidate development 
programs and stabilize economic expectations. Economic recovery started slowly 
after the war. The liberalisation of markets increased the supply of food aid, clothing 
and other humanitarian aid. The recovery of the rural commercial workforce and of 
displaced people contributed to the resumption of agricultural production.487 
By the beginning of 2000 the Mozambican economy was in forthright recovery. The 
2000 rate of inflation of 22.3per cent dropped to 13.8per cent in 2003 and 9.1per 
cent in 2004. Good performance in the agricultural sector, transport, 
communications, and the impact of Mozal II (and aluminium plant in Matola) and 
Sasol’s gas-to-liquid plant were responsible for the recovery. 
 
5.3 Human resources management 
Critical to the successful implementation of reforms in the central bank was the 
human factor. The human capital in financial systems plays a role that is seldom fully 
recognized or even acknowledged. After all, the efficiency of any financial 
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institution’s infrastructure depends on its professional, well-trained financial 
personnel. Their performance and dedication will determine the success or otherwise 
of the institution. 
In the period of the Banco de Moçambique, the country itself had an appallingly high 
percentage of untrained, unskilled employees at both basic and advanced skills 
levels. It soon became the new central bank’s strategy to promote and offer the 
necessary technical and conventional education, and to ensure staff retention as far 
as possible. 
The role of human capital has been largely neglected in the literature. The 1989 
World Bank Development Report highlights the importance of “good compensation 
and careers” without specifically referring to the problem of the financial personnel. 
This subject has been neglected in the discussion of the roots of the problem in the 
financial system488The report noted that developing countries have a propensity to 
admit candidates with PhDs or MBAs instead of with intermediate skills; skills that 
are essential guarantors of technical and administrative functions. In the financial 
sphere, the goal is better performance, rather than developing a pyramidal personnel 
structure. The question is how an extended system can produce competent staff at 
all levels of activities, including intermediate subalterns.489 
 Banco de Moçambique employed very few technically qualified people, or staff with 
any secondary or higher education. The first step was the opening of a secondary 
school for central bank staff, in the night shift, given the paucity of technicians with 
basic degree. In the beginning of the 1980’s under supervision of the Commercial 
School, the bank provided technical training for its staff. With separation from 
commercial bank functions, the central bank appointed technically selected staff with 
more specific competences for central bank functions. Article 5 of the Ministerial 
Decree 76/94, the Instituto de Formação Bancária, was provided for the technical 
training of employees in banking including the Banco de Moçambique’s staff. In the 
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1990’s the bank invested in training of its staff in the country and abroad. The 
training in 1997 covered 435 workers, from master's degree in financial economics to 
bank technical course involving medium to top level technicians and managers.490 It 
was thanks to individual initiatives and institutional investment in regular and 
technical training that the bank obtained a distinctly qualified staff that enabled the 
introduction of reforms to improve monetary policy management, and to adjust 
interest and exchange rates in a period when the metical devaluated by 80per cent, 
as it did in 1987. Maleiane observed that ʺthe dedication of the employees made the 
implementation of these reforms possible.ʺ491 
 A message was circulated to the staff stating that “at the Banco de Moçambique, the 
foreign technical assistance is important but should be for a short period of time, and 
specially reserved for such periods where the internal capabilities are not sufficient.” 
The Bank’s future was to encourage personal responsibility and hard work; to revise 
the career and remuneration system; while pointing out that the board encouraged 
academic and professional training. 492 
 
Table 9 – Comparative academic development of Central bank employees, 1986 -
1990 
 Number of employees 
Academic level 1986 per 
cent 
1988  per 
cent 
1990 per cent 
5th Grade 1026 61 965 47,6 1107 45,9 
7th Grade 536 31,9 912 45,0 1005 41,7 
12th Grade 101 6,0 123 6,1 248 10,2 
Graduate 18 1,1 26 1,3 48 1,9 
Total 1681 100 2026 100 2408 100 
Source: Banco de Moçambique Boletim Informativo do Pessoal , 1(1991);10. 
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In Table 9 above it is shown that the number of employees rose from 1681 in 1986 to 
2408 in 1990, but the percentage of 5th grade employees dropped from 61per cent in 
1986 to 45per cent by 1990.The percentage of graduate employees almost doubled 
from 1, 1 per cent to 1, 9per cent in 1990. In April 1992, to afford the Bank’s staff a 
comfortable retirement, the Board approved the establishment of a pension fund for 
bank employees in 2006, the Kuhanha- pension fund corporate management was 
established and in December 2009 approved the Regulation of Social security for the 
employees.493 
In 2000, the bank restructured its management in order to align the management 
structure to the principle of executive decentralisation and technical centralization as 
well as to harmonize the organic structure with the SADC central banks structure. 
The advantage of the restructuring was that it reduced the levels of decision-making 
from 10-12 to 3-4.494 
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Banco de Moçambique organic structure 2000495
 
To implement a modern system of human resources management, in 2005 the board 
approved an Integrated Human Resources Management System. 496 In December 
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2008 the Bank introduced a conceptual model of competences which were aimed at 
improving the human resource management processes in areas such as recruitment 
and selection, training, career development and staff performance evaluations.  
To comply with central bank functions since 2005 the central bank opted for a three 
year strategic plan. It defined two main components: central bank mission and vision. 
The optimization of human resource was one of the three strategic items in the 
defined vision of the central bank. Through Internal Directive no, 8/2006, the Bank 
adopted its Institutional Cultural Values, known by its Portuguese acronym as 
TEACHA. This acronym stood for transparency, involvement, self-development, 
competence, honesty and diligence. TEACHA incorporated the Bank’s vision and 
mission while also guiding the staff on professional conduct and behaviour. 
The Bank also promoted the development of sport and cultural activities for the 
employees. In 1999 a Cultural Centre was built at Matola, a facility of sports and 
leisure opened on 12 October 2001 by President Joaquim Chissano. In 1992 a 
kindergarten was established to care for the children of Bank employees and for the 
children of parents employed elsewhere in the financial system. The Bank 
encouraged co-operation and exchange of working experience among employees of 
central banks in southern Africa. Since 2000 the Bank encouraged its staff to take 
part in the SADC Central Banks Games. In April, 2004, Banco de Moçambique 
hosted for the first, the Games held in Maputo. 
From inception the Bank gave special attention to arts and cultural activities. It 
supported several artists whose work is on display at different premises of the 
Bank.497 
In June 2009 a Regulation on Institutional Sponsorship was approved. This set out 
guidelines to support the following areas: technical and scientific research, 
preserving the country’s historic and cultural heritage, and promoting sport. Apart 
from encouraging employee initiatives in those areas, the regulation also set out 
guidelines on the publishing and printing of books, and the support of musical 
performances and art exhibitions.  
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To ensure pleasant and more modern working conditions, and to stimulate 
productivity, the Bank launched a program in 1999 to upgrade the head office 
building and to replace the antiquated office furniture. This program was completed 
in February 2002. At the same time the systems and information technology was re-
engineered.498 
 
5.4. The central bank’s research and advisory role 
Organic Law 2/75, Chapter IV article 18, explained the central bank’s functions, 
which were amongst others, to be the government’s financial consultant, and align its 
activities to the government’s economic policy by maintaining close contact with the 
relevant government officials.499When in 1989 the Banco de Moçambique's 
Department of Economic Studies and Statistics was established (of which the main 
mission was to organise, negotiate and to implement the IMF program) it supported 
the Governor and the respective heads of departments who had to report to the 
Cabinet. This department was crucial for research, as well as economic and financial 
data analyses. It was established to enable the central bank to perform its function 
as the monetary authority and as the driver of reforms. A structural revision occurred 
in 1998, and with the co-operation of the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, the Bank 
strengthened its scientific skills by co-opting a lecturer of Economics, Professor Dr 
Clara Ana de Sousa. She came to be a Board Member with Studies and Statistics 
Department as part of her portfolio, and coordinated the research and specialized 
and scientific publications in support of bank operations and the advisory role to the 
government. It is in terms of the central bank’s responsibility that the Governor of the 
Banco de Moçambique is a permanent guest as an observer at the weekly cabinet 
meetings, without a vote. The rationale for this role is that above all the central bank 
developed capacity and fostered a high degree of intellectual independent analysis 
that was vital for the government economic policies. Government was not bound by 
these analyses, but the advice informed the government, who had the final decision. 
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This role was well defined by Margaret Thatcher according to whom ʺadvisers 
advises, and ministers decides policies.ʺ500 
At first, the new Banco de Moçambique's Department of Economic Studies and 
Statistics had only one computer and a printer for about 12 people, of whom only half 
had a post-graduate university degrees.501 At the end of 2010 the Department of 
Economic Studies and Statistics had a staff of 40 people. Five had Masters’ degrees 
in Business and Statistics, 24 had Bachelor degrees, 9 had passed high school, and 
merely two had only a secondary school certificate. The re-engineering of 
information technology, in 1998 allowed the central bank to adopt integrated systems 
and information technologies that facilitated an evaluation of overall bank needs in 
ICT and its provision. In 2010, each employee who performed technical functions 
had his/her own computer. The Department of Economic Studies and Statistics 
introduced specific IT programs for econometric analyses. 
 
5.5. Institutional and Information Technology reforms 
The financial system reforms of the Banco de Moçambique were affected by 
legislative and institutional reforms. Special mention should be made of the Decree-
Law 1/92 which separated the Bank’s central and commercial bank functions, the 
Exchange Law Regulation 3/96 which defined the new decentralised exchange 
regime and which defined the rules under which investors could bring in and 
repatriate fund and the Credit and Financial Institutions Law 15/99 which regulated 
the establishment of financial enterprises and their activities.502 
Institutionally the Banco de Moçambique complied with the government‘s Information 
Technology Policy Resolution no. 28/2000 of 12, December 2000, which provided 
guidance on the development and dissemination of systems and information 
technologies. The automation of central bank services had begun in 1989, based on 
the Project Development and Implementation of Information Systems (PDISI- 
acronym in Portuguese) which had World Bank support. The project aimed to equip 
the central bank with flexible, safe and responsive information systems and 
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technologies. To consolidate the automation project the Bank established the 
Computer System Development and Implementation Project Administration Unit on 
15 June 1994 to coordinate the project development of information systems involving 
both the commercial and central banks. This Unit was intended to develop solutions 
(infrastructure and software’s as well as the information technology design).503 
In 1998/9 the Bank introduced the Computer System Re-engineering Project 
(PRSI/2000), later with a steering committee in May 2000 to address the computer    
adjustment required to facilitate the turn of the millennium, which was designated 
Y2K 2000. Also in May 2000 the Bank approved a contingency plan to address the 
probable negative impact of the millennium transition and to ensure sustainability of 
the Information technologies solutions to be developed. The directive Plan on 
Information Technology System in the context of Information System Reengineering 
Project was approved and started in May 11, 2000.504 The development of integrated 
software solutions for the modernisation of the institutional processes began in 
November 2002.  
The IT reengineering platform enabled the support of the National Payment 
System505, (which strategy was approved by the BM Board of Directors in August 
2000). 
From November 1, 2003 the platform for state electronic transactions termed 
Government Electronic Fund Transfer System, entered into operation. This platform 
enabled the government’s payments and receipts to be performed in within 24 hours, 
ʺas a banker of the state we contributed to reform the State finances and bring 
discipline operationalising their "Treasury Single Account" and improving 
relationships with partners that finance the Balance of Payments, Maleiane stated.506 
From 24 March 2003 the Banking Supervision Application, a computer software 
solution for banking supervision, was implemented by the Bank. This covered 
licensing of financial institutions, sanctions sentencing, on-site and off-site 
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supervision via the application. The development of this computer solution had 
involvement of the central banks of South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia that were all partners. After a pilot project was 
completed, the installation began in Zambia in April 2004.507 
The consolidation of the Bank’s organisational structure occurred in April 2007 in 
terms of an amendment to the Organizational Manual. New departments were 
created, such as an Accounting and Budget Department, a Strategic Planning and 
Public Relations Office,508 and the Documentation and Information Centre.509 
 
The first Strategic Plan (2005/2007), introduced a new management approach based 
on a strategic vision. From 2006 the Banco de Moçambique took over the strategic 
planning as a key management instrument to guide the central bank to a completion 
of the statutory function prescribed in the Organic Law 1/92. 510  In April 2008 the 
second generation of Strategic Plan 2008/2010 was approved for the central bank by 
Administrative Order 5/2008. In 2005 the central bank defined its function as to 
manage the value of the metical in order to maintain a low and stable inflation rate, 
of which the annual average evolved from 2 to 1 digit between 2008 and 2010.511 
The second Strategic Plan focussed on six main strategic objectives: to improve the 
monetary policy model and its implementation; to improve the management of 
foreign reserves; to improve the quality of statistics published; to ensure a strong, 
healthy and competitive financial system; to establish a modern and efficient national 
payments system; to improve human resources management; and to implement best 
practices in institutional management.512 From then and allied to the development 
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and modernization of managerial skills the Bank has been offering best performance 
and diversified products to the financial system. 
 
5.6. The monetary, foreign exchange and credit policy reforms 
5.6.1 Monetary and Credit Policy Reform 
The first phase of the monetary policy management reform, direct monetary control, 
lasted from 1975 to 1992. It included the establishment of the Banco de Moçambique 
in 1975, the introduction of the metical as national currency in 1980, and the 
implementation from 1987 of the Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme.  
The second phase was between 1992 and 1996. Its milestone was the Decree-Law 
1/92, also known as the Banco de Moçambique Organic Law. This law stipulated 
that the central bank’s main functions were the preservation of the value of the 
national currency, the metical, and the management of monetary, credit and foreign 
exchange policies. The Bank’s commercial bank functions were separated and were 
transferred to the newly formed Banco Comercial de Moçambique (today known as 
the Millennium-Bank-BIM). 
 
The third period of monetary policy reform lasted from 1996 to 2008. This period was 
characterised by transition to indirect control instruments (such as interest rate and 
reserve requirement and money market operations). Before the introduction of the 
Economic Rehabilitation Program to control the currency stability, Banco the 
Moçambique implemented a restrictive direct monetary policy in the face of existing 
distortion in the economy, acting directly on monetary variables such as the interest 
rates rigidity and determining credit limits to the economy,513 From the ERP onwards, 
with increased incidence from 1992, the Bank introduced a set of monetary, foreign 
exchange and credit reforms, supported by regulatory and legislative enactments on 
the one hand, and with institutional reforms on the other hand. In this phase the main 
objective was to move from direct monetary policy instruments to an indirect system, 
in which the central bank embraced the indirect transmission model of monetary 
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policy by introducing market requirements such as reserve requirement ratio, the 
rediscount rate and open market operations. 
As mentioned in chapter 4, after the first phase of repressed interest rates (1974-
1980), given the need to increase credit for economic activities interest rates were 
reduced substantially Interest rates were increasingly differentiated by sectors where 
agriculture was afforded priority, the type of company (whether public or private) and 
the purpose of the amount requested, (if its required for an investment or money 
supply). Between 1981 and March 1988 the interest rates were subject to a slight 
reduction to stimulate economic priority socialist sectors, identified as priority sectors 
under the planned economy policies of the past.514 The adjustment of interest rates 
started in January 1989 to March 1992 (first phase) with gradual interest rates 
reduction aiming at differential reduction to inflation, from April 1992 to April 1993. In 
this phase the interest rate levels were calculated in terms of the maturities of 
projects to be financed. From May 1993, the reform programme was consolidated 
with a partial liberalisation of interest rates (third phase). During this phase interest 
rates were negotiated by commercial banks and other economic agents, with a band 
of maximums and minimums fixed by the central bank. The full liberalisation of 
interest rates in the market began on 1 June 1994.  
 
As a result of the structural adjustment implemented in the framework of the 
Economic Rehabilitation Programme, the market liberalisation, the end of war and 
the return of refugees to the country and to the productive activities, the international 
aid and foreign direct investment Mozambique recorded a reversal of negative 
economic growth between 1987-1990 a stable and impressive economic 
performance with a growth rate of 5,5 per cent, reducing the inflation rate (table 
10).515 The tendency of devaluating the metical was very high, reaching levels above 
600 per cent in 1987 and 80 per cent the following year516 Given the dynamism of 
the economy consequently the velocity of money at the beginning of the 1990’s, the 
central bank had to act on the money supply and in 1994 and 1995 expanded the 
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circulating currency issuing and launching notes of 50 000 meticals (mts) and 
afterwards the 100 000 mts, 20 000mts, 500 000 mts, 200 000mts and 10 000 mts to 
adjust the nominal value of metical.  
By Notice 13/GGBM/94, the central bank regulated the issuing of cheque and 
clearance of payment services.517 
 
Table 10 – Table of inflation 1987-2000 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1998 1999 2000 
139,7 47,2 39,5 44 1 3,1 10,3 
Source” Mosca, Economia de Moçambique, 407. 
 
The fluctuation of the inflation rate is remarkable since the introduction of reforms 
which was 3 digits in 1987, lowered to 1per cent in 1998 and rising again to 2 digits 
from 2000. 
 
For the analysis of monetary aggregates, plus the coordination, management and 
implementation of monetary policy, an ad hoc  unit was created, namely the 
Technical Committee for Monetary Policy. This unit allowed the board of the Banco 
de Moçambique to make decisions on monetary policy and credit, with participation 
of the Bank and the Ministry of Finance.An internal administrative order determined 
that it was necessary to ensure that policies in the economic development area 
complemented each other.518Adriano Maleiane commented that "...the strategy was 
to establish the Technical Committee... of the Technical Coordination which included 
technicians from both institutions, and they were to analyse the technical issues for 
the implementation of strategies that had been agreed with the Bretton Woods 
institutions.519 
The Technical Committee was a top-level policy-decision forum which, apart from its 
technical expertise, included the Governor of the Bank as chairperson, the Minister 
                                                          
517 Banco de Moçambique: 1975-2010 Chronology, 74. 
 
518 Banco de Moçambique Administractive Order 37/94, 10 July 1994. 
 
519 Interview with Maleiane, Maputo, 23 September 2014. Banco de Moçambique: 1975-2010 
Chronology 73. Administrative Order 37/94. 
 
159 
 
of Finance and the Executive Directors of those government departments involved in 
carrying out internal and external policies. The Bank’s directors included the 
directors of Economic Research and Statistics, Credit Operations, Issuing and 
Treasury, Foreign Exchange Operations, Foreign Exchange Control and External 
Debt departments and the Governor’s adviser. Other senior government officials 
could be called upon to join the weekly discussions.  
The regular coordinating meetings of the Technical Committee, without 
compromising the Bank’s institutional independence, allowed the Banco de 
Moçambique to stay abreast of government programmes while also giving them due 
consideration when designing policies, while the government side could absorb 
relevant information about the Bank’s activities. Because the choice of venue of 
these meetings was an issue that could lead to the idea of subordination by the 
participant that visits the other part venue, the Governor of the Bank, Adriano 
Maleiane, took the initiative and proposed that the meetings be held at the Ministry of 
Finance. 
The Bank’s credit policy underwent a gradual evolution from sector allocation (1987) 
to credit liberalisation, but based on credit limits defined by the Bank (1988 to 1989). 
In June 1994 the Bank approved a new credit policy, based on the setting of 
expansion limits to the Centralised Net Domestic Assets (AILs acronym in 
Portuguese).520 This was followed by the Decentralised Net Domestic Assets from 
1994, and applied to the commercial banks. The limits of AILs, announced bi-
annually, were later announced annually and then ceased to exist. 521 
The year 1996 was a good year for reform measures. “Before 1996 the registration 
of customers at risk with bad credit occurred frequently in every bank, and the banks 
had to exchange information among themselves on such customers at risk, in a 
system with a limited number of banks. The system failed to identify faulty and risky 
customers and registered a delay in processing time of credit applications. As the 
numbers of bank increased the processing of credit applications became less 
effective. In 1996, Banco de Moçambique decided to centralise information of the 
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risky credit application customers for the benefit of the whole banking system.522 The 
Central Risk service was established on 10 January 1996 to coordinate and facilitate 
the inter-bank risk consultations.523 
In 1997 Monetary authority Bonds were introduced and the issue and trade in 
Treasury Bills was regulated.524 In September 1998 Mozambique’s stock exchange 
was established. Trading of treasury bills began on 14 October 1999. The rates and 
commissions and the conditions for the submissions of proposals and auctions, were 
established by Notice no. 2 and 4/GGBM/99.525 Both monetary authority bills and 
Treasury Bills (T-Bills) were introduced on the interbank money market for monetary 
and fiscal policy purposes. Issued regularly by action system for banks, these 
instruments contributed to financial deepening and allowed banks to management 
their liquidity levels better by adding alternative investment products to the banks 
with excess liquidity.  
Effort to improve the economic environment and the management of the financial 
system earned Mozambique the confidence of donors. Mozambique benefited from 
the fourth, fifth and sixth World Bank IDA credit facility for economic reconstruction in 
June 1992, June 1994 and December 1998. It also benefitted from the third and 
fourth IMF agreement ESAF (Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility), offered 
between 1999 and 2002.526 
The central bank gave valuable support in the negotiations on foreign debt. In June 
1999 the debt was renegotiated within the framework of the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative to the amount of US$3.7 billion. In November 2001 Mozambique 
signed the seventh Agreement on External Debt with the Paris Cub in terms whereof 
95per cent of its debt was written off.527 
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From 10 to 13 February 2003 the Mozambican financial sector benefited from a 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund regular joint mission evaluation as part 
of the Financial Sector Assessment Programme. This mission reported on certain 
challenges to be addressed, such as the need to reinforce collateral (guarantees), to 
upgrade the level of financial intermediation, to increase the quality of the credit 
portfolio, the need to improve the legal system, and to lower operational costs. As a 
result, the Financial Sector Technical Assistance Program was established to 
improve the financial-sector institutional capacity and to introduce international 
standards to the central bank.528 To ensure transparency and reliability of the central 
bank asset management, the International Financial Reporting Standards were 
adopted in January 2008.529 
Banco de Moçambique Notice 12/GGBM/96 on 29 September 1997 created the 
Interbank Money Market and the respective regulation, which normative framework 
was adjusted on 21 August 1998, through Notice no.5/GGBM/98, by adopting the 
standing lending facility, absorption and last-minute facilities.530 
All these frameworks (interbank money market and interbank foreign exchange 
market) are aligned to international standards on which a central bank creates 
systems that allows commercial banks to exchange liquidity both in local and foreign 
exchange currency. 
These two frameworks had immediate impact on the banking system since the daily 
management of liquidity by banks improved dramatically. Commercial banks had, 
since then, the possibility to make short-term applications for its excess liquidity and 
also banks with shortages of liquidity had ways to solve the problem borrowing from 
other banks.  
Most commercial banks formed treasury and liquidity committees specialized to 
operate these frameworks to manage reserves on daily basis. The central bank 
reviewed its intervention rate in the Interbank Money Market, where the fall of the 
Standing Lending Facility rate dropped by 5 points to 13,5per cent531 As a result, the 
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commercial banks reduced their rates to 24per cent in December 2004 from 28per 
cent the year before. 
The last monetary policy reform in the period occurred with the creation of the 
Monetary Policy Committee, through the Internal Directive no. 52/2007 on 02, July, 
2007.532 It aimed at a clear definition of the medium and long-term monetary policy 
targets, the strategy of communication to assure transparency and central bank 
accountability, as well as the institutional and operational framework. To ensure 
these objectives the Committee had the Governor, Deputy-Governor and the Bank's 
executive directors as permanent members. In addition, the directors of Economic 
Research and Statistics and of the Department of Markets were permanently invited 
participants. The Governor as chairman of the committee invited internal or external 
experts whenever necessary. Day-long meetings were held monthly, after which a 
monetary policy press release was approved and disclosed on the Banco de 
Moçambique’s website. 
5.6.2 Central Bank supervision role 
Referring to the central bank’s supervisory role, Maleiane stated that “... 
strengthening bank supervision, (a function that was not visible until 1992 because of 
the dual role of the Bank as a central and a commercial bank but with more 
commercial than central functions, which made the oversight function irrelevant) 
helped control inflation and in 1998 we almost had deflation.”533 Thanks to effective 
supervision and discipline imposed on the financial system, in 1995 the central bank 
terminated the Credicoop, a bank co-operative created in 1986 in Maputo, because 
of systematic breaches of prudential standards. Credicoop had granted credit to its 
members exceeding central bank limits.  
For the same reason, a similar decision was later taken in respect of Banco Popular 
de Desenvolvimento. This intervention came in April 2001, when the Banco de 
Moçambique appointed an interim board of directors.534 Its mandate was to 
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undertake the reorganisation of bad credit and to reorganise the Banco Popular de 
Desenvolvimento for privatisation.535 
It was while the reorganisation was taking place that Dr Antonio Siba-Siba Macuacua 
of the Banco de Moçambique's Supervision Department was murdered on 11 August 
2001 at the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento’s headquarters.536 He had been the 
designated president of the interim board of this bank due to the central bank's 
responsibility, as the system supervisor. The evaluation was completed and the bank 
subsequently sold to private investors in accordance with what was expected. 
Finally, a third notable progressive feature of the supervision and control function 
was the privatisation of Banco Comercial de Moçambique. The State thereby 
retreated from direct management of the commercial banks.537 
Before 2005, the licensing of credit institutions and financial corporations was a 
government prerogative, and was subject to the approval of the cabinet of ministers, 
with the Banco de Moçambique playing an advisory role.538.  
On 27 October 1992 Decrees 35/92 and 36/92 authorized both the opening of a 
branch of the Banco Português do Atlantico and a branch of the Banco do Fomento 
Exterior in Mozambique. This introduced a new era of expatriate banks entering into 
the Mozambican banking system.539On 1 April 2001 the Cooperativa de Poupança e 
Crédito – SCRL, (CPC), opened its doors. It was created through Banco de 
Moçambique Internal Resolution 03/98 for the benefit of central bank employees and 
was extended to all other financial system staff members who had been employees 
since 31 December 1991. The management of salary-accounts of employees 
comprises a part of its commercial functions.  
For standardisation and harmonisation of operating procedures in electronic 
payments and cost reduction, the commercial banks created the Interbancos in 
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August 2001. INTERBANCOS is a private company owned by major commercial 
banks in Mozambique, which creates and manages a network connecting, the 
individual bank payment network allowing a more efficient flow of funds among the 
banks. The central bank strengthened its supervision functions since September 
1991 to allow for greater financial liberalization while at the same time regulating and 
overseeing the financial system.  
The stock exchange was opened and all participants in the securities market and 
financial resources mobilization collaborated to secure an efficient payment 
system.540From 2004, Decree-Law 9/2004, updated the Decree-Law 15/99 in which 
the central bank was given the responsibility to oversee all credit institutions and 
financial corporations, the authorization, registration licensing and abrogation of 
these institutions were placed under the supervision of the central bank Governor.541 
From this point onwards the Banco de Moçambique established a more direct 
regulatory and supervisory role in the financial system. 
The Bank registered and licensed new banks and financial institution, both local or 
foreign, thus opening the way for an open financial services sector, as undertaken in 
terms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Bank determined 
minimum capital requirements to be observed by credit institutions. New financial 
institutions and micro-finance banks were subjected to control mechanisms and 
supervision rules.542 
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Table 11 - Credit institutions and financial corporations established between 2005 
and 2010 
Name  Date Local  
Banco Oportunidade SARL  9.3.2005 Maputo  
Micro bank NGR-Natma  
and Getma & Rodrigues 
9.10.2007 Maputo 
Banco Terra , SA 3.12.2007 Maputo 
Yingwe Microbanco 22 April 2008 Morrumbene, Inhambane 
Province 
Moza Banco SA 7.5.2008 Maputo 
Dragão Câmbios, Lda 2.7.2008  Beira  
Banco Tchuma SA 16.9.2008 Maputo  
Caixa Comunitária de Microfinanças de Namuno 31.12.2008  Maputo 
The First MicroBank SA 27.1.2009  Pemba, Cabo Delgado 
Province  
Casa de Câmbios Xai-Xai 21.10.2009 Xai-Xai, Gaza province  
United Bank for Africa Moçambique SA 17.12.2009 Maputo 
Caixa Financeira de Caia ,MCB SA 21.12.2009 Vila de Caia, Sofala 
Province  
Carteira Móvel SA 28.1.2010 Maputo  
Banco Nacional de Investimentos SA 14.6.2010 Maputo 
Central Câmbios Limitada 9.7.2010  
Banco Único SA 12.10.2010  Maputo  
Source: Banco de Moçambique: 1975-2010 Chronology,1 975-2015 Chronology, 2000-2001 
Chronology. 
The Banco de Moçambique licensed since 2005, 18 credit institutions with almost 
430 branches all over the country, 8 microfinance banks, 22 Exchange Houses, and 
7 credit cooperatives.543 
In the course of the gradual transition to indirect monetary control, in 1999 the 
central bank opened up market operations by incentivizing long-term transactions in 
the Interbank Monetary Market, created in 1996 (see page14). For this purpose the 
Maputo Interbank Offered Rate (MAIBOR), was introduced. MAIBOR is a reference 
interest rate for the Mozambican banking system playing the same role as LIBOR in 
England. It is formed by the commercial banks which send daily quotations to the 
central bank of offer rates for the different maturities ranging from 1 day to 1 year. 
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The central bank calculates averages and publishes those to market the MAIBOR 
rates through the Meticalnet platform and the press. Commercial banks use MAIBOR 
as its reference for setting its lending rates in the credit market. The MAIBOR accord 
was signed by Banco Austral, Banco Comercial de Moçambique, Banco Comercial 
de Investimentos, Banco de Fomento, Banco Internacional de Moçambique (BIM), 
Banco Standard Totta de Moçambique and the Banco de Moçambique. 
To enhance accountability and good governance the Banco de Moçambique 
subscribed the National Statistical System as the authority for the compilation of 
monetary and foreign exchange operations statistics. On 6 September 2002 the 
Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, (INE) and the Bank formalised the Protocol of Co-
operation to delegate to the Bank the responsibility to produce and disseminate the 
national balance of payments statistics. In March 2003 Mozambique joined the 
International Monetary Fund General Data Dissemination System for the production 
and dissemination of relevant macro-economic data.544 
5.6.3 Expand banking activity in the economy vs financial inclusion 
The central bank also extended banking to rural areas. Maleiane stated, "In 1991 
and 1992 we were busy with the reforms and urging the banks to open offices in the 
provinces." Among the main problems experienced were the transportation of cash 
over routes, and the provision of banking services to the economic agents and the 
government, as its principal customers. The central bank opened branches in 
different regions. The Regional Centre branch in Beira was established on 18 
September 1995, and the North Regional branch opened in Nampula on 12 
September 1996.545The government identified the country districts as the primary 
areas where development must occur, but the financial sector was concentrated in 
the main urban centres. In January 2007 the central bank therefore began to 
address the challenge of expanding financial services through the remote areas of 
the country. This challenge led to the expansion of the central bank’s activity to the 
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provinces, opening a central bank delegation in almost every province. In this 
framework incentives were designed to bring the commercial banks to open their 
branches to bring financial services where they not yet exist, reducing certain costs 
and risks. Central bank branches were opened, in Quelimane (15 December 2006), 
Maxixe (29 December 2006), Pemba (29 January 2007), Tete (28 March 2007) and 
Lichinga (26 June 2007). The central bank was represented in eight of the ten 
provinces.546 Additionally, a set of incentives relating to promote the provision of 
financial services in the provinces were adopted by the bank (by Governor Notice 
10/GGBM). These included a special regime of reserve requirements; fiscal benefits 
(consisting of deductions on the tax of all bank profits resulting from rural branches 
and deductions on the total deposits of the balances deposited in rural areas when 
calculating the reserve requirement, access to the Finance Challenge Fund which 
was supported by the Bank and KFW Development Bank to finance micro-loans; 
differentiation in minimum capital requirements for the financial institutions and 
micro-finance lenders aiming to establish operations in the rural areas; and access to 
the Rural Finance Support Program.547In 2008, thanks to the above-mentioned 
incentives, 44 districts had 352 bank branches compared to 134 prior to 2008, POS’s 
increased by 133per cent, and 4,633 ATMs were opened. There were four savings 
and credit co-operatives, five micro banks and 17 microcredit operators.548These 
financial services networks improved financial inclusion.  
Since 2004 the central bank gave preference to indirect policy instruments 
introduced from 2002, particularly the open market operations and for liquidity control 
the bank used treasury bills. Since 2004 monetary and exchange rate policies were 
operated as a single integrated policy. 
5.6.4 The structural reform of the metical 
The macroeconomic reforms implemented by Mozambique from the end of the 
1980’s allowed reversing the chronic economic recession framework in the county 
and helped to achieve ratios of development and macroeconomic performance 
indicators and stability led the government to decide in mid-2005 to introduce a 
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reform of the currency structure, given its sharp devaluation from the cycle of crisis in 
the early years after independence.549 
 
Table 12 – Economic Growth (percentage), 1987-2000 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1998 1999 2000 
5,8 5,5 5,4 -0,2 12,6 7,5 1,8 
Source: Mosca, Economica de Moçambique, 407. 
 
Although slow the economy registered a general tendency of growth from 1987 as a 
result of economic reform, despite the cyclical crisis caused by war and natural 
disasters such as the floods of 2000. This environment of macroeconomic stability 
and development was fertile for currency reform. 
On 26 October 2005 a Coordinating Committee was tasked to introduce the "Metical 
New Family". This reform was based on a 3 digit reduction in the value of the 
metical, under the Decree Law 7/2005, and Governor Notice 03/GGBM/2006 of June 
16 2006.The introduction of the “Metical New Family” took place on 16 June, 2006. 
The three digits that the metical presented before 2006 were a result of the metical 
devaluation and high inflation during the implementation of the economic 
rehabilitation programme. As operational purpose the reform arose from the need in 
the monetary system to enhance the effectiveness of a modern payment systems 
and improve accounting processes avoiding numbers with excessive zeros, to 
secure the stability of the currency and to facilitate the calculation of the new value in 
such a way as to ensure clarity and convenience to the public, in particular 
increasing security in the handling of notes and coins. 
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Picture 5: Conversion Table from Metical to new family Metical. 
 
Source: Banco de Moçambique: Chronology 1975-2010, 118. 
 
The introduction of the “Metical New Family” took place on 16 June 2006. It was 
precede by an advertising campaign from December 2005 a period of double 
indications (this meant the seller of services supported this campaign by presenting 
to the customer both versions of cost of the same product during the campaign) in 
order to educate people about the new directive of the central bank. Goods were 
priced specifically in mt, the old version with the original 3 digits and mtn version 
without the 3 digits in the price (in mt/mtn meaning meticais and meticais “New 
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Family”) from January to June 2006. It was successfully executed by the central 
bank, notwithstanding the initial scepticism of international partners.550 
 
5.6.5. Foreign exchange policy reform 
In 1992 reform of the exchange rate policy commenced after it had begun in 1987 
with corrective adjustments (See Chapter 4.) From 1 April 1992, the unification of the 
Secondary and Official Market Exchange Rate began, which consisted of the 
merging of the official market (operated by banks) with a secondary market 
(operated by exchange houses) to a single exchange rate as a reference for 
monetary policy purpose. 
To complement the ongoing exchange rate reform, on 10 September 1992, Decree-
Law 25/92 approved the regulation of the secondary foreign exchange market, 
revoking the Decree-Laws 20/90 and 15/91.551 From August 1992, the Banco de 
Moçambique’s price of selling currency began to be calculated on the cost average 
of its foreign exchange transactions.552 
In December 1995 new system of mandatory reserves553 was introduced, setting 
coefficient at 15per cent. It was progressively lowered to 12per cent on 21 April 
1996, then to 9per cent on 2 March 1998 when it was established that its incidence 
base shall include the State deposits, followed by 6,8per cent on 17 May 1999 and 
conjoined with the reformulation of the regime.554 To establish operational and 
prudential principles in the management of its offshore assets, and its investments 
strategies on International Reserves Management, a Committee was established on 
24 July 2003, whose functions were to approve rules on operational aspects, such 
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as the criteria for the credit limit and risk limits, to propose to the Board future 
strategies plus the portfolio of reference benchmark amounts with reference to the 
macroeconomic and the country’s external conditions. The policy was reviewed by 
the board in June 2006.555 The Banco de Moçambique’s Notices 4 and 5/GGBM96 
formalised the Interbank Foreign Exchange House Accounting Plan and in 
September its Position Limit.556 The accounting plan contained rules and procedures 
to be observed by exchange houses on writing the books and reporting his 
operations and activities to the central bank and to the tax revenue authority and the 
market. 
In the interbank exchange market framework, it was necessary to establish a code of 
conduct. For this purpose Decree-Law 3/96 was promulgated to regulate the market. 
Activities of trade exchanges in the past were centralized in the bank, only later were 
decentralized to BSTM and BCM. It became necessary to reform and establish rules 
for foreign direct investment.557 
Subsequently, in 1997, for the evaluation and co-ordination of monetary and foreign 
exchange operations, the Bank created the Interbank Market Co-ordination 
Committee through Administrative Order 41/97, and approved the respective 
regulations.558 In March 1998 steps were taken to guarantee a link with the Monetary 
and Exchange Policy Committee. 
On 26 February 1997 the Bank’s board of directors created the monetary and 
Exchange Policy Committee, the composition of which was analogous to the 
composition of the previous Technical Committee. However, only the director of 
Economic Research and Statistics was the permanently invited participant, having to 
guarantee the Monetary and Exchange Policy Committee’s functioning.559 This 
committee proceeded with the Technical Committee’s responsibilities, namely the 
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coordination and monitoring of monetary policy in accordance with the government’s 
economic programme. This assured the necessary functional co-ordination between 
interbank foreign exchange market, the interbank money market and the securities 
market. From January 2005 the central bank adopted a new procedure: it 
implemented weekly foreign currency auctions to achieve greater transparency in the 
market.560 This innovation led to greater dynamism and diversification in the financial 
system. 
With the introduction of management based indirect instruments of monetary policy, 
the central bank began to intervene more often in the interbank foreign exchange 
market from 2006, with daily sales of foreign currency and at the monetary interbank 
market from 2007. This was in addition to the issuing of Treasury bills and overnight 
securities operations to control liquidity. 
 
5.6.6. The 2008 Global financial crisis and the Central Bank 
The global economic crisis of 2008, triggered by the US subprime crisis impacted on 
the global economy causing a slowdown in world economic growth. It also affected 
Mozambique particularly in the external sector. In 2009 exports of goods fell by 
30per cent compared to 2008, amounting to US$ 760.5 million and imports reduced 
by 11per cent, amounting to US$ 483,7 million which resulted in an increased deficit 
of the partial goods account contributing to the current account deficit before grants. 
The current account deficit amounted to US$1 9358 million, 10per cent less than the 
amount recorded in 2008.561 To soften the impact of external shocks to the economy, 
the central bank injected an additional US$ 673 million in 2008 and US$ 798 million 
in 2009 into the system through the foreign exchange interbank market. It also 
adopted a less restrictive policy by lowering its benchmark interest rate and brought 
about a downward revision of the coefficient and the monetary reserves (that stood 
at 8per cent) to compensate the deficit on external credit availability and stimulate 
the local banking system to increase funding to the private sector.562 
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The Bank also negotiated with the IMF, further access to the Exogenous Shock 
Facility grant of US$ 172 million.563 This was disbursed from July 2009. 
In February 2008 the Mozambican Parliament approved the National Payment 
System Law no. 2/2008 which was complemented a year later by Exchange Law 
11/2009 of 11 March 2009 to promote a sound, strong and competitive financial 
system. The National Payment System law sets provisions for a transparent 
environment to improve the efficient flow of funds in the economy. The law 3/96, 
deepened the foreign exchange reforms by adding, among others, the following 
practices: 
a) Central Bank no longer fixed the exchange rate in the banking system, leaving 
the exchange market to determine the equilibrium; 
b) Locals and foreigners were allowed to open accounts in foreign exchange in 
commercial banks, allowing more flexibility in transnational transactions; 
c) The transfer of funds for payment of goods and services were more liberalized 
and brought only under control of commercial banks, leaving the central bank 
with capital account transitions to control (foreign direct investment, loans, 
guarantees) 
These two statutes also reinforced the central banks’ legal basis to act as the sole 
regulator, supervisor and exchange authority. The central bank established the 
National Payment System Co-ordinating Committee.564 This is a body which main 
function was the creation of a basis for regulating the payment system and authorise 
studies for payment system development. An agreement was signed with Visa 
International which made the central bank its national settlement agent in offsetting 
domestic transactions.565 The Cahora Basa Dam Reversal Accord to Mozambique 
on 28 November 2007 gave a further impetus to the economic and social 
development of the country and the region given its potential to supply energy to 
some southern African countries. Despite exogenous shocks caused by rising oil and 
grain prices on the international market, the GDP grew by 6,3per cent which was 
only 1,97per cent lower than 2008. 
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In 2010 Mozambique experienced a massive rise in inflation, which led the central 
bank to intervene in the market. The crisis followed a sharp fall in the production of 
vegetables, fruits and cereals as a result of torrential rains and the correction 
process of some administered prices (in particular fuel) as well as the impact of the 
international financial crisis. The average annual inflation rate for 2010 stood at 
12,7per cent - the highest in five years. The metical depreciated sharply against the 
currencies of Mozambique’s trading partners.566 
The government opted for a gradual liberalisation of price control on some consumer 
goods. This caused a distortion in the consumer price index through a correction in 
the in the inflation rate. On the other hand, the balance of payments deteriorated 
because of the internal and external factors such as the impact of the international 
financial crisis the high demand for foreign exchange for imports, particularly fuel, 
(the international price of which was exceptionally high), conjugated with the delay of 
state budget and balance of payment support funds. All these adverse factors led to 
a volatile exchange rate that peaked at the beginning of 2010.567 
The fluctuations and the strengthening of the US dollars and the South African Rand 
had a significant impact on the Mozambican economy. Mozambique reacted by 
opting for a far tighter monetary policy, by reviewing upwards the intervention rates 
on the interbank monetary market, namely the standing lending facility and deposit 
facility to 400 base points and 100 base points over the year (2010) to 15,5per cent 
and 4per cent respectively. The mandatory reserves coefficient was reduced to 
8,75per cent (it was 10,15per cent in 2007, 9per cent in 2008 and 8per cent in 2009) 
and was aligned with the practice of regional central banks practices, South Africa 
excluded.568 
From August 2010 the Bank increased the volume on the interbank exchange 
market to improve liquidity sterilisation and bring the inflation rate down in order to 
stabilise the exchange-rate. The measures impacted on the international liquid 
reserves by about US$ 1 678 million covering 6 months of non-factored imports of 
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goods and services was covered. The central bank assumed responsibility for the 
total payment of fuel imports, thereby reducing the demand for foreign exchange at 
the commercial banks and freeing external resource for exchange rate stabilization. 
In 2010 the Exchange Law Regulation was approved. Since then directives for the 
external operations of the financial system was based on the current account 
liberalisation. This meant that more organised and credible data for the balance of 
payments were released. The ration of customers’ bad credit in the system dropped 
to 2per cent and the solvability indicators increased thanks to regular supervision 
and oversight of the financial system. 
The central bank did not inject public funds to keep any financial institutions afloat. 
Mozambique witnessed the opening of new financial institutions, which rose by 
11,4per cent in 2010. New financial products were offered, the client base expanded 
and the financial services provision rose to a 45per cent national coverage.569 These 
measures taken by the bank in 2010 proved crucial in limiting the contagion arising 
from the global financial crisis maintaining financial system stability and 
robustness.570 Given the volatility of the metical against the South African Rand 
showing strength on the back of a rising gold price, the central bank took corrective 
action, during the third and the fourth quarter of 2010, concentrating on US$ market 
on the management of exchange rate policy. The central bank lowered its 
benchmark interest rate and mandatory reserves coefficient allowed the appreciation 
of the metical which hit parity at 39Mt to the US$, the Rand and the Euro, in the last 
quarter of 2010.571 
The Bank’s challenge remained to expand the financial system to another 79 
unbanked districts while also modernising the financial sector in order to spread 
financial services and IT support to the most remote areas. These entailed offering 
alternatives such as mobile banking and cell phone banking that potential customers’ 
access to financial transactions, without having to erect actual bank branches. To 
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make the technologic infrastructure available to all commercial banks, and reduce 
operational transactions costs (which include the more widespread use of POS and 
ATM’s) the Socidade Interbancaria de Servicos (Mozambique Interbank Company – 
SIMO) was established. This is a corporation to provide and updated and integrated 
Banc de Moçambique and 12 more members.572 Later on all players in the financial 
system had to sign up as members, from this point onwards instead of using different 
servers responsible for payments and every payment in the country intermediated 
were delivered by one service provider. 
The central bank reduced the reserve requirements twice in 2010, fixing it at 8per 
cent and the intervention interest rates on the monetary interbank market, namely 
the standing lending facilities, to 11,5per cent and deposits to 3per cent per year.573 
These measures stimulated credit to domestic companies, and lowered interest rates 
charged by the commercial banks. It also led to the harmonisation of compulsory 
reserve ratios practiced in the region. 
To improve macroeconomic control, price stability and to promote economic 
development through better control of variables such as interest and exchange rates, 
and monetary and exchange policies, the central bank created successive 
coordination committees, such as The Technical Committee of Monetary Policy, the 
Monetary Policy Committee, the Committee of International Reserves Management, 
the Interbank Market Co-ordination and the Monetary exchange Policy Committee.574 
Their characteristics, objectives, composition and performance were enhance during 
this period, substantiating the institutional development of the central bank to design, 
implement and manage monetary and exchange policies, according to the rapid and 
profound transformation of the economy. 
It was in this period that far-reaching reforms were introduced in order to adjust the 
institutions to its mission as a central bank in a developing country. Its interventionist 
                                                          
572 Gove, E. Governor’s speech at the New Year’s celebration 2010, Banco de Moçambique, 17. 
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573 Banco de Mocambique, Annual Report, 2009, 12. 
 
574 Banco de Moçambique, “Monetary Policy in Mozambique: Framework design, formulation, 
implementation and effectiveness.” Seminar on Transition to a Forward looking monetary policy 
framework. Mauritius, June 2014. 
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role was progressively reduced with the adoption of indirect instruments for the 
management of monetary, credit and foreign exchange policies. 
The central bank embraced and promoted the expansion of commercial bank 
services in the remote areas of the country in line with the government’s economic 
and infrastructure development plans. The outcome was that far greater numbers of 
Mozambicans were integrated into the country’s financial system. 
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6. Conclusion 
The historiography of Mozambique from independence in 1975, in particular the 
historiography of banking, is scanty. 
A researcher wishing to study the history of the country’s financial system find 
practically no secondary sources available for this field. The reason is twofold: first, 
because of the traditional secrecy regarding the operation of the financial system 
and second, because the institutions involve have never made it a practice of 
keeping source documents, let alone making them available in the public domain for 
researchers to use. 
Banco de Moçambique organised its primary sources and classified them into two 
groups: those that should remain in the current files and for how long and those that 
should remain on file for query purposes and that were to be readily available in case 
proof is required in connection with any legal dispute. 
The creation of a Documentation and Information Centre and integrating a file 
service was a step in the right direction, but much must be done to make primary 
sources available to researchers. 
This researcher has had access to many primary sources thanks largely to her many 
years in the Bank’s service. A study of Banco de Moçambique's history is particularly 
important because its central role in the national economy is intrinsically linked to the 
post-independence history of the country.  
A discussion of the genesis and the nature of central banking gives us a background 
for comparative and conceptual analyses that are crucial for an understanding of the 
emergence of Banco de Moçambique, its functions and its development as a central 
bank.  
Considering four main central bank functions for methodological analyses, namely: 
the central bank as government's banker, the oversight of the national financial 
system, ensuring price stability, and its role as manager of the money supply, this 
study concludes that Banco de Moçambique was originally a central bank with 
commercial bank functions and evolved into specialised central bank, acquiring other 
central bank-related functions, in the period under review (1975-2010).  
Historically central banks originated when existing financial systems realised the 
need for a regulator that could address and solve potential banking problems that 
could arise due to economic and social crisis.The old European central banks were 
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established in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries and had evolved from 
commercial banks. These central banks obtained the sole right to issue currency,to 
quell financial crisis, and to relieve the scarcity of means of payment when 
industrialisation took off. The first central bank was the Bank of England in 1694, 
which was the first bank to systematise a code of central banking, it is also the 
reason why the Bank of England is considered the first central bank worldwide, even 
though the Bank of Sweden, started in 1658 and became a state bank in 1668.  
In the old traditional concept a central bank only emerges in a market with capital 
and monetary market operational. The International Financial Conference held in 
Brussels in 1920, passed a resolution that brought up a new model of a central bank, 
when countries that had no central bank of issue were urged to establish one. From 
1921 several countries established their central banks, with no transplant of the 
classical central bank model but trying to adapt the structures and objectives to the 
concrete needs of their economies. Central banks arose in the Developing Countries 
of Central and South America in the years after the great depression, and profit from 
the experience of earlier central banks but were aware of the differences between 
the economic environment and that they emerged for currency stabilization and to 
prevent inflation in most cases with an incipient or without money and capital market. 
A modern concept arose from the mid-1950ˈs with emerging countries of Africa and 
South East Asia, which achieved political independence from colonial rule or 
protectorates. The prevailing economic and social differences that distinguish one 
country from another influenced the formulation of the central banking policies albeit 
having the same basic characteristics. They established central banks which were 
institutions that had to regulate an existing financial system while encouraging the 
development of an indigenous monetary and capital market. These new central 
banks replaced colonial institutions, but aligned the financial systems to serve the 
interests of the newly independent countries.  
Banco de Moçambique (“the ″Bank″) was the successor of Banco Nacional 
Ultramarino which had been set up in 1864 as the issuer for Portugal’s colonies, and 
to develop a colonial monetary market in the colonies that lacked a financial system. 
By this time Portugal itself had a central bank, the Banco de Portugal.  
Other Portuguese commercial banks arrived in the 1960s thanks to the colonial 
liberalisation policy. Portuguese capital and foreign-owned industrial oligarchies 
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promoted capital and industrial investments in the colonies, and this activity on the 
other hand consolidated Banco Nacional Ultramarino as a reserve bank and as a 
leading commercial bank. On independence, all those activities and functions were 
deemed incompatible with the new nation’s national interests. This meant that Banco 
Nacional Ultramarino had to cease operations and was replaced by Banco de 
Moçambique in 1975. 
Thus the Bank inherited Banco Nacional Ultramarino’s primary mandate of being the 
issuer and manager of the national payments system. The Bank had to introduce 
new policies and procedures for a new nation. These functions were aligned with the 
Basu theory, which states that the new generation of central banks has to be 
prepared to assume the conventional functions and challenges for which they are 
created.  
There is still a controversy as to whether the central bank main function in the 
beginning was its monopoly right of issuing banknotes, or whether its role was that of 
lender of last resort. At the same authors such as M. de Kock and Basu assume that 
central banks played an important role in the development of the respective 
countries’ financial systems as currency issuer; banker of banks; government 
banker; custodian and manager of foreign exchange; bank of rediscount and settler 
of clearance balances between banks; lender of last resort; and credit policy 
manager.  
M.de Kock concludes that these functions were generally performed by the old 
banks while the newer ones were only entrusted to perform some of these functions.  
After a 10-year struggle to throw off Portuguese colonial rule, Mozambique became 
independent on 25 June 1975. Banco Nacional Ultramarino (with headquarters in 
Lisbon) performed central bank functions not only in Mozambique, but also in 
Angola, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe and Cabo Verde). As such, this bank 
was the sole issuer of the escudo (the then circulating currency),was the banker of 
banks, government banker, monetary and credit policy manager, a reserve bank, 
while also carrying on business as a commercial bank.  
The creation of central banks in the wake of the new countries’ independence was 
supposedly in alignment with the International Financial Conference in Brussels in 
1920, and the Genoa Conference in 1922, to ensure economic restoration and 
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stability in their monetary and financial systems, and as a step towards joining the 
global financial market. Those interviewed for this dissertation all agreed that, prior to 
independence, the freedom fighters realised that a central bank would be necessary 
as soon as Mozambique became independent. To them it was a matter of economic 
sovereignty and economic and financial liberation. They also felt that it would be 
impossible to rule Mozambique without control of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino. 
The Bank was seen as a tool to promote rapid economic growth and development. 
One of its perceived functions was to counter attempts at financial sabotage and to 
protect the country from the risk of sabotage and economic deprivation in the form of 
an uncontrolled repatriation of capital as practiced by the expatriate banks. It was 
also expected to play its part in averting an economic collapse during the critical 
transition period. The Bank’s first Organic Law set out its main function as ensuring 
the stability of the country’s internal monetary system.  
The period 1975-77 saw the creation of a national bank that also performed most 
commercial bank functions and services amidst a strong community of expatriate 
bank branches. When Mozambique became independent in 1975 and a central bank 
had to be established, the economy was exhausted due to the war and the transition 
crisis. FRELIMO’s socialist development policy, in a region that was still largely 
hostile towards the new country as well as negative perceptions by Western 
governments led many Mozambicans to contemplate changing direction and steering 
the country towards a market economy. 
Although Mozambique was first colonised by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century, 
roughly two-thirds of Mozambique were ceded to chartered companies which were 
linked to British, French and German capital interests as Portugal itself was too weak 
economically to undertake the administration and control of those areas. 
Mozambique is a predominantly agrarian country. In 1900 it had a population of 
about 3-million people, the majority of which lived in rural areas. A number of people 
had moved to the towns to avail themselves of urban facilities. 
Apart from its links to foreign capital interests and to Portugal’s backward economy, 
Mozambique was closely linked to other southern African economies through its 
migrant labour system. These were Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Nyasaland and 
the Island of Sao Tomé, but particularly South Africa, where Mozambicans worked 
on the mines, on farms, in transport and harbour services, and elsewhere. The 
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migrants’ wages, when these were brought back home, constituted an important 
source of external revenue for Portugal, and were used to help finance the colony's 
development. 
Portugal used coercive method to exploitation such as forced labour (chibalo), hut 
tax and mussoco (labour tax) to increase production levels. 
The coup d'etat in Portugal on 28 May 1928 brought Dr Oliveira Salazar to power. 
His party espoused “economic and political nationalism” as defined in the 1930 
Colonial Act. It bound the colonies closer to Portugal, which exerted a more direct 
colonial management style on what was henceforth known as the Portuguese 
Colonial Empire. Portugal took over direct control of all its areas in Mozambique that 
had been controlled by chartered companies. Particularly from the 1960s, Lisbon 
embarked on an immigration policy to strengthen the Portuguese settler communities 
in the colonies. This led to the introduction of segregation policies in urban areas, to 
job reservation for technically skilled white workers, while the education system 
aimed to subordinate the “natives” to the white settlers. Only a small number of 
Africans, the assimilados were permitted access to some of the privileges reserved 
for the white people. The growth of the settler population called for increased food 
production, thereby simulating the small agro-industry, while industries such as 
transport, tourism and trade also received a boost. These economic activities in turn 
benefited the banking sector.  
On the other hand the "economic nationalism” policy consolidated the control of the 
Mozambican economy by some powerful groups including Entreposto Group, 
Monteiro e Giro, Champalimaud , Companhia Uniao Fabril- CUF and Joao Ferreira 
dos Santos. Some of them provided the capital to enable Portuguese commercial 
banks to open branches in the colony from 1965. This was made possible by the 
liberalisation policy (Decree-Law 46.312 of 28 April 1965) that in the banking system 
was consolidated by the Decree-law 45296 of 08, October 1963.  
From 1966 Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor was established, belonged to the 
Champalimaud Group. The Banco Standard Totta de Mocambique, a successor of 
Standard Bank, was established in 1966 as a joint venture with 37per cent of its 
capital coming from Companhia Uniao Fabril; 5 per cent from Anglo-American, 35per 
cent from Standard Bank and 15per cent from resident Portuguese settlers. The 
Banco Comercial de Angola was established in 1971, Banco Portugês do Atlantico 
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held 40per cent and Barclays Bank held 60per cent. In addition, Banco de Crédito 
Comercial e Industrial, established in 1965, belonged to Banco Borges e Irmão. 
Casa Bancaria in Beira was set up with Portuguese settler capital. Three state 
banks, the Caixa Económica do Montepio de Moçambique, Instituto de Crédito de 
Moçambique and Banco de Fomento, were established in 1970 and 1971. Despite 
the proliferation of commercial banks from the 1960s onwards, Banco Nacional 
Ultramarino was the main investor in the Mozambican economy, with interests 
ranging from the sugar industry to the insurance sector. 
The social stratification and segregationist colonial policy that was implemented from 
the 1960s stirred a growing indigenous opposition to Portuguese rule. This erupted 
into a guerrilla war from 1964 to 1974 with the aim of achieving total liberation. On 7 
September 1974 a ceasefire agreement was signed, of which Clause 16 provided for 
the closing down of Banco Nacional Ultramarino and the creation of the Banco de 
Moçambique, a central bank that was also an issuing bank. Mozambique became 
independent on 25 June 1975. Throughout the 1970s due to the war and to the 
international oil crisis Mozambique was in a dire economic recession with high 
inflation.  
The new central bank began operations in an unfavourable economic climate. On 
the one hand, Portugal had nationalised the issuing banks: Banco de Portugal, 
Banco de Angola and Banco Nacional Ultramarino in August 1974, followed by the 
nationalization of the commercial banks in March 1975, to protect the Portuguese 
economy in face of the 25 April Revolution and decolonization.  
The nationalists discussed the role of Banco Nacional Ultramarino in the economy 
and Oscar Monteiro proposed the terms and conditions for the creation of a central 
bank, to be enshrined in the Lusaka Accord of 7 September 1974 (as the clause 
16).The agreement provided the basis for the transfer of power from Portugal to 
Mozambique, the provision for a new constitution, and the establishment of a central 
bank who role and functions were established by Organic Law no. 2/75 of 17 May 
1975. This day marks the establishment of the central bank. 
Immediately after signing the agreement with the Portuguese delegation in Lusaka, 
Samora Machel, the President of FRELIMO, established a number of working groups 
led by Joaquim Chissano (who had been tasked with transferring power to 
FRELIMO). Chissano became Prime Minister of the transitional government which 
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Joaquim de Carvalho chaired the steering committee on economic and financial 
issues. He co-ordinated the Joint Economic Commission that discussed and decided 
on the transfer of Banco Nacional Ultramarino’s assets and liabilities. Alberto 
Cassimo and Carlos Adrião Rodrigues, both members of the steering committee for 
economic and financial affairs, were nominated as the first Governor and Deputy 
Governor of Banco de Mocambique on 21 May, 1975, respectively. Cassimo 
occupied his post until 22 April 1978, when he was designated Minister of Labour. 
Rodrigues, graduated in Law was a member of Mozambique Democratic Group. He 
resigned from the position of deputy-governor and went back to Portugal in 1977. 
Before the creation of the central bank there was an unsuccessful attempt to 
introduce the national currency, the metica. At that time it was considered one of the 
symbols of sovereignty. However, after the London-based company, Thomas de la 
Rue, had produced the money, Samora Machel, then President of FRELIMO, did not 
approve of it being sent into circulation. 
There were several well-documented cases of economic sabotage which adversely 
affected a significant number of companies, apart from capital being repatriated 
through the connivance of members of the financial system. Decree-Law 16/75 was 
enacted to stop these activities. This law also enabled administrative councils to 
intervene in the case of abandoned or sabotaged companies and to take over their 
management. To counter the flight of capital, the Bank took control over all external 
transactions from 5 November 1975. 
The socialist model of development was reinforced by FRELIMO’s Third Congress in 
February 1977, when Marxism-Leninism was proclaimed as the political option for 
Mozambique while deciding on socialism as the development strategy within the 
context of a planned economy. Banco de Moçambique was defined as a state tool 
for exercising overall economic control, and the restructuring and integration of 
commercial banks into the Bank in 1977-1978, which according to some authors 
consisted of nationalization of banks, fell within the framework of the state control of 
the key economic sectors. The Bank had to provide the monetary resources as 
outlined in the Central State Plan to ensure the continuation of production and 
employment. The National Planning Commission, which co-ordinate the Central 
State Plan, was created by Decree-Law 33/78 of 8 May 1978.  
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Through Decree-Law 5/77 of 31 December 1977, the expatriate banks which had 
been operating in Mozambique from the 1960s had to cease their activities. These 
banks were: Casa Bancária de Moçambique, Banco de Credito Comercial e 
Industria, and Banco Comercial de Angola. All their assets and liabilities were turned 
over to the Banco de Moçambique. The Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor and Banco de 
Fomento Nacional (with headquarters in Lisbon) were dissolved and were wound 
down within a year.  
Decree-Law 6/77 of 31 December 1977 created the Banco Popular de 
Desenvolvimento – a merger of the Instituto de Crédito de Moçambique and Caixa 
Económica Montepio de Moçambique. Only one commercial bank, Banco Standard 
Totta de Moçambique, was not included in this reform process, and remained a 
private business. 
The two laws mentioned above were the basis on which the State banking system 
was created in 1978, with Banco de Moçambique at its apex. Its commercial 
functions were expanded. From November 1977 it undertook all of the offshore 
banking transactions (this monopoly was scrapped in April 1989); 80per cent of 
credit market transactions (from 1987 the central bank began to arbitrate annual 
credit limits for the financial system); and finally, it held 90per cent of the deposits of 
the large State companies. 
The central bank had to extend credit to the gigantic State sector (that emerged from 
the enterprises that had been abandoned by the Portuguese settlers who returned to 
Portugal), often without a guaranteed return. The Banco Popular de 
Desenvolvimento had to finance State infrastructure, agriculture and industry 
according to the State Central Plan.  
FRELIMO party cells were formed which had the task of organising workers and 
production, and to foster patriotic behaviour in public life, for example in economic 
enterprises, in residential areas, and in schools and hospitals. A party cell was 
established in the central bank on 28 December 1978 at a general meeting of 
employees.  
The second Governor of the Banco de Moçambique was Sergio Vieira (his term was 
from 1978-1981). He was tasked with resuming the mandate to introduce 
Mozambique’s new currency, the metical, on 16 June 1980 in terms of Decree-Law 
2/80. This project was supported by the Democratic Republic of Germany (East 
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Germany) and ran from 16 to 19 of June 1980. From then onwards Banco de 
Moçambique began to exercise one of its chief functions as a central bank, namely 
as the sole issuer of the metical, the national currency. Sergio Vieira was a full 
member of the Cabinet of Ministers. As such, he could not claim to be free from 
political interference in the running of the Bank. Vieira's first action was to exchange 
the Portuguese citizens on the board for local nationals. He created a disciplinary 
board and introduced a dress code which is still in place today. It was during his time 
that in his mandate that the national currency was introduced. Sergio Vieira launched 
a program of vocational training while also promoting self-development. 
The central bank desired that foreign technical assistance should be made use of for 
a short period so as to pass on know-how to the staff. In addition, while promoting 
institutional and specialised training, the Bank encouraged initiatives for academic 
learning.  
Prakash Ratilal succeeded Sergio Vieira as the third central bank Governor in 1981. 
In 1986 Eneas da Conceição Comiche took over, and from 1991 Adriano Afonso 
Maleiane was appointed as the fifth Governor, occupying the post for three 
mandates until 2006 when Ernesto Gouveia Gove, was designated Governor. To 
reinforce the board of directors, António Pinto de Abreu was nominated Deputy-
Governor on 9 December 2010.  
Until the early 1980s, Mozambique was subject to a socialist development model. 
The aim was to halt the increasing decline in production and output, and to launch a 
new, revolutionary economic and social order. However, the new country had to face 
adverse regional and international circumstances such as having to implement 
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia; supporting both the African National Congress 
(ANC) regarding South Africa and the Zimbabwean liberation movements. These 
objectives virtually choked off Mozambique’s primary sources of badly needed 
foreign exchange earnings. Even worse, it placed the country in the centre of the 
regional conflict. South Africa reduced the numbers of Mozambican miners and in 
1978 stopped the deferred payments in gold to the Bank, a system which had been 
in operation since the 1928 migrant labour agreement. Furthermore, the foreign 
revenue earnings that Mozambique derived in respect of transport services (railways 
and harbours) from Zimbabwe and South Africa were also reduced. Besides, 
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Mozambique was suffering from a severe drought which alternated with extensive 
flooding. Successive international oil crisis also harmed its economy.  
Thanks to patriotic fervour and mobilisation of the people, the economic performance 
improved between 1975 and 1981, but weakened again in 1982, partly because of 
the war. Agriculture was defined as being the ″base of development ″ and the State 
injected funds for mechanisation with tractors, combine harvesters and other 
machinery made available. Industry was considered the ″dynamising sector″ but the 
available machinery was obsolete. State funds were provided for capital investment 
in terms of priorities as set out in the State Central Plan, but since these funds were 
derived from domestic and external credits, this system of financing soon proved to 
be highly unsatisfactory given the paucity of the new country’s resources.  
Banco de Moçambique aligned its policies and actions to correspond with the State’s 
economic policy and objectives. Thus, from 1974 to 1988 monetary policy was run 
on an administratively fixed basis characterised by a rigid exchange and interest rate 
regime. Administrative fluctuating currency control brought real devaluation, although 
an apparent stability, and serious financial economic imbalances in the face of prices 
contraction.  
FRELIMO’s Fourth Congress in 1983 made a reappraisal of the guidelines as laid 
down by the Third Congress. It decided on new guidelines strategies to revive the 
stagnating economy. It was decided that the private sector could and should play a 
role in the economy, and that the burgeoning State sector ought to be downsized. 
These insights paved the way for economic reforms. Thus the socialist experiment in 
Mozambique lasted some 10 years. 
 With its adherence to the IMF institutions, Mozambique in 1984 began to embrace a 
new development model, based on the market economy. In 1987 the govern 
Introduced the Economic Rehabilitation Programme. The central bank adopted a 
less restrictive monetary policy, introducing gradual reforms from 1989. These 
included resuming the credit control function as opposed to the State Central Plan 
allocations, and introducing flexible exchange and interest rates. From 4 March 1987 
to 1990 the central bank began calculating daily exchange rates (in contrast to the 
procedure from the start of independence when the Mozambican escudo was linked 
to the Portuguese escudo) setting up for the first time a flexible and realistic 
exchange rate, and, inter alia, to liberalise the foreign trade, until the unification of 
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the secondary market with the official market exchange rates in April 1992. Between 
1989 and March 1992, interest rate adjustments were made, aiming at reducing 
market distortions and to achieve positive rates. The benchmark of total deregulation 
was reached in May 1994. The liberalisation of interest and exchange rates enabled 
a transition to take place from direct to indirect monetary policy instruments. It 
improved liquidity control with reduced operations out of the official market, and 
opened the foreign exchange market to more operators. Credit to the private sector 
increased from 1987 to 1992 in contrast to credit to State companies which was 
diminishing. The volume of credit was high and the inflation rate stood at around 
three digits 
Banco de Moçambique gradually consolidated its central bank functions via 
institutional, legislative, monetary and credit policy reforms. Some of central bank 
institutional reforms were that the Legal Department added the drafting of bank 
legislation to its competencies and the creation of Banco de Moçambique’s 
Department of Economic Research and Statistics in 1989. This department began 
producing research papers and statistical analyses for the Bank; and provided 
professional advice to the board in respect of monetary and exchange policies. This 
unit played an important role in assisting the Bank with organising, negotiating and 
implementing the IMF programme. It also furnished the Bank with analytical and 
technical advice to facilitate its role as advisor to government. The Bank also 
encouraged technical and scientific research, publishing essays. This publishing 
activity was consistent with the creation of the central bank’s Documentation and 
Information Centre.″ For transparency and accountability the bank consolidated the 
production and publishing of periodicals containing analyses and statistical 
information such as the Annual Report, Statistical Bulletin and the Preços e 
Conjuntura Financeira. The central bank was assigned to produce and disseminate 
the national balance of payment statistics. Furthermore, in March 2003 Mozambique 
joined the IMF General Data Dissemination System for producing macroeconomic 
data. In 1987 a new organic structure was approved by the board in order to 
separate the Bank’s commercial function from its central bank function. This started 
a process that ended in 1992 when the definitive separation of the two sections took 
place. 
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In June 1994 the Monetary Policy Technical Committee was created. It consisted of 
senior technical staff from both the central bank and the Ministry of Finance to 
analyse the issues that had been agreed with the IMF and how they should be 
implemented.  
In February 1997, the Monetary and Exchange Policy Committee was created, as a 
result of financial system evolution and the central bank itself. It had to evaluate and 
co-ordinate monetary and foreign exchange operations, while also integrating 
monetary and exchange rate policies for better liquidity control. 
An improvement in monetary policy and a new definition of its medium and long-term 
objectives; a new analytical framework for monetary policy; definition of strategic 
framework, new internal and external communication strategies, led the central bank 
to create the Monetary Policy Committee in October 2007. From then onwards a 
one-day monetary policy meeting was held monthly to promote transparency and 
accountability. A press release, posted on the Bank’s website, was released after 
each meeting. 
From 2000 successive organic structural changes were made to align the central 
bank to SADC's central banks structure. Before the creation of Supervision 
Department in 1991, the Bank’s oversight functions in respect of the financial system 
were insignificant due to the Bank’s dual characteristic and its role in the planned 
economy. Its efficiency could be evaluated by the central bank decision to wound 
down Credicoop, because of systematic failure of prudential standards and the 
supervision act which led to the privatization of the Banco Popular de 
Desenvolvimento .  
From 1989 the central bank began to implement an IT project for business 
automation. In 1988/9, there were concerns about possible IT problems due to the 
arrival of the new millennium – a problem that was, what was designated Y2K 2000. 
To address it and to develop a consistent reengineering program of business 
automation the central bank introduced an integrated program, the Computer 
System Re-engineering Project, with a Directive Plan on the Information Technology 
System.  
As a part of the Economic and Social Rehabilitation Program, the financial system 
conceived, in 1990, "the Guidelines for Financial Reforms", that was an umbrella of a 
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series of reforms of which the main one was the separation of the commercial from 
the central bank functions and the restructuring of the Banco Popular de 
Desenvolvimento for further privatization.  
The reforms of 1984 to 1992 were consolidated up to 2010. This was when the Bank 
progressed towards more effective central banking functions. Institutional, legislative 
and policy reforms were passed to enable the Bank to improve its performance. At 
the end of this period the Bank was represented in all main business centres and 
had a presence in eight of the 10 provinces.  
The creation of the Interbank Monetary Market and the Interbank Foreign Exchange 
Market in 1996 and 1997 made it possible for the central bank to conduct business 
within an indirect instruments management framework.  
To strengthen the market the central bank created the Central Risk Centre in 1996 to 
co-ordinate information about credit risk in the whole system. In the following year 
Monetary Authority Bonds were created, and in 1998 Mozambique's stock exchange 
began trading. All these developments revealed an expanding national financial 
market and innovative new products. Decree-Law 15/99 was approved to update the 
rules and regulations for the creation and operation of credit institutions.  
In 1999 the Bank’s head office building was upgraded and the old furniture was 
replaced to provide bank staff with a healthier and more modern working 
environment. 
A Human Resources Management System that matched staff remuneration to staff 
performance was introduced in 2005. In December 2008 it was upgraded with the 
addition of a conceptual model of competences to improve management in areas 
such as recruitment and selection, training, career development and staff 
performance evaluation. To help guide staff behaviour, the Bank distributed its vision 
and mission statement. In doing so the Bank’s institutional cultural values were 
incorporated in the acronym TEACHA which, translated, stands for transparency, 
involvement, self-development, assiduity, competence, honesty and diligence.  
Before Decree-Law 9/2004 was promulgated, the authorisation and revocation of the 
constitutions of credit institutions resorted under the Cabinet of Ministers. From 
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2005, under the new law, this authority was exercised by the central bank, and a 
spate of new credit institutions and financial corporation’s made their appearance. 
Although the Bank has to date still not succeeded in offering its services and facilities 
to all parts of the sprawling country, the modernisation and expansion of the financial 
system (with IT support) has made mobile banking and mobile telephone banking 
available to existing and potential new customers who could not be reached 
previously.  
As a result of reforms during the period from 1992 to 2010, Mozambique garnered 
the trust of foreign donors, and gained access to a fourth, fifth and sixth IDA credit 
for reconstruction. It could also sign the third and fourth ESAF (Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility) of the IMF. In these instances the central bank as government 
advisor gave valuable support.  
In 2006, thanks the increasing modernisation of the national payment system and 
the prevailing economic stability, the central bank proceeded with the currency 
reform, reducing a 3 digit calculation to the single digit "Metical".  
In 2010, because of the reduced supply of agricultural products and the continuing 
international financial crisis, Mozambique registered a higher inflation rate than in 
any of the preceding five years. The balance of payments deteriorated. The central 
bank decided to increase the “sell” volume on the interbank exchange market as a 
mechanism of liquidity sterilization, to reduce the inflation rate. 
The financial system reforms were beneficial in that they led to a greater scrutiny 
thanks to improved supervision and the transition from direct instruments of 
monetary policy management to the modern indirect instruments. The reforms also 
led to a greater consolidation of Banco de Moçambique’s expertise as a central bank 
through extensive structural and policy reforms. All this culminated in improved, 
modern banking services to the country. 
After emerging as a central and commercial bank – with more commercial than 
central bank functions as a result of having taken over the colonial Banco Nacional 
Ultramarino –the Banco de Moçambique became the country’s first national bank. It 
gradually evolved into a recognisable and respected African central bank, and this 
status became fully effective from 1992. This landmark achievement occurred within 
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the context of fundamental shifts in the young country’s political, economic and 
social conditions. A contributory factor was the fact that the Bank was finally able to 
take its rightful place in the southern African region, while also playing an important 
role in the international financial arena. 
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Biographies of central Bank Governors: Banco de Moҁambique 
Governors and Deputy Governor 
 ― Alberto Francisco Cassimo  
Was born on the 28th of August, 1944, in Quelimane, province of Zambézia .  
After studying at Quelimane’s Primary School and Industrial and Commercial School, 
he joined Frelimo in September, 1964 and was connected with the radio programme 
″ A Voz da Frelimo″. 
From 1965 to 1971 he studied and graduated as a licentiate in Economics at the 
Lomonossov, Moscow State University. In 1973 he was appointed as a member of 
Frelimo’s Executive Committe and information and Propaganda Deputy Secretary 
and, in the same year, he was appointed Frelimo’s Treasury and Finance 
Department Secretary until 1977. In August, 1977, he was elected as a member of 
the Central Committee of the Frelimo Party at Frelimo’s III Congress. Between the 
21st of May, 1975 and 22nd of April, 1978, he held the position of Governor of the 
Bank of Mozambique. From 1978 until the time of his death, he held the past of 
Minister of Labour.  
― Carlos Adrião Rodrigues 
Was born in Lisbon on 2 June 1929 where he concluded the elementary school. In 
1945 he came to Mozambique to meet his parents. In Lourenço Marques (today 
known as Maputo) he completed the high school and returned to Lisbon to graduate 
in Law. He then came back to Mozambique Democrat Group .In the 1960s he held, 
for several times, the position of president of the Mozambique Cineclub and director 
of the magazine Objectiva 60, an organ of this instituition. He was also a member of 
the Administrative Commission of Rádio Clube de Moçambique. In 1975, he was 
appointed Deputy-Governor of Banco de Moçambique by then President Samora 
Machel, a position he hold until 1978.  
 
― Sergio Vieira 
Was born on May 4, 1941, in Tete, He concluded the high school in 1959. From 
1959 to 1961 he attended the Faculty of Law at the University of Lisbon but he was 
then forced to interrupt his studies and abandon Portugal, in 1962 he was accepted 
in the Faculty of Law at the University of Paris and the institute of Political Studies in 
Paris.  
Once again he interrupted his studies because of the need to fight for independence. 
In 1967, he graduated in Political Sciences at the Univerisity of Algeria. From 1967-
1969, he was the Secretary in the mandate of the President Eduardo Mondlane, and 
from 1970 to 1975, he held the same position under the President Samora Machel. 
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From 1975 to 1977, he was the Office Director of the President Samora Machel and 
then Governor of the Banco de Moçambique (1978-1981). After leaving the Bank, he 
held various government positions namely; Minister of Agriculture (1981 - 1983); 
Governor of the Province of Niassa; Deputy Defence Minister ( 1983―1984); 
Security Minister (1984―1987) and academic position namely; Invistigator and 
Director of the Centre for African Studies (1987-1992) at Universidade Eduardo 
Mondlane. He was a member of the National Parliament from the 1st to the 5th 
Legislature, where he held several important positions in various Labour 
Commissions. He was also the Director General of the Zambeze Development 
Planning Office and is the founding member of the Mozambican writers’ Association.  
― Prakash Ratital 
Was born on March 26, 1950 in Manhiça, province of Maputo. He graduated in 
Economics from ISCEF - Institute of Economic and Finance Sciences of Lisbon in 
1974. From 1975 to 1977, he was the Chairman of Mozambique Montepio and its 
Savings Bank. From 1977 to 1979, he was the General Director of the Mozambique 
Insurance Company, and during the period 1978 and 1980 he was the Deputy 
Governor of the Banco de Moçambique and member of the Council of Minister. After 
leaving the Bank, he held governmental and academic positions, and is currently 
working in the private sector where he is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of 
MozaBanco. He published numerous books and collaborated in edition of 
periodicals. He worked as a consultant to UNICEF in the framework of the 
emergency program in Angola. He was a member of the Constituent Assembly in 
Mozambique and Member of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd People’s Assembly. He is a 
member of AMECOM - Mozambican Association of Economist.  
― Eneas da Conceição Comiche 
Was born on June 28, 1939, in Moma, Nampula province.  
He concluded his primary schooling in 1951 and his studies at the Commercial 
School in Maputo, in 1957. In 1959, he completed the Commercial Institute in 
Lisbon. He graduated in Economics at the Faculty of Economics from the University 
of Porto, in 1969.  
From 1964 to 1970, he worked at the firm Armazéns Soares Carreia in Vila Nova de 
Gaia, in Portugal, as head of the administrative office, becoming an assistant lecturer 
at the Faculty of Economics in Lourenço Marques University (1970- 1977). From 
1970 to 1971, he was a technician at the Mozasmbican Credit Instatute, having 
becoming the Director of the Institute from 1974 to 1975 and later the Chairman of 
the Board os Directors (1975-1977). He was the Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento from 1978 to 1986, Vice - Minister for 
Finance, 1984 to 1986 and Governor of Banco de Moçambique (1986-1991). After 
leaving the Central Bank, he was the Minister of Finance from 1991 to 1994. 
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Between 2003 and 2008 he occupied the position of Mayor of Maputo City, and 
currently he is a member at the national Parliament.   
― Adriano Afonso Maleiane 
Was born on November 6, 1949, in Matola, Maputo province, Mr Maleiane began his 
banking career in 1973, at the Casa Bancária de Moçambique (Mozambique 
Banking House), moving afterwards to the Banco Commercial de Angola ( Angola’s 
Commercial Bank ), in 1974. In 1977, in the context of the Bank restructuring, he 
was transferred to the Banco de Moҁambique where he occupied several positions 
with highlights to: Head of Imports and Exports Sector; Manager of Credit and 
Transportation, Director, Deputy Governor, and finally, in 1991, Governor until his 
retirement in 2006.  
By President Decree , in 1983 , he was appointed to the Empresa Estatal Citrinos 
the Maputo ( Citrus State Company of Maputo ), and a year later he was appointed 
National Director of Agricultural Economy, in the Ministry of Agriculture , until 1986 
when he resumed his banking career at the Banco de Moçambique .  
As Governor of the Banco de Moçambique, he led the transformation process of the 
Bank which until 1991, was also functioning as a commercial bank, to exclusively 
assume Central Bank functions. He participated in the negotiation of the foreign debt 
under the Paris and London Club, and in the process leading to the selection of 
Mozambique as a beneficiary of the debt reduction program (HIPC) and, 
subsequently, the writing off of a significant part of Mozambique’s debt. After leaving 
the Bank, he was the non-executive chairman of VISABEIRA group. He also held the 
position of Banco Nacional de Investimento Chairman of the Executive Committee, 
and is currently the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance.  
― Ernesto Gouveia Gove 
Was admitted at the Central Bank in 1976, and has taken various positions in 
different departments, namely Foreign, Issuing and Treasury, Credit and the 
Documentation Centre. He was Director for Foreign Currency, Issuing and Treasury 
Operations before being appointed Executive Director and Board member in 1991.  
Dr Gove graduated in economics by Eduardo Mondlane University in 1989, and 
obtained a master’s degree in financial economics from the University of London in 
1998. He took a number of Training courses of the IMF and World Bank Institutes 
and in the Swiss Central Bank Institute in Berne, and he has participated in various 
seminars.  
Dr Gove took part in Mozambique’s financial sector reforms in coordination with the 
World Bank team that produced the Report on the Financial Sector in Mozambique 
in 1992.  
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He led the technical teams that prepared the technical proposals justifying the 
separation of commercial functions from those of Central Bank and legislation that 
resulted in the creation of Banco Comercial de Moçambique. Following the adoption 
of the Law 1/92 of 3 January, Dr Gove led the process of establishing the Banking 
Supervision Department and organised the training of the first supervisors.  
In 1995 Dr Gove was appointed Deputy-Governor of the Banco de Moçambique . He 
chaired the Board of Directors of Sociedade de Noticias and the Board Fiscal 
Committee of Açucareira de Mafambisse (Mafambisse Sugar Company), and also 
lectured at Eduardo Mondlane University from 1990-1994.  
Dr Gove was nominated the Alternate Governor of the Islamic Development Bank, 
the international Monetary Fund and the World Bank. He was appointed Governor of 
the Banco de Moçambique on 25 July 2006.  
Dr Gove was born in 1957 .He is married and has four children.  
― Antonio Pinto De Abreu 
Antonio Pinto De Abreu, Was Born in 21 of March of 1965, in the former Vila Pery* 
today known as Chimoio, located in the Province of Manica. In 1977 he was part of 
the first group of Mozambicans students who went to Cuba. In 1982 he was admitted 
to the Banco de Moҁambique where he held different management and advisory 
positions being a member of the Board of Director since 1996. By reason of his 
competences, he participated in the negotiations of the country’s macroeconomic 
programs with the International Monetary Fund and with the World Bank Group 
Since 1990. He led the technical teams of Banco de Moҁambique on the structural 
reforms agreed upon with the World Bank from 2000 to 2004, as well as those from 
financial, monetary and exchange programs agreed upon with International 
Monetary Fund from 1995-2000 and 2005 to 2006. 
In 1989, he concluded with a Diploma of Merit, The Bachelor’s degree in Economic 
by the Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM). In 1998 he obtained, with distinction, 
the Master’s Degree in Financial Economy by the School of Oriental and African 
Studies *SOAS (in London) . As an university teacher, he developed some academic 
activities most of them in the Faculty of Economics of Universidade Eduardo 
Mondlane (UEM), the Higher Polytechnic and University Institute-ISPU, today known 
as ʺA Politecnicaʺ (Maputo and Quelimane) and at The Catholic University Of 
Mozambique (Beira). He has several works, either self-written works or in co-
authorship nationally and internationally, as well as lecturers. He currently occupies 
the position of Deputy-Governor of Banco de Moҁambique since December 2010 
and member of the Mozambican Association of Economists. As a poet and writer he 
is member of Mozambican Association of Writer. He is married and father of two 
children.  
 
